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Enhancing power grids’ performance and resilience has been one of the greatest challenges in
engineering and science over the past decade. A recent report by the National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine along with other studies emphasizes the necessity of
deploying new ideas and mathematical tools to address the challenges facing the power grids
now and in the future. To fulfil this necessity, numerous grid modernization programs have been
initiated in recent years.
This thesis focuses on one of the most critical challenges facing power grids which is their
vulnerability against failures and attacks. Our approach bridges concepts in power engineering
and computer science to improve power grids resilience and security. We analyze the vulnerability
of power grids to cyber and physical attacks and failures, design efficient monitoring schemes
for robust state estimation, develop algorithms to control the grid under tension, and introduce
methods to generate realistic power grid test cases. Our contributions can be divided into four
major parts:
Power Grid State Prediction: Large scale power outages in Australia (2016), Ukraine (2015),
Turkey (2015), India (2013), and the U.S. (2011, 2003) have demonstrated the vulnerability of
power grids to cyber and physical attacks and failures. Power grid outages have devastating
effects on almost every aspect of modern life as well as on interdependent systems. Despite their
inevitability, the effects of failures on power grids’ performance can be limited if the system
operator can predict and understand the consequences of an initial failure and can immediately
detect the problematic failures. To enable these capabilities, we study failures in power grids
using computational and analytical tools based on the DC power flow model. We introduce new
metrics to efficiently evaluate the severity of an initial failure and develop efficient algorithms
to predict its consequences. We further identify power grids’ vulnerabilities using these metrics
and algorithms.
Power Grid State Estimation: In order to obtain an accurate prediction of the subsequent
effects of an initial failure on the performance of the grid, the system operator needs to exactly
know when and where the initial failure has happened. However, due to lack of enough measu-
rement devices or a cyber attack on the grid, such information may not be available directly to
the grid operator via measurements. To address this problem, we develop efficient methods to
estimate the state of the grid and detect failures (if any) from partial available information.
Power Grid Control: Once an initial failure is detected, prediction methods can be used to
predict the subsequent effects of that failure. If the initial failure is causing a cascade of failures
in the grid, a control mechanism needs to be applied in order to mitigate its further effects.
Power Grid Islanding is an effective method to mitigate cascading failures. The challenge is to
partition the network into smaller connected components, called islands, so that each island can
operate independently for a short period of time. This is to prevent the system to be separated
into unbalanced parts due to cascading failures. To address this problem, we introduce and study
the Doubly Balanced Connected graph Partitioning (DBCP) problem and provide an efficient
algorithm to partition the power grid into two operating islands.
Power Grid Test Cases for Evaluation: In order to evaluate algorithms that are developed
for enhancing power grids resilience, one needs to study their performance on the real grid data.
However, due to security reasons, such data sets are not publicly available and are very hard to
obtain. Therefore, we study the structural properties of the U.S. Western Interconnection grid
(WI), and based on the results we present the Network Imitating Method Based on LEarning
(NIMBLE) for generating synthetic spatially embedded networks with similar properties to a
given grid. We apply NIMBLE to the WI and show that the generated network has similar
structural and spatial properties as well as the same level of robustness to cascading failures.
Overall, the results provided in this thesis advance power grids’ resilience and security by
providing a better understanding of the system and by developing efficient algorithms to protect
it at the time of failure.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Electric power systems are one of the most essential infrastructure systems in the modern world.
The National Academy of Engineering named Electrification as the greatest engineering achie-
vement of the 20th century [51]. Despite their importance, power systems are aging infrastruc-
ture that are under stress by operational uncertainties and are facing challenges never envisioned
when they were first developed.
Power systems consists of four main parts as depicted in Fig. 1.1:
• Generators: Convert energy from coal, natural gas, petroleum, nuclear energy, or rene-
wable resources into electricity,
• Transmission Network: High Voltage lines connecting generators to the distribution
system of a town, city, or a large industrial plant,
• Distribution Network: Provides electricity at various levels to residential, commercial,
and industrial consumers. It mostly have a loopless topology,
• Loads or consumers.
The main focus of this thesis is the transmission network of the power systems, or as we refer
to the power grid.
Enhancing power grids performance and resilience has been one of the greatest challenges
in engineering and science over the past decade. A recent report by the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine [106] along with other studies emphasizes the necessity of
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Figure 1.1: The main components of power systems.
deploying new ideas and mathematical tools to address the challenges facing the power grids
now and in the future. To fulfil this necessity, numerous grid modernization programs have
been initiated in recent years all over the world, including the one by the Department of Energy
(DOE) in the U.S.
The DOE envisions that by 2030, the grid will have evolved into an intelligent energy system,
a smart grid [106]. Some of the promises of the smart grid are:
• Self-healing from power disturbances
• Resilient operation against both cyber and physical attacks
• Utilizing all generation and energy storage technologies
• Enabling active participation of consumers
• Enabling new energy markets
This thesis focuses on the first two promises listed above which deal with power grids’
resilience and security. We study power grids’ resilience and security from different angles as
described in the following sections. Our approach bridges concepts in power engineering and
computer science to improve power grid performance and security. We analyze the vulnerability
of power grids to failures, design efficient monitoring schemes for robust state estimation, develop
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algorithms to control the grid under tension, and introduce methods to generate realistic power
grid test cases.
1.1 Power Flow
Today’s power grids deploy the Alternating Current (AC) based systems for power generation
and transmission. Electric power in these systems flows from generators to loads based on a set
of differential equations which depend on the structure of the network as well as the physical
properties of the lines. In the steady state (i.e., fixed frequency), phasors are commonly used
to compute the AC power flows using a set of nonlinear equations [76].
Under operating conditions, the AC power flow equations can be reduced to a set of linear
equations known as the DC power flow equations [76]. Due to their linearity, the DC power
flow equations are widely used for optimal power flow computation and contingency analysis in
power grids [39, 116, 147]. Most of the results provided in this thesis are also based on the DC
power flow equations.
In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of the AC and DC power flow equations and study the
accuracy of the DC power flows. In particular, in Section 2.4, we analytically derive an upper
bound on the difference between the AC and the DC power flows. Results provided in that
section appeared in [40].
1.2 Power Grid State Prediction
Large scale power outages in Australia (2016), Turkey (2015), India (2013), and the U.S. (2011,
2003) have demonstrated the vulnerability of power grids to failures caused by natural disasters,
such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and solar flares as well as mismanagement and computers
malfunctioning. Power grid outages have devastating effects on almost every aspect of modern
life as well as on interdependent systems such as telecommunications, gas, water supply, and
transportation networks. Follow up reports of these events [7, 8, 9, 12], exposed the insufficient
understanding of failures and their consequences in power grids.
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Therefore, there is a need to study the vulnerabilities of power grids to failures. The main
questions that we seek to answer in this part are:
• How an initial failure may result in a cascade of failures?
• How can one predict the evolution of cascading failures?
• What are the most vulnerable parts of the grid to failures?
To answer these questions, in Chapters 3 and 4, we study failures and cascades in power
grids using analytical methods.
Analyzing failures and cascades (Chapter 3): We study failures in power grids using com-
putational tools and the DC power flow model. Unlike graph-theoretical network flows, power
flows are governed by the laws of physics with no strict capacity bounds on the lines. Nonethe-
less, there is a rating threshold associated with each line–if the flow exceeds the threshold, the
line will eventually experience thermal failure. Such a failure alters network topology, giving rise
to a different flow pattern which could cause other line failures. The repetition of this process
constitutes a cascading failure.
The study of cascading failures in power grids was initiated in [39, 147] which used the
linearized DC model and a probabilistic outage rule for overloaded line failures. Similar cascade
models have been used to study the properties of the cascades [18, 19, 27, 44, 91], as well as to
design control schemes to mitigate the cascade [28, 110] and to detect vulnerable parts of the
grid [29, 83]. In Chapter 3, we follow [27, 29] and study cascades due to line overloads in power
grids with a deterministic outage rule.
First, based on the algebraic properties of the DC power flow equations, we analytically study
the impact of a single line failure on the flows on other lines. We illustrate the impact of the
distance on the flow increase in lines following a failure and show that unlike in epidemic based
models, a failure of a specific line in the grid can affect remote lines, so that the cascade does not
necessarily develop contiguously. Then, we introduce metrics to evaluate the robustness of grids
to failures, and develop an efficient algorithm to identify the evolution of cascading failures. We
compare the severity of the cascade initiated by line failures (selected under different metrics)
and proved that finding the set of lines whose removal has the most significant impact is NP-hard.
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Our results provides important insights on the consequence of line failures in power grids
and can support the development of algorithms for controlling the evolution of a cascade upon
failures as well as designing robust power grids.
Our results for this part appeared in [40,103,127,128,138].
Quantifying the effect of k-line failures (Chapter 4): Contingency analysis in power grids
is one of the most effective ways to improve grids’ resilience against failures. The main goal of
contingency analysis is to detect probable failures in the grid that result in a critical state and
deploy preventive measures to avoid such states.
Many great ideas have been developed for contingency analysis in power grids since the
advent of the modern power transmission network. Compensation theorem and current injection
methods were used to analyze the effect of line failures in [58, 59, 66, 92, 155]. In particular,
[155] introduced the notion of line outage distribution factors that inspired many other studies
including the work presented in Chapters 3 and 4. [144] used matrix updates to study the effect
of two line failures and used the results to introduce an algorithm for the N ´ 2 contingency
problem. In a follow up work [87], contingency and Influence graphs were introduced to study
N ´ 2 contingency analysis. More optimization-based techniques for contingency analysis of the
grids were explored in [30,47,63]. A mixed-integer model for the N´k contingency problem was
presented and used in [30], while [47] focused on identifying the most probable failure modes in
static load distribution using a linear-program. In a more recent innovative paper, probabilistic
algorithms were developed to identify collections of multiple contingencies that initiate cascading
failure [83].
Due to the large number of possibilities, however, high order contingency analysis is compu-
tationally expensive and not fully deployed. In order to circumvent this issue, we analytically
compute the redistribution of power flows following a k-line failure (i.e., failures in k distinct
lines) using the DC power flow model and based on that introduce the disturbance value of a
k-line failure. We show that this value can be efficiently computed in Op1q for any set of line
failures independently of the size of the grid and can be effectively used to filter out noncritical
contingencies. The disturbance value can therefore significantly reduce the time complexity of
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contingency analysis by revealing contingencies that are vital for more in depth analysis and
pave the way for the deployment of high order contingency analysis in power grids.
Our results for this part appeared in [125,136].
1.3 Power Grid State Estimation
In order to obtain an accurate prediction of the subsequent effects of an initial failure on the
performance of the grid, the system operator needs to exactly know when and where the initial
failure has happened. However, due to lack of enough measurement devices or a cyber attack
on the grid (e.g., cyber attack on the Ukrainian grid in December 2015 [13]), such information
may not be available directly to the grid operator via measurements. Therefore, this information
should be estimated from a partial available information. To address this problem, in Chapters 5
and 6, we study cyber-physical attacks on power grids.
Cyber-physical Attacks (DC Model) (Chapter 5): We study an attack where an adversary
attacks a zone by disconnecting some of its power lines (failed lines) remotely or through a
physical attack and blocking the information flow from the zone to the grid control center. We
assume that the state of the system is described under the DC power flow model. We use tools
from linear algebra and graph theory, and leverage the properties of the DC power flow model
to develop methods for information recovery. We prove that by solving a linear program (LP),
the failed lines can be detected and the grid’s state variables inside the attacked zone can be
recovered. We identify sufficient conditions on the zone structure and constraints on the attack
characteristics such that the solution to the LP is guaranteed to recover the information.
The considered problem is very similar to the problem of line failure detection using phase
angle measurements [73, 142, 143, 163]. Up to two line failures detection, under the DC power
flow model, is studied in [142, 143]. Since the provided methods in [142, 143] are greedy-based
methods that need to search the entire failure space, the running time of these methods grow
exponentially as the number of failures increases. Hence, these methods cannot be generalized
to detect higher order failures.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
The novelty of our method is the transformation of the line failures detection problem, which
is combinatorial in nature, to a convex optimization problem. As a result, our method can be
used to detect any set of line failures in a running time that is independent of the size of this
set and solely depends on the size of the network.
Our results for this part appeared in [129,132].
Cyber-physical Attacks (AC Model) (Chapter 6): We extend the results from Chapter 5
to the case when the state of the system is given under the AC power flow model. We present
the Convex OPtimization for Statistical State EStimation (COPSSES) Algorithm to detect the
failed lines inside the attacked area. The algorithm is based on a convex relaxation of the LP
presented in Chapter 5 for information recovery under the DC power flow model. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a method for line failures detection under the
AC power flow model that can be used to detect any number of line failures.
Our results for this part appeared in [137].
1.4 Power Grid Control
Once an initial failure is detected, the prediction methods mentioned in section 1.2 can be used
to predict the subsequent effects of that failure. If the initial failure is causing more subsequent
failures in the grid, a control mechanism needs to be applied in order to mitigate its further
effects.
One of the most effective of these mechanisms is Power Grid Islanding. The objective is to
partition the network into smaller connected components, called islands, so that each island can
operate independently for a short period of time. This is to prevent the system to be separated
into unbalanced parts due to subsequent failures. It also expedites the restoration of the grid
after a major failure, by reducing transient stability problems during system reconnection.
In order for an island to operate, it is necessary that the power supply and demand at that
island be almost equal (if the supply and demand are not exactly equal but still relatively close,
load shedding/generation curtailing can be used in order for the island to operate). Equality of
supply and demand in an island, however, may not be sufficient for its independent operation.
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It is also important that the infrastructure in that island have the physical capacity to safely
carry the power flows. This problem has been studied in the power systems community but
almost all the algorithms provided in the literature are heuristic methods that have been shown
to be effective only by simulations [71,107,121,139].
In order to provide a theoretical framework for power grid Islanding problem, in Chapter 7,
we model and study this problem using graph theory.
Power Grid Islanding (Chapter 7): We introduce and study the Doubly Balanced Connected
graph Partitioning (DBCP) problem. The DBCP problem is the problem of partitioning a graph
into two parts such that both parts are connected and comparable in size, and supply is almost
equal to demand in each part. The idea is that when an island is large enough compared to
the initial network, it most likely has enough capacity to carry power flows. In this way, the
partitions obtained from solutions to the DBCP problem are operational. We prove that if the
graph representing the grid is 2-connected (as it is usually the case), such a partition always
exists and can be found in polynomial time. Our method is geometric and used the convex
embedding of 3-connected graphs.
Our results for this part appeared in [130,131].
1.5 Power Grid Test Cases for Evalution
In order to evaluate algorithms that are developed for enhancing power grids resilience, one needs
to study their performance on the real grid data. However, due to security reasons, such data
sets are not publicly available and are very hard to obtain. There are only very limited test cases
and real-world power grid data sets that are publicly and freely available. These include the
IEEE test cases [1], the National Grid UK [2], the Polish grid [4], and an approximate model of
the European interconnected system [162]. To the best of our knowledge, among these, National
Grid UK is the only publicly available dataset with geographical locations. Even if the data was
available, it would be unwise to publish vulnerability results which are based on real topologies,
due to the enormous cost of grid enhancements. On the other hand, it was recently shown that
simple random graph models cannot be used to generate grids with appropriate structural and
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spatial characteristics [52]. Therefore, there is a growing interest in generating synthetic power
grids [11,33,34,75].
Generating Synthetic Power Grids (Chapter 8): We study the structural properties of
the U.S. Western Interconnection grid (WI), and based on the results we present the Network
Imitating Method Based on LEarning (NIMBLE) for generating synthetic spatially embedded
networks with similar properties to a given grid. We apply NIMBLE to the WI and show that
the generated network has similar structural and spatial properties as well as the same level of
robustness to cascading failures. NIMBLE uses the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) for node
density estimation and generates nodes with similar spatial distribution as the nodes in a given
network. Then, inspired by the historical evolution of the grids, NIMBLE connects the nodes.
This method has several tunable parameters that allow generation of grids similar to any given
grid.
Our results for this part appeared in [126,134,135].
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Chapter 2
Power Flow
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the AC and DC power flow equations as well as
some basic definitions and notations that are used in this thesis. Since the DC power flows
provide an approximation for the AC power flows, in Section 2.4, we study the accuracy of this
approximation by deriving an analytical upper bound on the difference between the AC and the
DC power flows.
2.1 Summary of Notations
We represent the power grid by a connected undirected graph G “ pV,Eq where V “ t1, 2, . . . , nu
and E “ te1, . . . , emu are the set of nodes and edges corresponding to the buses and transmission
lines, respectively. Each edge ek is a set of two nodes ek “ ti, ju.
Throughout this thesis, we use bold uppercase characters to denote matrices (e.g., A), italic
uppercase characters to denote sets (e.g., V ), and italic lowercase characters and overline arrow
to denote column vectors (e.g., ~θ). For a matrix Q, qij denotes its pi, jqth entry, and Qt denotes
its transpose. For a column vector ~y, yi denotes its i
th entry, }~y}1 :“ řni“1 |yi| is its `1-norm,
}~y}2 :“ přni“1 y2i q1{2 is its `2-norm (also known as Euclidean norm), and suppp~yq :“ ti|yi ‰ 0u
is its support which indicates the nonzero entries of vector ~y.
For a set V , |V | denotes it size; For a real number r, |r| denotes is absolute value; And for
a complex number c, |c| denotes its magnitude.
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2.2 The AC Power Flows
Today’s power grids deploy the Alternating Current (AC) based systems for power generation
and transmission. Electric power in these systems flows from generators to loads based on a set
of differential equations which depend on the structure of the network as well as the physical
properties of the lines. In the steady state (i.e., fixed frequency), phasors are commonly used
to compute the AC power flows using a set of nonlinear equations [76].
In the phasor domain, the status of each node i is represented by its voltage vi “ |vi|eiθi
in which |vi| is the voltage magnitude, θi is the phase angle at node i, and i denotes the
imaginary unit. The characteristics of each line ti, ju is determined by its admittance value
gij ` ibij “ 1rij`ixij , where gij , bij , rij , and xij denote line conductance, susceptance, resistance,
and reactance, respectively. The complex power flow sij on the line ti, ju from node i to j is
equal to:
sij “ vipvi˚ ´ vj˚ qpgij ` ibijq˚, (2.1)
where ˚ denotes the complex conjugation. The complex power sij “ pij ` iqij from node i to
node j consists of the active power flow pij “ Retsiju and reactive power flow qij “ Imtsiju.







vipvi˚ ´ vk˚qpgik ` ibikq˚, (2.2)
where Npiq is the set of nodes that are directly connected with a line to the node i.
Using 2.2, the equations for the active power pi and the reactive power qi at each node i can
be written as:
pi “ ´řkPNpiqYtiu |vi||vk|pgik cos θik ` bik sin θikq (2.3)
qi “ ´řkPNpiqYtiu |vi||vk|pgik sin θik ´ bik cos θikq (2.4)
where θik “ θi ´ θk, and gii ` ibii “ ´řkPNpiqpgik ` ibikq.
In the AC power flow problem, each node i is categorized into one of the following three
types:
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1. Slack node: The node for which the voltage is typically 1.0. For convenience, it is indexed
as node 1. The active power p1 and the reactive power q1 need to be computed.
2. Load node: The active power pi and the reactive power qi at these nodes are known and
the voltage vi needs to be computed.
3. Voltage controlled node: The active power pi and the voltage magnitude |vi| at these nodes
are known and the reactive power qi and the phase angle θi need to be computed.
The problem is to compute p, q, v at all the nodes.
2.3 The DC Power Flows
Under operating conditions, the AC power flow equations can be reduced to a set of linear
equations known as the DC power flow equations [76]. The DC power flow equations provide a
linearized approximation of the active power flows in the AC model. Due to their linearity, the
DC power flow equations are widely used for optimal power flow computation and contingency
analysis in power grids [39,116,147]. Linearization is possible under the following conditions [76]:
1. The difference between the voltage phase angles of every couple of neighboring nodes is
small such that sin θik « θik and cos θik « 1.
2. The active power losses are negligible, and therefore the admittance value of each line can
be calculated neglecting the line resistances by ´ibij “ 1{ixij .
3. The variations in the voltage magnitudes |vi| are small and, therefore, it is assumed that
@i, |vi| “ 1.
Under these assumptions, given the active power vector ~p P R|V |ˆ1 and the reactance values,
the DC power flow is a solution P P R|V |ˆ|V | and ~θ P R|V |ˆ1 of:
ÿ
jPNpiq
pij “ pi, @ i P V (2.5)
pij “ ´bijpθi ´ θjq, @ ti, ju P E (2.6)
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where pij is the active power flow from node i to node j, and θi is the phase angle of node i.
Eq. (2.5) guarantees (classical) flow conservation and (2.6) captures the dependency of the flow
on the reactance values and phase angles. Additionally, (2.6) implies that pij “ ´pji. When the
total supply equals the total demand in G (i.e.,
řn
i“1 pi “ 0), (2.5)-(2.6) has a unique solution.1
Eq.(2.5)-(2.6) are equivalent to the following matrix equation:
A~θ “ ~p (2.7)
where A P R|V |ˆ|V | is the admittance matrix of G,2 defined as follows:
aij “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
0 if i ‰ j and ti, ju R E,
bij if i ‰ j and ti, ju P E,
´řkPNpiq bik if i “ j.
Since A is not a full-rank matrix, we use the Moore-Penrose Pseudo-inverse of A [14], denoted
by A`3 to solve (2.7). One can show that if (2.7) has a feasible solution, ~θ “ A`~p is a solution
for (2.7). Once ~θ is computed, the power flows, pij , can be obtained from (2.6).
2.3.1 Incidence Matrix
Under an arbitrary direction assignment to the edges of G, the incidence matrix of G is denoted
by D P t´1, 0, 1unˆm and defined as,
dij “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
0 if ej is not incident to node i,
1 if ej is coming out of node i,
´1 if ej is going into node i,
and Y :“ diagpr1{xe1 , 1{xe2 , . . . , 1{xemsq is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries equal to the
inverse of the reactance values. It can be verified that A “ DYDt.
1The uniqueness is in the values of pijs rather than θis (shifting all θis by equal amounts does not violate
(2.6)).
2The admittance matrix A can also be considered as the weighted Laplacian matrix of the graph.
3A` “ limδÑ0AtpAAt ` δ2Iq´1 [14].
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The incidence matrix is a very useful matrix in analyzing failures in power grids. We use
this matrix in Chapters 3 and 4 to quantify the effects of line failures, and in Chapters 5 and 6
to detect line failures after a cyber-phyical attack on the grid.
The incidence matrix can also be used to compute the power flows on the lines under the DC
model. Given the vector of the phase angles, ~f “ Dt~θ gives the power flows such that for any
ek “ ti, ju, assuming that ek is directed from i to j, fek “ pij “ ´pji. We use vector ~f P R|E|
to efficiently present power flows under the DC model more instead of matrix P in Chapters 3,
4, and 8.
2.3.2 Matrix of Equivalent Reactance Values
Define matrix R P Rmˆm as R :“ DtA`D. It can be shown that for any @1 ď i ď m : rii is
equivalent reactance between end buses of the line ei. Matrix R is a symmetric matrix and is
very useful in quantifying the effect of line failures. In fact, in Chapter 3, we use this matrix
to quantify the effect of single line failure when all the reactance values are equal to 1. In
Chapter 4, we generalize the idea for k-line failures and arbitrary reactance values.
2.4 The DC Power Flows Accuracy
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the DC power flows provide a good approximation of the AC
power flows under three conditions. In the following lemma, we provide an upper bound on
the difference between the AC power flows p
(AC)
ij and the DC power flows p
(DC)
ij under those
conditions. In this section, θ
(DC)
i denotes the phase angle of the nodes under the DC power
flows.
Lemma 2.1. Assume the three conditions for validity of the DC power flows as a linear ap-
proximation for the AC power flows hold within following bounds:
1. |θi ´ θj | ď θ,@ti, ju P E,
2. |gij{bij | ď g,@ti, ju P E,
3. ||vi| ´ 1| ď v,@i P V ,
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for θ, v, g ă 1. Then, for any 1 ď i, j ď n:
|ppACqij ´ ppDCqij | ď }A}1 ` }~ppACq ´ ~ppDCq}1, (2.8)











`pvi ´ vjqpgij ` ibijq˘˚(
“ Re p|vi|2 ´ |vi||vj |eipθi´θjqqpgij ´ ibijq(
“ |vi|2gij ´ |vi||vj |gij cospθi ´ θjq
´ |vi||vj |bij sinpθi ´ θjq.
Define θi ´ θj :“ αij and |vi| :“ 1` βi. Then:
||vi|2gij | “ |gij ` p2βi ` β2i qgij |
ď |bij |pg ` 2vg ` 2vgq.
Moreover, using | cospxq| ď 1:
||vi||vj |gij cospαijq| ď |gij ` pβi ` βj ` βiβjqgij |
ď |bij |pg ` 2vg ` 2vgq.
Using sinpxq “ x` F pxq, for F pxq :“ ´x3{6`Opx5q, we also have:
´ |vi||vj |bij sinpθi ´ θjq “
“ ´bijpθi ´ θjq








2vθ ` 2vθ ` 3θ{6` 3θv{3` 3θ2v{6q
ď |bij |
`
2vθ ` 2vθ ` 3θq.




ij “´bijpθi ´ θjq ` eij , (2.9)
in which:
|eij | ď |bij |
`
2g ` 4vg ` 22vg ` 2vθ ` 2vθ ` 3θ
˘
.
Notice that ´bijpθi ´ θjq is not necessarily equal to p(DC)ij “ ´bijpθ(DC)i ´ θ(DC)j q since θi and
θj are obtained from the AC power flows, which are different from the phase angles obtained
by the DC power flows. However, we can compute the difference between these two values by
writing the power flow equations using (2.9) as follows:
AC: A~θ ` ~e “ ~p(AC)
A~θ “ ~p(DC) ´ ~e` p~p(AC) ´ ~p(DC)q
DC: A~θ(DC) “ ~p(DC),
in which ~e is an nˆ 1 vector with the ith entry equal to ei such that |ei| ď řjPNpiq |eij |. Recall
that vectors ~p(AC) and ~p(DC) are equal except (depending on the lossless assumption) in the
slack bus (first entry). From the flow equations and the superpositions principle, the difference
between ´bijpθi ´ θjq and ´bijpθ(DC)i ´ θ(DC)j q cannot be greater than the maximum flow that
vector ~e´p~p(AC)´~p(DC)q can produce which is at most }~p(AC)´~p(DC)}1`přni“1 řjPNpiq |bij |qp2g`
4vg ` 22vg ` 2vθ ` 2vθ ` 3θq. Hence, a conservative bound for the difference between the
AC and DC power flows is:
|p(AC)ij ´ p(DC)ij | ď }A}1 ` }~p(AC) ´ ~p(DC)}1.

Corollary 2.1. If the lines are lossless (g “ 0), then for any 1 ď i, j ď n:
|ppACqij ´ ppDCqij | ď p2vθ ` 2vθ ` 3θq}A}1.
Proof. Since lines are lossless, }~p(AC) ´ ~p(DC)}1 “ 0. Using this and g “ 0 in (2.8) gives the
bound. 
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Corollary 2.2. If the lines are lossless (g “ 0), and for all the lines bij “ ´1, then for any
1 ď i, j ď n:
|ppACqij ´ ppDCqij | ď 4p2vθ ` 2vθ ` 3θq|E|.
Proof. In this case, since for all the lines bij “ ´1, }A}1 “ 4|E|. Therefore, using Corollary 2.1
gives the bound. 
In the following Lemma, we demonstrate that if the power network topology is a tree, we
can improve the bound in Corollary 2.1 and prove that the DC power flows are equal to the AC
power flows.
Lemma 2.2. If G is a tree and g “ 0, then @1 ď i, j ď n : ppACqij “ ppDCqij
Proof. We want to show that p
(DC)
ij “ p(AC)ij ,@ti, ju P E is a DC power flow solution for this
instance. As all the lines are purely reactive, the network is lossless and in the AC power flows




ij “ pi. Hence,
setting p
(DC)
ij “ p(AC)ij completely satisfies the active power flow conservation in equation (2.5).
It remains to prove that there are phase angles satisfying equation (2.6) with p
(DC)
ij “ p(AC)ij .
Since G is a tree, m “ n ´ 1. Hence, p(DC)ij “ ´bijpθ(DC)i ´ θ(DC)j q for all ti, ju P E consists
of n ´ 1 independent linear equations for n variables θ(DC)1 , θ(DC)2 , . . . , θ(DC)n (It is known that
for a connected graph G, rankpAq “ n ´ 1 [32]). As a result, by selecting θ(DC)1 “ 0, all other
phase angles can be found uniquely. Hence, p
(DC)
ij “ p(AC)ij is the DC power flow solution for this
instance as well.

In this section, we demonstrated that the DC power flows can approximate the AC power
flows very well depending on the θ, g, and v values. In this thesis, due to the nonlinearity of
the AC power flows, we mainly use the DC power flows. Extending the methods provided in
this thesis to the AC power flow model should be of particular interest to researchers in power
engineering community.
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Chapter 3
Analyzing Failures and Cascades
Large scale power outages in Australia (2016), Turkey (2015), India (2013), and the U.S. (2011,
2003) have demonstrated the vulnerability of power grids to failures caused by natural disasters,
such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and solar flares as well as mismanagement and computers
malfunctioning. These power grid outages have devastating effects on almost every aspect of
modern life as well as on interdependent systems such as telecommunications, gas, water supply,
and transportation networks. Follow up reports of these events [7,8,9,12], exposed the insufficient
understanding of failures and their consequences in power grids. Hence, there is a need for
investigation of failures in power grids.
As we discussed in Chapter 2, unlike graph-theoretical network flows, power flows are gover-
ned by the laws of physics and there are no strict capacity bounds on the lines [25]. Yet, there
is a rating threshold associated with each line – if the flow exceeds the threshold, the line will
eventually experience thermal failure. Such an outage alters the network topology, giving rise
to a different flow pattern which, in turn, could cause other line outages. The repetition of this
process constitutes a cascading failure [44].
Some previous analytical works (e.g., [42,156] and references therein) assumed that a line/node
failure leads, with some probability, to failures of nearby nodes/lines. Such epidemic based mo-
deling allows using percolation-based tools to analyze the cascade’s impact. Yet, in real large
scale cascades, a failure of a specific line can affect remote lines and the cascade does not neces-








Functional Under Maintenance Tripped
Figure 3.1: The first 11 line outages leading to the India blackout on July 30th, 2012 [8]. The
numbers indicate the order in which outages occurred; Lines that were undergoing maintenance
at the time of the cascade are marked separately; Note that the failures did not develop conti-
guously.
sarily develop contiguously. For example, the evolution of the 2012 cascade in India appears in
Fig. 3.1. Similar non-contiguous evolution was observed in a 2011 cascade in South California [9]
and in simulation studies under more realistic models [27].
Motivated by these observations, we analytically study the properties of failures, detect
most vulnerable lines to failures, and introduce algorithms to efficiently predict the cascading
failure evolution. We employ the DC power flow model which is commonly used in large-scale
contingency analysis of power grids [28, 30, 113], and the cascading failure model of [62] (see
also [27,28,30,111]).
First, in order to investigate the impact of a single line failure on the power flow changes,
we provide a rank-1 update of the pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix after a single line
failure. We then use that to analytically compute the flows on the lines after a single line failure.
and obtain an upper bound on the flow changes. We build on these results and develop metrics
to study the robustness of graphs to failures.
We also illustrate via simulations the relation between the flow changes after a failure and the
distance (in hop count) and resistance distance from the failure. In our simulations, we consider
the U.S. Western Interconnection and the Texas Interconnection as well as Erdo˝s-Re´nyi, Watts
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and Strogatz [153], and Bara´basi and Albert [23] graphs. These simulations show that there are
cases in which the flow on a line far away from the initial failure significantly increases. These
observations are clearly in contrast to the epidemic-based failure models.
Once a line fails, there is a need for a low complexity algorithm to predict its consequences
so that the system operator can react quickly if the initial failure results in a cascading failures.
The Cascading Failure Evolution (CFE) Algorithm that has been used to identify the evolution
of the cascade [28,30,44] has the time complexity of Opt|V |3q, where |V | is the number of nodes
and t is the number of cascade rounds). In order to improve its running time, we develop the
low complexity Cascading Failure Evolution – Pseudo-inverse Based (CFE-PB) Algorithm.
The algorithm is based on the rank-1 update of the pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix.
We show that its complexity is Op|V |3`|Ft˚ ||V |2q (|Ft˚ | is the total number of lines failures during
the cascade). Namely, if t “ |Ft˚ | (one line fails at each round), the complexity of the CFE-PB
Algorithm is Opmint|V |, tuq times lower than that of the CFE Algorithm. The main advantage
of the CFE-PB Algorithm is that it leverages the special structure of the pseudo-inverse to
identify properties of the underlying graph and to recompute an instance of the pseudo-inverse
from a previous instance.
Finally, we prove that the problem of finding the set of line failures of size at most k that
causes a cascade resulting with the minimum possible yield (the fraction of demand satisfied
after the cascade), referred to as the minimum yield problem, is NP-hard. However, we introduce
a very fast heuristic termed the Most Vulnerable Edges Selection – Resistance distance Based
(MVES-RB) Algorithm for finding such a set, approximately. We compare the performance of
the MVES-RB Algorithm and other heuristic methods on the IEEE 118- and 300-bus benchmark
systems [5] and show that it performs relatively well considering its low time complexity.
3.1 Related Work
The study of cascading failures in power grids was initiated in [39,147] which used the linearized
DC model and a probabilistic outage rule for overloaded line failures. Similar cascade models
have been used to study the properties of the cascades [18,19,26,27,44,91], as well as to design
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control schemes to mitigate the cascade [28,110] and to detect vulnerable parts of the grid [29,83].
In this Chapter, we follow [27,29] and study cascades due to line overloads in power grids with
a deterministic outage rule.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.5, we use the admittance matrix of the grid to compute flows. This is
closely related to solving Laplacian systems which can be solved by several techniques, including
Gaussian elimination and LU factorization [77]. Recently, [49] used preconditioning, to provide
highly precise approximate solutions to Laplacian systems. Yet, this approach is not suitable
for analyzing the effects of line failures.
The problem of identifying the set of failures with the largest impact was studied in [28, 30,
113]. In particular, [30] studies the N ´ k problem which focuses on finding a small set of lines
whose removal disallows supporting a minimum demand. A broader interdiction problem where
all the network components are subject to failure was studied in [120]. A similar problem is
studied in [113] using the alternating-current (AC) model. However, none of the previous works
consider the cascading failures. Moreover, while the optimal power flow problem has been shown
to be NP-hard [31,93], the complexity of the cascade-related problems was not studied yet.
In simulations, we use graphs that can represent the power grid topology. The structure of
power grids was widely studied [23,42,52,153]. Specifically, Watts and Strogatz [153] suggested
the small-world graph as a good representative of the power grid. Baraba´si and Albert [23]
showed that scale-free graphs are better representatives. However, [52] indicated that none
of these models can represent the U.S. Western Interconnection properly. Hence, we consider
these graphs and the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph but we also use the Western Interconnection, the Texas
Interconnection, and the IEEE 118- and 300-bus benchmark systems [5] in order to consider
realistic systems.
3.2 Model and Preliminaries
In this chapter, we use the DC power flows as described in Section 2.3. We refer to the failed
lines and line failures as failed edges and edge failures in the graph G. Moreover, in this chapter,
Ai denotes the i
th row of matrix A.
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Algorithm 1 - Cascading Failure Evolution (CFE)
Input: A connected graph G “ pV,Eq and an initial edge failures event F0 Ď E.
1: F0˚ Ð F0 and iÐ 0.
2: while Fi ‰ H do
3: Adjust the total demand (supply) to equal the total supply (demand) within each connected
component of G “ pV,EzFi˚ q.
4: Compute the new flows fepFi˚ q @e P EzFi˚ .
5: Find the set of new edge failures Fi`1 “ te||fepFi˚ q| ą ce, e P EzFi˚ u. Fi˚`1 Ð Fi˚ Y Fi`1 and
iÐ i` 1.
6: return t “ i´ 1, pF0, . . . , Ftq, and fepFt˚ q @e P EzFt˚ .
3.2.1 Cascading Failure Model
The Cascading Failure Evolution (CFE) Algorithm described here is a slightly simplified version
of the cascade model used in [27,30,62]. For each edge e “ ti, ju, consider an arbitrary direction
as in Subsection 2.3.1 and define fe :“ pij , if direction of the edge goes from i to j. We assume
that each edge has a predetermined capacity ce “ cij “ cij , which bounds the amount of power
that it can carry without any risks of failure (that is, |fe| ď ce). The cascade proceeds in rounds.
Denote by Fi Ď E the set of edge failures in the ith round and by Fi˚ “ Fi˚´1YFi the set of edge
failures until the end of the ith round (i ě 1). We assume that before the initial failure event
F0 Ď E, the power flows satisfy (2.5)-(2.6), and |fe| ď ce @e P E.
Upon a failure, some edges are removed from the graph, implying that it may become discon-
nected. Thus, within each component, depending on whether demandąsupply or supplyądemand,
the total demand is adjusted to be equal to the total supply by decreasing the demand (sup-
ply) by the same factor at all demand (supply) nodes (Line 3). This corresponds to the load
shedding/generation curtailing process. Since power grids are operated by a central system,
we follow [27, 28, 30] and assume that the demand (supply) are adjusted globally. For any
set of failures F Ď E, we denote by fepF q the flow on the edges in G1 “ pV,EzF q after the
shedding/curtailing.
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Following an initial failure event F0, the new flows fepF0q,@e P EzF0 are computed (by (2.5)-
(2.6)) (Line 4). Then, the set of new edge failures F1 is identified (Line 5). Following [27,30,62],
we use a deterministic outage rule and assume, for simplicity, that an edge e fails once the flow
exceeds its capacity: |fepF0˚ q| ą ce.1 Therefore, F1 “ te : |fepF0˚ q| ą ce, e P EzF0˚ u.
If the set F1 of new edge failures is empty, the cascade is terminated. Otherwise, the process
is repeated while replacing the initial event F0˚ “ F0 by the failure event F1˚ , and generally
replacing Fi˚ by Fi˚`1 at the ith round (Line 5). The process continues until the system stabilizes
(i.e., until no edges are removed). Finally, we obtain the sequence pF0, F1, . . . , Ftq of the sets of
failures associated with the initial event F0, and the power flows fepFt˚ q at stabilization, where
t is the number of rounds until stabilization. Since solving a system of linear equations with n
variables, requires Opn3q time [77], the output can be obtained in Opt|V |3q time.
When the initial failure event contains a single edge F0 “ te1u, for any edges e “ ti, ju P
Ezte1u, we denote the flows after the failure by p1ij or f 1e ” fepte1uq and the flow changes by
∆pij “ p1ij ´ pij . Moreover ∆fe “ ∆pij .
3.2.2 Metrics
We define metrics for evaluating the grid vulnerability (some of which were defined in [27], [155]).
To study the effects of a single edge (e1) failure after one round, we define the ratio between the
flow change on an edge e, and its original value or the flow value on the failed edge e1:
Edge flow change ratio: Se,e1 :“ |∆fe{fe|.
Mutual edge flow change ratio: Me,e1 :“ |∆fe{fe1 |.
The mutual edge flow change ratio corresponds to the Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF)
defined in [155] (we used a different term to be consistent with the other metric).
We also define a metric to evaluate the cascade severity.
Yield: the ratio between the demand supplied at stabilization and the original demand after
an initial failure event.
1Note that [27,30,62] maintain moving averages of the fe values to determine which edges fail.
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3.2.3 Graphs and Parameters Used in Simulations
For simulations, we used the NetworkX [81] library in Python, as well as igraph [54] library
in R. The simulation results are presented for graphs described below. The parameters are as
indicted below, unless otherwise mentioned.
Western Interconnection (WI): The U.S. Western Interconnection with 13626 nodes and
18089 edges. The data is from the Platts Geographic Information System (GIS) [3]. In some
cases a 1374-node connected subgraph of the WI is considered.
Texas Interconnection (TI): The Texas Interconnection with 4544 nodes and 6264 edges
(obtained from the Platts GIS [3]).
IEEE benchmark Systems: The IEEE 118-bus and 300-bus benchmark systems with 179
and 409 edges, respectively [5].
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph: A random graph where each edge appears with probability p “ 0.01.
Watts and Strogatz graph [153]: A small-world random graph where each node connects to
k “ 4 other nodes and the probability of rewiring is p “ 0.1.
Bara´basi and Albert graph [23]: A scale-free random graph where each new node connects
to k “ 3 other nodes at each step following the preferential attachment mechanism.
To maintain consistency when evaluating a metric in generated random networks and in a
real-world network (e.g., WI), in this chapter, we assume that the reactance values (or suscep-
tance values) are equal to 1 for all edges (´1{xij “ bij “ ´1 @ti, ju P E). However, to provide
representative results about real-world networks, we also perform the same evaluations with es-
timated reactance values. The reactance of a line depends on its physical properties (such as its
material) and there is a linear relation between its length and reactance: the longer the line, the
larger its reactance. Thus, we assume that all lines have the same physical properties and use
the length to determine the reactance. It is important to note that flows are scale invariant to
the reactance (that is, multiplying the reactance of all lines by the same factor does not change
the flow values). Hence, we simply use the length of a line as its estimated reactance.
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3.3 Admittance Matrix Properties
Recall that the power flow equations can be solved by using the Pseudo-inverse of the admittance
matrix A`. In this section, we use the Pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix in order to obtain
results that are used throughout the rest of the Chapter. Specifically, it is used in Section 3.4
to study the impact of a single edge failure on the flows on other edges and in Section 3.5
to introduce an efficient algorithm to identify the evolution of the cascade. We prove several
properties of the Pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix A`.
A cut-edge of a graph G is an edge whose removal increases the number of connected compo-
nents of G. Jointly verifying whether an edge is a cut-edge and finding the connected components
of the graph takes Op|E|q (using Depth First Search). The following two Lemmas show that by
using the precomputed pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix, these operations can be done
in Op1q and Op|V |q, respectively. The algorithm in Section 3.5 uses these results to check if
the pseudo-inverse should be recomputed. Moreover, Lemma 3.1 is crucial for the proof of the
Theorem 3.1, below. We note that a similar lemma when all the admittance values are equal to
1 appeared in [22].
Lemma 3.1. Given G “ pV,Eq and A`, all the cut-edges of the graph G can be found in Op|E|q
time. Specifically, an edge ti, ju is a cut-edge if, and only if, a´1ij ´ 2a`ij ` a`ii ` a`jj “ 0.
Proof. Suppose ti, ju is a cut-edge. Then, the solution to (2.5)-(2.6) for the power vector ~p , in
which pi “ ´pj “ 1 and zero elsewhere is pij “ ´pji “ 1 and zero elsewhere. On the other
hand, ~θ “ A`~p is a solution to the equivalent matrix equation (2.7). Since the solution with
respect to the power flows is unique, 1 “ pij “ ´aijpθi ´ θjq “ ´aijpA`i ~p ´ A`j ~pq ñ 1 “
´aijpa`ii ´ a`ij ´ a`ji ` a`jjq ñ a´1ij “ p2a`ij ´ a`ii ´ a`jjq ñ a´1ij ´ 2a`ij ` a`ii ` a`jj “ 0.
Now suppose a´1ij ´ 2a`ij ` a`ii ` a`jj “ 0. The solution to (2.5)-(2.6) for the power vector ~p
(as defined above) for the flow on edge ti, ju is pij “ pi “ ´pj “ 1. Therefore, there are no
other paths from i to j. Otherwise, because of the phase angle difference between nodes i and
j, part of the flow should be routed through other paths. Thus, edge ti, ju is the only path from
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node i to j, and is a cut-edge. Hence, using the precomputed A`, identifying whether an edge
is a cut-edge takes Op1q time and finding all the cut-edges of the graph takes Op|E|q time. 
Lemma 3.2. Given G “ pV,Eq, A`, and the cut-edge ti, ju, the connected components of
Gzti, ju can be found in Op|V |q.
Proof. Suppose that ti, ju is a cut-edge of the connected graph G, and Gzti, ju “ G1 Y G2.
Assume that i P G1 and j P G2. We show below that for any tr, su P Gzti, ju, a`ir´a`jr “ a`is´a`js.
Moreover, for any r P G1 and s P G2, a`ir ´ a`jr ‰ a`is ´ a`js.
Suppose that tr, su P G1 (the argument is the same for G2) is an arbitrary edge. Then,
the power flows solution to (2.5)-(2.6) in G for the power vector ~p with pr “ ´ps “ 1 and zero
elsewhere, is nonzero in G1 and zero elsewhere. Therefore, pij “ 0. On the other hand, ~θ “ A`~p
is a solution to the equivalent matrix equation (2.7). Since the solution with respect to power
flows is unique, 0 “ fij “ ´aijpθi ´ θjq “ ´aijpA`i ~p ´A`j ~pq ñ 0 “ pa`ir ´ a`is ´ a`jr ` a`jsq ñ
a`ir ´ a`jr “ a`is ´ a`js.
From this and since a`ii ´a`ji ‰ a`ij ´a`jj (Lemma 3.1), for any r P G1 and s P G2, a`ir´a`jr ‰
a`is´ a`js. Thus, by using the precomputed pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix, computing
A`i ´A`j , and dividing the entries into two groups with equal values, the connected components
of Gzti, ju can be identified. This process requires Op|V |q time. 
In the following, we denote by A1 the admittance matrix of the graph G1 “ pV,Ezti, juq
and by ~p 1 the power vector after removing an arbitrary edge ti, ju from G and conducting the
corresponding load shedding/generation curtailing. Lemma 3.3 shows that after the removal of
a cut-edge, A` can be used to solve (2.7) and A1` is not required.
Lemma 3.3. Given graph G “ pV,Eq, A`, and a cut-edge ti, ju, then ~θ1 “ A`~p 1 is a solution
of (2.7) in G1.
Proof. First, ~θ1 “ A`~p 1 is a solution to (2.7) for the power vector ~p 1 in the graph G. Since the
solution to (2.5)-(2.6) with respect to power flows is unique, if p1ij “ 0, then ~θ1 “ A`~p 1 is also a
solution to (2.7) for the power vector ~p 1 in the graph G1. Therefore, we only need to prove that
θ1i “ θ1j in ~θ1 “ A`~p 1.
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To prove this, we prove that θ1i´θ1j “ pA`i ´A`j q~p 1 “ 0. From the proof of Lemma 3.2, since
ti, ju is a cut-edge, the entries of A`i ´A`j have equal values at the entries in the same connected
component. On the other hand, since ~p 1 is the power vector after load shedding, then the sum
of the supplies and demands at each connected component is zero. Thus, pA`i ´A`j q~p 1 “ 0. 
The following theorem gives an analytical rank-1 update of the pseudo-inverse of the admit-
tance matrix. Using Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1, in Section 3.4 we provide upper bounds on
the mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1). We note that the proof could be simplified, if the
form of A1` was known in advance. However, the proof provides the derivation of A1`. We also
note that a similar result to Theorem 3.1 was independently proved in a technical report [117].
Theorem 3.1. Given a connected graph G “ pV,Eq, the admittance matrix A, and A`, if ti, ju
is not a cut-edge, then,
A1` “ pA` aijXXtq` “ A` ´ 1
a´1ij `XtA`X
A`XXtA`
in which X is an nˆ 1 matrix with 1 in ith entry, ´1 in jth entry, and 0 elsewhere.
Proof. First, we show that AA` “ I ´ 1nJ. A is a real and symmetric matrix. There-
fore, there exists an orthogonal and unitary matrix U such that A “ UtΛU, in which Λ “
diagpλ1, λ2, . . . , λnq is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of A and Ui is the normalized eigen-
vector related to eigenvalue λi. It is well-known that when G is connected and unweighted, the
multiplicity of eigenvalue 0 of the Laplacian matrix is 1 [32]. Exactly the same result with the
same approach can be obtained for a weighted graph. Therefore, we can assume that λ1 “ 0
and all other eigenvalues are nonzero. In this case U1 “ r 1?n , 1?n , . . . , 1?n s. On the other hand,
A` “ UtΛ`U, and therefore,
AA` “ UtΛUUtΛ`U “ UtΛΛ`U
“ Utdiagpλ1λ`1 , λ2λ`2 , . . . , λnλn` qU
“ UtpI´ diagp1, 0, . . . , 0qqU “ I´ 1
n
J.
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A is a real and symmetric matrix, and therefore, there exist an n ˆ n matrix B such that
BBt “ A. Using [14, Theorem 4],
pA` aijXXtq` “ pCCtq` ` rI´ p?aijXC`qts
ˆ rA` ´ aijA`XpI´C`CqKXtA`s ˆ r1´?aijXC`s, 2
where, C “ rI´AA`sX and
K “ tI` aijrpI´C`CqXtA`XpI´C`Cqsu´1.
Therefore, all we need to compute is matrices C and K. Using the previous part,





It is easy to see that JX “ 0, and thus, C “ 0. Using this,
K “ tI` aijrpI´C`CqXtA`XpI´C`Cqsu´1
“ tI` aijrIXtA`XIsu´1 “ t1` aijXtA`Xu´1.
Notice that X is an nˆ1 vector, and therefore, XtA`X is a scaler and I in the second equation
is 1ˆ1. Hence, it is written 1 instead of I in the last equation. Since ti, ju is not a cut edge, from
Lemma 3.1 we have, 1 ` aijXtA`X “ aijra´1ij ´ 2pa`qij ` pa`qii ` pa`qjjs ‰ 0, and therefore,
K is well-defined. Replacing K and C,
pA` aijXXtq` “ A` ´ aijA`Xt1` aijXtA`Xu´1XtA`




In the following, we use Theorem 3.1 to derive an equation similar to the one provided in [155,
Section 7.4.1] by using the superposition principle. Recall from Section 3.2 that A` “ rar`ss.
Corollary 3.1. The flow on an edge tr, su after a failure in the non-cut-edge ti, ju is,
p1rs “ prs ´ arsaij
pa`ri ´ a`rjq ´ pa`si ´ a`sjq
a´1ij ´ 2pa`qij ` pa`qii ` pa`qjj
pij .
2?aij might be an imaginary number.
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Figure 3.2: Scatter plot showing the distance versus the resistance distance between nodes in
the graphs defined in Subsection 5.2.3. All graphs have 1374 nodes.
Finally, Lemma 3.4, gives the complexity of the rank-1 update provided in Theorem 3.1.
This is used in the computation of the running time of the algorithm in Section 3.5.
Lemma 3.4. Given graph G “ pV,Eq, A`, and a non-cut-edge ti, ju, A1` can be computed
from A` in Op|V |2q.
We now define the notion resistance distance [100]. In resistive circuits, the resistance dis-
tance between two nodes is the equivalent resistance between them. The resistance distance is
a measure of distance between nodes of the graph [22]. For any network, this notion can be
defined by using the pseudo-inverse of the Laplacian matrix of the network. Specifically, it can
be defined in power grid networks by using the pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix, A`.
Definition 3.1. Given G “ pV,Eq, A, and A`, the resistance distance between two nodes
i, j P V is rpi, jq :“ a`ii ` a`jj ´ 2a`ij. Accordingly, the resistance distance between two edges
e “ ti, ju, e1 “ tv, uu is rpe, e1q “ mintrpi, vq, rpi, uq, rpj, vq, rpj, uqu.
We use the resistance distance in Section 3.4 to obtain upper bounds on the flow changes
after a single failure and assess the robustness of specific graphs against such failures. Moreover,
using resistance distance, in Section 3.6, we provide a heuristic for the minimum yield problem.
When all edges have the same reactance, xij “ 1 @ti, ju P E, the resistance distance between
two nodes is a measure of their connectivity. Smaller resistance distance between nodes i and
j indicates that they are better connected. Fig. 3.2 shows the relation between the distance
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(a) WI (b) TI
Figure 3.3: Scatter plot showing the distance versus the resistance distance between nodes in
the WI and TI with estimated reactance values.
and the resistance distance between nodes in the graphs defined in Subsection 5.2.3 (notice that
xij “ 1 @ti, ju P E).3 As can be seen, there is no direct relation between these two measures
in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Bara´basi-Albert graphs. However, in the WI and Watts-Strogatz graph the
resistance distance increases with the distance.
Fig. 3.3 also shows the relation between the distance and the resistance distance in the WI
and TI when the estimated reactance values (as described in Subsection 5.2.3) are used. As
expected, this relation is different from the case when all the edges have equal reactance values.
3.4 Effects of a Single Edge Failure
In this section, we provide upper bounds on the flow changes after a single edge failure and
introduce a metric to evaluate the robustness of grids to failures. We evaluate this metric for
3While in the WI the reactance values depend on the line characteristics (see values in [27]), for comparison
and consistency, we used xij “ 1 @ti, ju P E in all the graphs in Fig. 3.2.
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Figure 3.4: The average, standard deviation, and maximum edge flow change ratios (Se,e1) as
the function of distance (dpe, e1q) from the failure. The right y-axis shows the values for the
maximum edge flow change ratios (maxSe,e1). All graphs have 1374 nodes. The data points are
obtained for 40 random choices of an initial failure.
Watts and Strogatz graphs and demonstrate that symmetric graphs are the most robust graph
structures to edge failures.
For simplicity, in this section, we assume that xe “ 1 @e P E, unless otherwise indicated.
However, all the results can be easily generalized.
3.4.1 Flow Changes
3.4.1.1 Edge Flow Change Ratio
To provide insight into the effects of a single edge failure, we first present simulation results.
Fig. 3.4 shows the edge flow change ratios (Se,e1) as the function of distance (dpe, e1q) from
the failure for over 40 different random choices of an initial edge failure, e1. The power sup-
ply/demand in the Western interconnection is based on the actual data. In other graphs, the
power supply/demand at nodes are i.i.d. Normal random variables with a slack node to equalize
the supply and demand. Notice that if the initial flow in an edge is close to zero, the edge flow
change ratio on that edge can be very large. Thus, to focus on the impact of an edge failure on
the edges with reasonable initial flows, we do not illustrate the edge flow change ratios for the
edges with flow below 1% of the average flow. Yet, we observed that such edges that experience
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a flow increase after a single edge failure, are within any arbitrary distance from the initial edge
failure.
Fig. 3.4 shows that after a single edge failure, there may be very large flow increases (edge
flow change ratios up to 80, 14, 50, and 24 in Figs. 3.4-(a), (b), (c), and (d), respectively). These
changes may occur far from the initial edge failure (edge flow change ratio around 10 for edges
11- and 4-hops away from the initial failure in Figs. 3.4-(a) and (c), respectively). Moreover, for
all the four graphs, we observed that there are edges (far from the initial edge failure) whose
flow changed from zero to a positive value.
These observations motivate us to prove the following result analytically. We show that by
choosing specific parameter values, the edge flow change ratio can be arbitrarily large.
Observation 3.1. For any we1 , we2 P R, there exists a graph G “ pV,Eq and edges e1, e2 P E
such that Se2,e1 “ we2{we1.
Proof. We construct the graph G “ pV,Eq as follows: V “ ts, tu, ps “ ´pt “ 1, and there are
two parallel edges e1 and e2 between s and t. Assume the reactance values xe1 “ we1 , xe2 “ we2
are such that 0 ă xe1 ă xe2 .
By (2.5)-(2.6), we get fe1 “ xe2xe2`xe1 and fe2 “
xe1
xe1`xe2 . If F0 “ te1u, then fe2pF0q “ 1 and
Se2,e1 “ xe2{xe1 “ we2{we1 . 
3.4.1.2 Mutual Edge Flow Change Ratio
We use the notion of resistance distance to find upper bounds on the mutual edge flow change
ratios (Me,e1). The following Lemma, which is an immediate result of Corollary 3.1, provides
a formula for computing the flow changes after a single edge failure based on the resistance
distances. It is independent of the power supply/demand distribution.
Lemma 3.5. Given G “ pV,Eq, A, and A`, the flow change and the mutual edge flow change
ratio for an edge e “ ti, ju P E after a failure in a non-cut-edge e1 “ tv, uu P E are,
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(a) A subgraph of the WI (b) Erdos-Renyi
(f) Cycle(e) Complete(d) Barabasi and Albert












Figure 3.5: Visualization of the mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1) for edges in different
graph classes after a single edge failure (represented by the black wide line).
∆fe “ ∆pij “ 1
2
´rpi, vq ` rpi, uq ` rpj, vq ´ rpj, uq








Proof. It is an immediate result of Corollary 3.1. 
Lemma 3.5 is similar to the calculation of the Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODF)
presented in [155, Appendix 7B.2]. However, here we use Theorem 3.1 to derive similar equations
in terms of the resistance distances. This formulation allows us to provide useful equalities and
inequalities (e.g., Corollaries 3.2 and 3.6).
Fig. 3.5 shows a visualization of the mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1) for edges in
different graph classes after a single edge failure. These values are differently distributed for
different graph classes.
The following Corollary gives an upper bound on the flow changes after a failure in a non-
cut-edge tv, uu P E by using the triangle inequality for resistance distance and Lemma 3.5.
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Corollary 3.2. Given G “ pV,Eq, A, and A`, the flow changes in any edge e “ ti, ju P E
after a failure in a non-cut-edge e1 “ tv, uu P E can be bounded by,
|∆pij | ď rpv, uq
1´ rpv, uq |pvu|, Me,e1 ď
rpv, uq
1´ rpv, uq .
Proof. Using triangle inequality for resistance distance, we can write,
´rpi, vq ` rpi, uq ď rpv, uq
rpj, vq ´ rpj, uq ď rpv, uq.
Apply these to Lemma 3.5 completes the proof. 
In Observation 3.1, we showed that edge flow change ratios (Se,e1) can be arbitrarily large.
However, the following observation shows that the mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1) are
always bounded by 1. The proof is intuitive using flow conservation in the power flows.
Observation 3.2. For any non-cut-edge e1 “ tv, uu and any edge e ‰ e1, Me,e1 ď 1.
Proof. Suppose X is a n ˆ 1 matrix with 1 in vth entry, ´1 in uth entry, and 0 elsewhere.
Using Theorem 3.1 or superposition property, it is easy to verify that after a failure in an edge
e1 “ tv, uu, A1`p~p ´ pvuXq “ A`~p . Thus, ~θ1 ´ ~θ “ pvuA1`X ñ ∆~θ “ pvuA1`X. On the
other hand, it is easy to see that ∆~θ is the phase angle of the nodes in G1 when ~p “ pvuX.
Thus, the flows should be smaller than the supply value which is equal to |pvu|. Hence, for any
e “ ti, ju P E1, |∆pij | ă |pvu| ñMe,e1 ď 1. 
Corollary 3.3. After a failure in a non-cut-edge e1 “ tu, vu, Me,e1 ď mint1, rpu,vq1´rpu,vqu.
Proof. Combining Observation 3.2 and Corollary 3.2 gives the result. 
Observation 3.2 and Corollary 3.2 provide some initial upper bounds on the mutual edge
flow change ratios. In the next subsection, we study the mutual edge flow change ratios in detail
and demonstrate how they can be used to evaluate the robustness of graphs against failures.
We present simulations to show the relations between the mutual flow change ratios and the
two distance measures. Figs. 3.6 and 3.7 show the mutual edge flow change ratio (Me,e1) as
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Figure 3.6: The average mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1) versus the distance from the
initial edge failure. All graphs have 1374 nodes. Each point represents the average of 40 different
initial single edge failure events.
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Figure 3.7: The average mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1) versus the resistance distance
from the initial edge failure. All graphs have 1374 nodes. Each point represents the average of
40 different initial single edge failure events. For clarity, the markers appear for every 5 data
points.
the function of distance (dpe, e1q) and resistance distance (rpe, e1q) from the failure, respectively.
The figures show that increasing the number of edges (increasing p in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph and
increasing k in Watts and Strogatz, and Bara´basi and Albert graphs) affects the Me,e1-rpe, e1q
relation more than the Me,e1-dpe, e1q relation. This suggests that the resistance distance better
captures the structure of a graph. Both figures show a monotone relation between the mutual
edge flow change ratios and the distances/resistance distances. However, this monotonicity is
smoother in the case of the distance.
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Figure 3.8: The average mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1) versus the distance from the
initial edge failure using estimated reactance values in the WI and TI. Each point represents the
average over all possible initial single edge failure events.
Moreover, Fig. 3.6, unlike Fig. 3.4, shows that after a single edge failure, the mutual edge
flow change ratios decrease exponentially as the distance from the initial failure increases. Thus,
it suggests that probabilistic tools may be used to model the mutual edge flow change ratios
(Me,e1) better than the edge flow change ratios (Se,e1).
To show these relations when the estimated reactance values (as described in Subsection 5.2.3)
are used, we computed the average mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1) in the entire WI and
the TI. As can be seen in Fig. 3.8, in the TI, the mutual edge flow change ratios decrease ex-
ponentially as the distance from the initial failure increases. This is similar to the exponential
decrease observed in Fig. 3.6 when all the reactance values are equal. Similarly, in the WI this
exponential decrease occurs for the distance up to 7-hops from the initial failure. However, for
the longer distances, the changes remain as small as « e´5.
As can be seen in Fig. 3.9, the Me,e1-rpe, e1q relation is very similar to Fig. 3.7. Fig. 3.9 shows
that the Me,e1-rpe, e1q relation is not as smooth as the Me,e1-dpe, e1q relation.
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Figure 3.9: The average mutual edge flow change ratios (Me,e1) versus the resistance distance
from the initial edge failure using estimated reactance values in the WI and TI. Each point
represents the average over all possible initial single edge failure events.
3.4.2 Graph Robustness
In this subsection, we define the failure cost of an edge and the average edge failure cost in a
graph. Using Corollary 3.1, we analytically compute these costs. We then demonstrate that the
results can be used to study the robustness of graphs to single edge failures. Recall that we
assume all the lines have reactance values qual to 1.






The failure cost of an edge e is a good measure of the average changes that occur in the flows
of the other edges to compensate for the failure in an edge e. It can help constructing a reliable
power grid in two ways: (i) by designing networks with a minimum maximum failure cost, and
(ii) by setting the power supply and demand values such that edges with high failure costs carry
small flows. The following Lemma analytically shows the relation between the failure cost of a
non-cut-edge and the resistance distance between its ending nodes. It can be considered as a
generalization of the upper bound provided in Corollary 3.2.
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1´ rpi, jq . (3.1)
Proof. Recall that E “ te1, e2, . . . , emu. Assume e :“ ew “ ti, ju. Denote the set of edges of G
with direction (as in Subsection 2.3.1) by E “ t1, 2, . . . , mu. Recall the definition of matrix R
from Subsection 2.3.2. It is easy to see that, @1 ď w, z ď m : rwz “ a`ip ´ a`iq ´ a`jp ` a`jq where
w “ pi, jq, z “ pp, qq.
Based on the definition of the resistance distance, it is easy to see that @1 ď w ď m : rww “
rpi, jq where w “ pi, jq. Using Corollary 3.1, it is also easy to see that Mez ,ew “ |rwz |1´rww .
Consider D P t´1, 0, 1unˆm, the incidence matrix of the graphG as defined in Subsection 2.3.1.
From the definition, R “ DtA`D. On the other hand, A “ DDt. Thus, R “ DtpDDtq`D.
From [14, eq. 3.11.2], pDDtq` “ pDtq`D`. Moreover, from [14, eq. 3.8.2], pDtq` “ pD`qt.
Thus,
R “ DtpDDtq`D “ DtpDtq`D`D “ pD`DqtpD`Dq.
From the properties of the pseudo-inverse [14, Theorem 3.9], D`D is symmetric and D`DD` “
D`. Hence,
R “ pD`DqtpD`Dq “ D`DD`D “ D`D.
Hence, from the properties of the pseudo-inverse, R2 “ D`DD`D “ pD`DD`qD “

















As we mentioned at the beginning of the proof, from the definition of the matrix R, it is easy
to see that rww “ rpi, jq and Mez ,ew “ |rwz |1´rww . Hence,
rpi, jq




pMez ,ewq2 “ pm´ 1qFCew .

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Eq. (3.1) is very insightful. Intuitively, similar to the inequality in Corollary 3.2, it demon-
strates that failures in edges with high resistance distance values have a strong effect on the
other edges. However, it is more accurate, since it provides an equality instead of an inequality.
Moreover, (3.1) allows to obtain a bound on the average edge failure cost, which is defined below
as a metric for the robustness of a graph to a single edge failure.
Definition 3.3. In a graph G with n nodes and m edges, the average edge failure cost is defined
as, FCG :“ 1m
ř
ePE FCe.
Using (3.1), the following Lemma provides a lower bound for the average edge failure cost
in a graph.







¯´1 ď FCG, (3.2)
and equality holds if for any two edges e “ ti, ju and e1 “ tv, uu, rpi, jq “ rpv, uq.
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 3.6. Since G is 2-edge-connected,
it does not have a cut-edge. Thus, from Lemma 3.6, for any edge e “ ti, ju, pm ´ 1qFCe “
rpi, jq{p1´ rpi, jqq. Hence, řePE FCe “ 1m´1 řti,juPE rpi,jq1´rpi,jq .
From the proof of Lemma 3.6, R “ D`D. Thus, trpRq “ trpD`Dq “ trpDD`q. On
the other hand, from [14, eq. 3.11.7], DD` “ pDDtqpDDtq`. Since DDt “ A, therefore
DD` “ AA` and from the proof of Theorem 3.1, DD` “ AA` “ I ´ 1nJ. Hence, trpRq “
trpI´ 1nJq “ n´ 1. Therefore,
ř
ti,juPE rpi, jq “
řm
w“1 rww “ trpRq “ n´ 1.







ti,juPE rpi, jq “ n ´ 1 is when all the rpi, jqs are equal.
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Lemma 3.7 provides a lower bound on the average edge failure cost in a graph (FCG). More
importantly the proof demonstrates that between all the graphs with n nodes and m edges, the
one with equal resistance distance values between all pairs of connected nodes minimizes this
metric.
The following Corollary shows that for symmetric graphs the equality holds in Lemma 3.7.
Corollary 3.4. In a symmetric graph G, FCG “ pm2´mn´1 ´pm´ 1qq´1. Moreover, for any graph
H with the same number of nodes and edges as G, FCH ě FCG.
Proof. Since G is symmetric, for any two edges ti, ju, tv, uu P E, there is an automorphism
σ : V Ñ V , such that σpiq “ v and σpjq “ u. Suppose Π is the permutation matrix representing
σ, then the admittance matrix of σpGq is Aˆ “ ΠAΠt. Since σ is an automorphism, Aˆ “ ΠAΠt “
A. It is also easy to verify that Aˆ
` “ ΠA`Πt “ A`. Thus, aˆ`ii ` aˆ`jj ´ 2aˆ`ij “ a`ii ` a`jj ´ 2a`ij .
On the other hand, from Aˆ
` “ ΠA`Πt, aˆ`ii “ av`v, aˆ`jj “ au`u, and aˆ`ij “ av`u. Hence, av`v `
au`u ´ 2av`u “ a`ii ` a`jj ´ 2a`ij ñ rpv, uq “ rpi, jq. Therefore, for any two edges ti, ju, tv, uu P E,
rpv, uq “ rpi, jq. Now by using Lemma 3.7, it is easy to see that FCG “ pm2´mn´1 ´ pm ´ 1qq´1.
Moreover, from Lemma 3.7, for any graph H with the same number of nodes and edges as G,
FCH ě FCG. 
Corollary 3.4 demonstrates that symmetric graphs have the lowest average edge failure cost
among all the graphs with the same number of nodes and edges. Moreover, from Lemma 3.7
and Corollary 3.4 it can be concluded that as graphs become more symmetrical, their average
edge failure cost (FCG) decreases. To show this numerically, we computed the average edge
failure cost and the maximum mutual edge flow change ratio (maxe,e1PEMe,e1) versus the rewiring
probability (p) in Watts and Strogatz graphs with 30 nodes and 60 edges. We chose the Watts
and Strogatz graph, since in this type of graphs, as p increases, the symmetry of the graph
decreases.
Fig. 3.10 shows the average edge failure cost of the graph (FCG) and the maximum mutual
edge flow change ratio (maxe,e1PEMe,e1) versus the probability of rewiring (p). Initially (p “ 0),
G is a 4-regular graph (namely, every node is connected to exactly 4 other nodes). However, as
p increases, G tends toward a random graph with no symmetry. Thus, an increase in p in the
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Figure 3.10: The average edge failure cost of the graph (FCG) and the maximum mutual edge
flow change ratio (maxe,e1PEMe,e1) versus the probability of rewiring (p) in a Watts and Strogatz
graph with 30 nodes and 60 edges. Each point is the average over 100 generated graphs with
the same parameters.
Watts and Strogatz graph can be considered as decrease in the symmetry of the graph. As we
expected, the figure shows that as p increases, both the average edge failure cost of the graph
(FCG) and the maximum mutual edge flow change ratio (maxe,e1PEMe,e1) increase.
Overall, results suggest that as graphs become more symmetrical, they become more robust
against single edge failures.
3.5 Efficient Cascading Failure Evolution Computation
Based on the results we obtained in Section 3.3, we present the Cascading Failure Evolution
– Pseudo-inverse Based (CFE-PB) Algorithm which identifies the evolution of the cascade.
The CFE-PB Algorithm uses the Moore-Penrose Pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix for
solving (2.7). Computing the pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix requires Op|V |3q time.
However, the algorithm obtains the pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix in round i from the
one obtained in round pi´ 1q, in Op|Fi||V |2q time. Moreover, in some cases, the algorithm can
reuse the pseudo-inverse from the previous round. Since once lines fail, there is a need for low
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Algorithm 2 - Cascading Failure Evolution – Pseudo-inverse Based (CFE-PB)
Input: A connected graph G “ pV,Eq and an initial edge failures event F0 Ď E.
1: Compute A`, F0˚ Ð F0 and iÐ 0.
2: while Fi ‰ H do
3: for each tr, su P Fi do
4: if tr, su is a cut-edge (see Lemma 3.1) then
5: Find the connected components after removing tr, su. (see Lemma 3.2)
6: Adjust the total demand (supply) to equal the total supply (demand) within each connected
component.
7: else update A` after removing tr, su. (see Lemma 3.4)
8: Compute the phase angles ~θ “ A`~p and compute new flows fepFi˚ q from the phase angles.
9: Find the set of new edge failures Fi`1 “ te||fe| ą ce, e P EzFi˚ u. Fi˚`1 Ð Fi˚ YFi`1 and iÐ i`1.
10: return t “ i´ 1, pF0, . . . , Ftq, and fepFt˚ q @e P EzFt˚ .
complexity algorithms to control and mitigate the cascade, the CFE-PB Algorithm may provide
insight into the design of efficient cascade control algorithms.
We now describe the CFE-PB Algorithm. It initially computes the pseudo-inverse of the
admittance matrix (in Op|V |3q time) and this is the only time in which it computes A` without
using a previous version of A`. Next, starting from F0, at each round of the cascade, for each
e P Fi, it checks whether e is a cut-edge (Line 4). This is done in Op1q (Lemma 3.1). If yes,
based on Lemma 3.3, in Lines 5 and 6, the total demand is adjusted to equal the total supply
within each connected component (in OpV q time). Else, in Line 7, A` after the removal of e
is computed in Op|V |2q time (see Lemma 3.4). After repeating this process for each e P Fi, the
phase angles and the flows are computed in Op|V |2q time (Line 8). The rest of the process is
similar to the CFE Algorithm.
The following theorem provides the complexity of the algorithm (the proof is based on the
Lemmas 1–4). We show that the algorithm runs in Op|V |3 ` |Ft˚ ||V |2q time (compared to the
CFE Algorithm which runs in Opt|V |3q). Namely, if t “ |Ft˚ | (one edge fails at each round), the
CFE-PB Algorithm outperforms the CFE Algorithms by Opmint|V |, tuq.
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Theorem 3.2. CFE-PB Algorithm runs in Op|V |3 ` |Ft˚ ||V |2q.
Proof. Finding the pseudo inverse of the matrix requires Op|V |3q time. Therefore, Line 1 takes
Op|V |3q time. Lines 5 and 6 in the algorithm take Op|V |q time and Line 7 takes Op|V |2q,
therefore the whole for loop takes at most Op|Fi||V |2q time at each step. Using A` computed
in the for loop, Lines 8 and 9 take Op|V |2q time. Thus, the total running time of the algorithm
is at most Op|V |3q `Opp|F0| ` |F1| ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` |Ft|q|V |2q “ Op|V |3q `Op|Ft˚ ||V |2q. 
Note that a similar approach (the step by step rank-1 update) can be applied to other linear
equations solution methods (e.g., LU factorization [77]). Yet, using the pseudo-inverse allows
developing tools for analyzing the effect of a single edge failure (as showed in Section 3.4) and
supports the development of an algorithm for finding the most vulnerable edges (see Section 3.6).
3.6 Hardness and Heuristic
In this section, we establish that deciding if there exists a failure event (of size at most a given
value) such that the yield after stabilization is less than a given threshold, is NP-complete.
Using the results from Section 3.4, however, we introduce a heuristic for the problem of finding
an initial failure that causes a cascade resulting with the minimum possible yield (minimum
yield problem). We numerically show that in most cases, solutions obtained by the heuristic
lead to a yield comparable to the solutions obtained by more numerically complex methods.
Lemma 3.8. Given G, a real number y, 0 ď y ď 1, and an integer k ě 1, deciding if there exists
a set of initial edge failures of the size at most k resulting in a yield less than y is NP-complete.
Proof. Consider following problem:
1. Suppose G “ pV,Eq is an instance of the classical flow problem, with a single source node
tsu and set of sink nodes T . Assume demands are equal to 1 and lines have unbounded
capacity (Op|V |q). Does a subset of edges A Ď E with |A| ď k exist such that |Tfail| ě l?
(Tfail is the set of sink nodes which get disconnected from the source node s after removing
set of edges A.)
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It is proved in [20, Theorem 7], that problem above is NP-complete. We want to use this result
to proof Lemma 3.8. For this reason we provide a polynomial time reduction from problem
above to minimum yield problem.
2. Suppose G “ pV,Eq is an instance of the power flow problem, with set of supply node
S “ tsu and set of demand nodes T . Assume pt “ ´1 for all t P T , and ps “ |T |. Assume
all the lines have capacities equal to |T | and reactance values equal to 1. Is there a set of
initial failures with size less than k resulting in yield Y ď 1´ l|T |?
Claim. Suppose the graphs in problems 1 and 2 are the same, then the answer to problem 1 is
yes if, and only if, the answer to problem 2 is yes.
Proof. (ñ) Assume the answer to problem 1 is yes. It means that there exists a set of edges
A Ď E with |A| ď k such that their removal disconnects at least l of the sink nodes from the
source node. Now in problem 2, choose F0 “ A. Since two graphs are the same, at least l of
the demand nodes are disconnected from the supply node s. As a result, final yield is at most
|T | ´ l. Since initial supplied demand was |T |, Y ď 1´ l|T | .
(ð) Now the other way, assume the answer to problem 2 is yes. It means that there is an initial
set of edge failures F0 Ď E with |F0| ď k such that Y ď 1´ l|T | . First, since all the edges have
capacity equal to |T | which is an upper bound for a flow in an edge, after initial set of failures,
there is no cascade. Therefore, there is no further edge failures. Second, with the same reason,
as long as a demand node is connected to the supply node, its demand can be satisfied. Now
since Y ď 1´ l|T | , with initial set of failure F0, at least l of the demand nodes are disconnected
from supply node s. In problem 1 choose A “ F0, since the graphs in two problems are the
same, by removing set of edges A from G, at least m of the sink nodes are disconnected from
source node s. Since |A| “ |F0| ď k, the answer to problem 1 is also yes. ˝
It can be concluded from this claim that problem 1 can be reduced to problem 2. Hence, the
minimum yield problem is NP-hard and its decision version is NP-complete. 
As indicated in Lemma 3.8, the minimum yield problem is NP-hard. We now present a
heuristic algorithm for solving this problem when xe “ 1 @e P E. We refer to it as the Most
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Algorithm 3 - Most Vulnerable Edges Selection – Resistance distance Based (MVES-RB)
Input: A connected graph G “ pV,Eq and an integer k ě 1.
1: Compute A`.
2: Compute the phase angles ~θ “ A`~p and compute flows fe from the phase angles.
3: Compute the resistance distance rpi, jq “ rpeq @e “ ti, ju P E.
4: Sort edges e1, e2, . . . , e|E| such that v ď u iff |fevrpevq| ě |feurpeuq|.
5: return e1, e2, . . . , ek.
Vulnerable Edge Selection – Resistance distance Based (MVES-RB) Algorithm. From Corol-
lary 3.6, edges with large rpi, jq have larger failure costs. Thus, edges with large rpi, jq ˆ |fij |
have greater impact on the flow changes on the other edges. Based on this result, the MVES-RB
Algorithm selects the k edges with highest rpi, jq ˆ |fij | values as the initial set of failures in
Op|V |3q.
The MVES-RB Algorithm is in the same category as the algorithms that identify the set of
failures with the largest impact (i.e., algorithms that solve the N´k problem [30,113]). However,
none of the previous works focusing on the N ´ k problem, considers cascading failures. To
evaluate the performance of the MVES-RB Algorithm, we compare its performance to that of
the four other intuitive methods for selecting the initial set of failures: (i) Random, (ii) Greedy,
(iii) Max-flow, and (iv) Stepwise greedy.
In Random selection, k initial edge failures are randomly selected in Opkq time. In Greedy
selection, for each edge e P E, the yield is computed after an initial failure in that edge. Then,
the k edges that have the lowest resulting yield values are removed. The Greedy selection takes
Opt|V |3|E|q time. In Max-flow selection, the k edges with the maximum amount of initial flow
are selected in Op|V |3q time. Stepwise-greedy selection is a step by step selection method. At
each step, an edge e is selected such that if e is removed together with the previously selected
edges, the yield is minimized. For k “ 1, both Stepwise-greedy and Greedy selection select
an edge that upon its failure minimizes the yield. The running time of the Stepwise selection
method is Opt|V |3|E|kq.
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Figure 3.11: Comparison between the effectiveness of different methods for selecting the most
vulnerable edges when the factor of safety is α “ 0.1.
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Figure 3.12: Comparison between the effectiveness of different methods for selecting the most
vulnerable edges when the factor of safety is α “ 0.2.
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To compare the performance of different selection methods, we computed the yield after
selecting k “ 1, . . . , 15 edges as the initial failed edges in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus benchmark
systems. For all the edges the reactance values are xe “ 1. For capacities, we consider two
options: (i) for each edge ce “ p1 ` αq|fe|,4 where fe is the initial flow on the edge, and (ii)
all edges have equal capacities equal to ce “ 1.2 maxe1 |fe1 | (thereby removing the effect of
asymmetry in the capacities).
Figs. 3.11 and 3.12 illustrate the results when capacities are chosen based on the initial
flows with α “ 1.1 and α “ 1.2, respectively. As can be seen, the Stepwise-greedy method
that has the worst running time outperforms the other methods in most of the cases. However,
the Max-flow method and the MVES-RB Algorithm that have much lower running time than
the Stepwise-greedy method, perform relatively well and in most cases better than the Greedy
method. The Random selection method that has the lowest running time also seems to perform
well in some cases.
Fig. 3.13 illustrates the results when all the edges have equal capacities. As can be seen,
in that case, the Random selection is not comparable to other methods. As it was previously
the case, the Stepwise-greedy method outperforms other methods here as well. The MVES-
RB Algorithm, the Max-flow, and Greedy methods perform equally good and none of them
outperforms the other. The running time of the MVES-RB Algorithm and Max-flow method,
however, is much less than the Greedy method.
Overall, the Stepwise-greedy method outperforms others in most of the cases. However,
its high running time makes this method impractical in larger networks. Thus, since both the
MVES-RB Algorithm and the Max-flow method have a much lower running time and perform
relatively good in the most cases, they seem to be better options.
4Following [27], we assume that the capacities are 1 ` α times the initial flows. α is often referred to as the
Factor of Safety (FoS) of the grid.
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Figure 3.13: Comparison between the effectiveness of different methods for selecting the most
vulnerable edges when capacities are all equal to 1.2 maxe |fe|.
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3.7 Conclusion
In order to better understand failures and the evolution of cascades in the power grid, we studied
properties of the admittance matrix of the grid and provided analytical tools for computing the
impact of a single edge failure on the flows on the other edges. Based on these tools, we derived
upper bounds on the flow changes after a single edge failure and introduced a metric to assess
the robustness of graphs to single edge failures. We illustrated via simulations the impact of such
failures. Then, we showed the unique properties of the cascading failure model and introduced
a pseudo-inverse based efficient algorithm to identify the cascade evolution. Finally, we proved
that the minimum yield problem is NP-hard and introduced a simple heuristic to detect the
most vulnerable edges.
In a follow up to our work presented in this chapter, in [138], we extensively studied cascading
failures’ spatial and temporal properties in the U.S. Western Interconnection (WI) power grid
with collaboration with researchers at Yeshiva University. Based on simulations, we observed
that the yield has a bimodal distribution (i.e., the failure of a randomly selected line leads either
to an insignificant power loss or to a major blackout). We found that there is a latent period
in the development of major blackouts where few lines are overloaded and the yield remains
high. The duration of this latent period is proportional to the line tolerance (the ratio of the
maximum load a line can carry to its initial load). The existence of the latent period suggests
that intervention during the early stages of a cascade can significantly reduce the risk of a major
blackout. Our recent observations as well as the results provided in this Chapter show that due
to their unique properties, cascades in power grids require more studies to be fully understood
and controlled.
In another recent collaborative work [40], we studied cascades under the more detailed AC
power flow model and compared the severity of the cascade under the AC and DC models.
We observed that despite the strong correlation between the results under the two models, the
DC cascade model can lead to an inaccurate and overly optimistic cascade predictions in large
power grids. Hence, more studies under the AC power flows is needed to obtain a more accurate
understanding of the cascades in power grids.
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Chapter 4
Quantifying the Effects of k-line
Failures
Power grids are required to withstand a single component failure, known as the N´1 contingency
standard. However, one or more lines can often be out of service for various reasons such as
maintenance and construction works. This can result in the violation of the N ´ 1 standard
and vulnerability of the power grid to a single failure, as was the case in Turkey in 2015 [12].
Therefore, higher order contingency analysis is necessary to detect critical events caused by more
than a single failure.
Due to the large number of possibilities, high order contingency analysis is computationally
expensive. Therefore, most of the previous tools are effective for analyzing contingencies caused
by failures in one or two components of the grid [30, 47, 58, 59, 66, 67, 92, 144]. In order to
circumvent this issue, in this chapter, we introduce the disturbance value of a failure. We show
that this value can be efficiently computed for any set of line failures independently of the size
of the grid and can be effectively used to filter out less crucial contingencies. The disturbance
value can therefore significantly reduce the time complexity of contingency analysis by revealing
contingencies that are vital for more in depth analysis.
First, we extend and build on the results in Section 3.4 which focused on single line failures
to analytically compute the effect of multiple line failures on redistribution of power flows. We
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refer to an event resulting in the failure of k distinct lines, a k-line failure event. Similar to the
most of the previous work on contingency analysis, we use the linearized DC approximation of
the power flows, due to the complexities associated with the AC power flow model. We present
an analytical update of the pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix after a k-line failure event.
Our approach is similar to [79], but we use the pseudo-inverse instead of the truncated inverse of
the admittance matrix which requires selecting a node as the slack bus. An advantage of using
pseudo-inverse is that it allows having a unified formula for all k-line failures regardless of their
location and their connectivity to the slack bus.1 Using this result, we define and analytically
compute the k-line outage distribution matrix which generalizes the definition of the line outage
distribution factors for single line failures [155] or as we called it, mutual edge flow change ratio
in Chapter 3.
While the k-line outage distribution matrix captures all effects of a k-line failure on flow
changes, it is not efficient to compute and store this matrix for contingency analysis in large
power grids. To overcome this challenge, we use the matrix of equivalent reactance values as we
did in Subsection 3.4.2 to efficiently compute the sum of changes in the power flows after a k-line
failure and to provide a metric that captures the essence of the flow changes after failures. In
particular, we define and analytically compute the disturbance value of a failure (the weighted
sum of squares of the flow changes) and show that this computation can be done for a k-line
failure in Op1q as long as k is much smaller than the total number of lines, the case in contingency
analysis of the power grids. Hence, the disturbance value of a k-line failure can be computed
independently of the size of the grid.
To show that the disturbance values provide a separation between failures with higher impact
and lower impact, we compute the disturbance values for all possible choices of 3-line failures
in the IEEE 118-bus and 300-bus systems. We demonstrate that by ranking cases based on
their disturbance values and considering only cases with high disturbance value, we are able to
1Another advantage of using pseudo-inverse is that our results can be tied to the related notions of Laplacian
and resistance distances in graph theory [22]. This enables further use of existing tools in graph theory for
contingency analysis in power grids as in [128].
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decrease the total number of cases needed to be analyzed for contingency analysis by more than
90%.






cases which requires Opmkq time. To alleviate this issue, we provide an
approximation for the disturbance values. We show that by approximating the disturbance
value of a k-line failure, one can only focus on the rm ăă m lines with the highest 1-line









cases. Moreover, we numerically
show that the approximation error is below 10% in most of the cases in the 118- and 300-bus
systems.
To show that disturbance values effectively rank k-line failures, we numerically compute
the relationship between disturbance value of all 3-line failures and the severity of the initiated
cascades in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems. We show that although the disturbance value
does not take into account the capacities of the lines, it can predict the average severity of the
cascade initiated by a failure.
Finally, we numerically show the usefulness of the disturbance values in predicting changes
under the more detailed AC power flows after a k-line failure. In particular, we compute the
disturbance values under the AC power flows and show that the disturbance values under the AC
and DC differ only in scaling. We also study the correlation between the voltage changes after
a k-line failure and disturbance values, and show that k-line failures with higher disturbance
values cause more voltage changes as well.
Since the AC power flow equations are nonlinear, there are k-line failures after which the
AC power solver does not converge to a solution. We show that almost all such failures in the
IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems have the disturbance values that are between the top 10% of
all the k-line failures in terms of the disturbance values.
4.1 Related Work
Many great ideas have been developed for contingency analysis in power grids since the advent
of the modern power transmission network. Detecting most important lines and nodes solely
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based on the topology of the power grid was studied in [151] using network centrality measures.
Compensation theorem and current injection methods were used to analyze the effect of line
failures in [58,59,66,92,155]. In particular, [155] introduced the notion of line outage distribution
factors that inspired many other studies including the work presented in this and previous
chapter. [86,144] used matrix updates to study the effect of two line failures and used the results
to introduce an algorithm for the N ´ 2 contingency problem (contingencies caused by failures
in at most 2 components of the grid). In a follow up work [87], contingency and Influence graphs
were introduced to study N ´ 2 contingency analysis.
More optimization-based techniques for contingency analysis of the grids were explored in [47,
63]. In particular, [47] focused on identifying the most probable failure modes in static load
distribution using a linear-program. In a recent innovative paper, probabilistic algorithms were
developed to identify collections of multiple contingencies that initiate cascading failure [83].
High order contingency analysis was studied in [30, 45, 114]. In [45], the contingencies were
ordered based on their empirical occurrence probabilities and only contingencies with high proba-
bility were considered. A mixed-integer model for the N ´k contingency problem was presented
and used in [30]. However, this method does not scale well as k increases. In [114], the resistance
distances are used as in [128] to identify most important lines and to prune the graph. The con-
tingency analysis was then performed on the reduced graph instead of the entire graph in order
to reduce the total number of contingencies. However, since resistance distances are computed
independently of supply and demand values, such an approach may miss contingencies that are
caused by failures in lines carrying large power flows.
The main advantages of using disturbance value for contingency analysis, as proposed in this
chapter, over previous work is that: (i) using techniques from linear algebra, the disturbance
value can be efficiently computed for any number of line failures independently of the size of a
grid, and therefore it scales well for high order contingency analysis, (ii) due to its simplicity, it
is easy to implement, and (iii) since the disturbance value is based on the power flows as well
as the admittance matrix, it captures both the topological and operational properties of the
system.
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4.2 Model
We consider contingencies caused by the set of line failures of size k denoted by L Ď E. We
refer to these failures as k-line failures. Without loss of generality, for convenience we assume
L “ te1, e2, . . . , eku. We denote the graph after failures by G1 “ pV 1, E1q, in which E1 “ E´L and
V 1 “ V . We also assume that removing edges in L from G does not disconnect the graph. Notice
that failures that disconnect the grid have the highest priority, since they most likely divide the
grid into unbalanced islands in terms of supply/demand values that may result in further failures.
Therefore, such failures should always be considered for more in depth contingency analysis. In
Section 4.4, we show that some of our results can be used to approximately rank k-line failures
that disconnect the grid based on their criticality among themselves.
Hence, here we assume G1 is connected. Upon failures, the power flows redistributed in G1
based on the equation A1~θ1 “ ~p, in which A1 is the admittance matrix of G1. In Section 4.3, we
use linear algebra to compute A1` and quantify the effect of k-line failures.
Notation. In this Chapter, ~yk denotes the subvector of ~y with its first k entries. We use k¯
to show the indices other that 1 to k (e.g., ~fk¯ denotes the subvector of
~f with its k ` 1 to m
entries). We denote the submatrix of Q limited to the first k columns by Qk and the submatrix
of Q limited to the first k rows and columns by Qk|k. We define ∆~fk¯ “ ~fk¯´ ~f 1¯k to show the flow
changes on the lines in EzL after the failure in lines in L.
4.3 Failure Analysis
In this section, we study the effect of k-line failures on the flow changes on the other lines using
the DC power flows as described in Section 2.3.
The following lemma is the generalization of Lemma 3.1 and is similar to the idea used
in [79, Theorem 2] to detect the connected components after multiple line failures. Our proof is
different from the proof of a similar Theorem in [79, Theorem 2].
Lemma 4.1. Matrix I´Y1{2k|kDtkA`DkY1{2k|k is invertible if, and only if G1 is connected.
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Proof. First, it is easy to see that I ´ Y1{2k|kDtkA`DkY1{2k|k is invertible if, and only if I ´
Yk|kDtkA`Dk is invertible. Now assume, G1 is disconnected. Without loss of generality, as-
sume C “ te1, e2, . . . , eru is a minimal subset of te1, e2, . . . , eku such that GzC is disconnected.
Since, C is a minimal subset, GzC has only two connected components G1 and G2 and each
ei P C has one end in G1 and the other end in G2. Again with out loss of generality, assume that
all the edges in C are directed from G1 to G2. We prove that vector ~v P Rk defined as vi “ yii
for i ď r and vi “ 0 for i ą r is an eigenvector of Yk|kDtkA`Dk associated with the eigenvalue
1. Notice that if we set ~p “ Dk~v, then θi “ 1 for all i P G1 and θi “ 0 for all i P G2 gives a
solution to DC power flow problem in G. It is easy to see that in this setting ~fk “ ~v. On the
other hand, ~fk “ Yk|kDtkA`~p, and since ~fk “ ~v and ~p “ Dk~v, therefore Yk|kDtkA`Dk~v “ ~v.
Hence, Yk|kDtkA`Dk has eigenvalue 1 and I´Yk|kDtkA`Dk is not invertible.
Now assume, I´Yk|kDtkA`Dk is not invertible. Then, I´Yk|kDtkA`Dk has an eigenvalue
0 and Yk|kDtkA`Dk has an eigenvalue 1. Assume ~v is the eigenvector associated with the
eigenvalue 1 of Yk|kDtkA`Dk. It is again easy to see that since Yk|kDtkA`Dk~v “ ~v, if we set
~p “ Dk~v, then ~fk “ ~v is the solution to the power flow problem in G. From the flow conservation
equations, it is also easy to verify that ~fk¯ “ 0. Now, by contradiction assume G1 is connected.
Then, there should be a path in G1 from a node i to node j such that θi ‰ θj . Therefore, there
should be an edge e “ pw, zq in this path such that θw ‰ θz and thus fe ‰ 0. However, since
e P G1 and ~fk¯ “ 0 we know that fe “ 0 which is a contradiction. Therefore, G1 is not connected.
From the proof it can be seen that if ~v is an eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of
Yk|kDtkA`Dk, then nodes with the same phase angle values in the solution of the power flow
problem in G with ~p “ Dk~v form a connected component in G1. This can be used to efficiently
find the connected components of G1 after a k-line failure. 
In the following lemma, we generalize Theorem 3.1 for single line failures and provide an
analytical update of the pseudo-inverse of the admittance matrix following a k-line failure.
Lemma 4.2. If G1 is connected,
A1` “ A` `A`DkY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kDtkA`DkY1{2k|ks´1Y1{2k|kDtkA .`
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Proof. First, from Lemma 4.1, since G1 is connected, rI´Y1{2k|kDtkA`DkY1{2k|ks´1 is defined. Now
to show the equality, it is easy to see that AA` “ I´ 1nJ, in which I is the identity matrix and
J is all 1 matrix (For more details see the proof of Theorem 3.1). Hence, from [14, Theorem 4.8],
since A1 “ A´DkYk|kDtk “ A´DkY1{2k|kpDkY1{2k|kqt, the pseudo inverse of A1 can be computed
as,
A1` “ A` `A`DkY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kDtkA`DkY1{2k|ks´1Y1{2k|kDtkA .`

From Lemma 4.2, the changes in phase angles after k-line failures can be computed as,
~θ1 ´ ~θ “ pA1` ´A`q~p
“ A`DkY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kDtkA`DkY1{2k|ks´1Y1{2k|kDtkA`~p
“ A`DkY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kDtkA`DkY1{2k|ks´1Y´1{2k|k ~fk
“ A`DkY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kRk|kY1{2k|ks´1Y´1{2k|k ~fk. (4.1)
Recall from Subsection 2.3.2 that matrix R is the matrix of equivalent reactance values.
Using (4.1), we can compute the changes in the flows as,
∆~fk¯ “ Yk¯|k¯Dtk¯A`DkY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kRk|kY1{2k|ks´1Y´1{2k|k ~fk
“ Yk¯|k¯Rk¯|kY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kRk|kY1{2k|ks´1Y´1{2k|k ~fk. (4.2)
It is important to see that Yk¯|k¯Rk¯|kY
1{2
k|krI´Y1{2k|kRk|kY1{2k|ks´1Y´1{2k|k is independent of ~p and
solely depends on the structure properties of the network. Hence, following a similar definition
in [155] for single line failures, we define this matrix as k-line outage distribution matrix and
denote it by L :“ Yk¯|k¯Rk¯|kY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kRk|kY1{2k|ks´1Y´1{2k|k . Hence, ∆~fk¯ “ L~fk.
While k-line outage distribution matrix captures all effects of a k-line failure on the flow
changes, it is not efficient to compute and store it for contingency analysis in large power grids.
In order to overcome this problem, we use the matrix of equivalent reactance values to efficiently
compute the sum of changes in the power flows after k-line failures and to provide a metric to
capture the essence of the flow changes after failures. The following lemma is the main step
towards this goal. It demonstrates that Y1{2RY1{2 is an idempotent matrix. Recall that we
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used a similar idea in the proof of Lemma 3.6. We use this property, to provide the results in
Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2.
Lemma 4.3. Y1{2RY1{2 “ Y´1{2D`DY1{2, and therefore
pY1{2RY1{2q2 “ Y1{2RY1{2.
Proof. We know from before that R “ DtA`D and A “ DYDt “ pDY1{2qpDY1{2qt. Hence,




From the properties of the pseudo-inverse, pDY1{2q`pDY1{2q is a symmetric matrix. Moreover,
pDY1{2q`pDY1{2qpDY1{2q` “ pDY1{2q`. Therefore,
Y1{2RY1{2 “ pDY1{2q`pDY1{2qpDY1{2q`pDY1{2q




“ Y´1{2D`DY1{2 “ Y1{2RY1{2.

Corollary 4.1. Rk|k¯∆~fk¯ “ Rk|k ~fk.
Proof. To make equations cleaner in the proof, define H :“ Y1{2RY1{2. From Lemma 4.3,
H2 “ H. Hence, if we use block multiplication, then Hk|k “ H2k|k ` Hk|k¯Hk¯|k. Using this
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equation,
∆~fk¯ “ Yk¯|k¯Rk¯|kY1{2k|krI´Y1{2k|kRk|kY1{2k|ks´1Y´1{2k|k ~fk
ñY1{2k|kRk|k¯∆~fk¯ “ Hk|k¯Hk¯|krI´Hk|ks´1Y´1{2k|k ~fk
ñY1{2k|kRk|k¯∆~fk¯ “ Hk|kY´1{2k|k ~fk
ñY1{2k|kRk|k¯∆~fk¯ “ Y1{2k|kRk|k ~fk ñ Rk|k¯∆~fk¯ “ Rk|k ~fk.

Corollary 4.1 shows the use of matrix R in evaluating the effect of k-line failures without
computing the flows directly. This equation can be used to estimate the effect of k-line failures.
Since the matrix of equivalent reactance values needs to be computed only once, the matrix
equation in Corollary 4.1 can be written for any k-line failures without further computations.
To quantify the effect of k-line failures more efficiently, in the following, we define a metric
that captures the effect of k-line failures by a single value and show that it can be computed




k¯|k¯∆~fk¯ as the disturbance value of a k-line failure. It is easy to see that y
´1
ii ∆fi captures
the changes in the phase angle differences between the end buses of a single line. Hence, the









i reflects both the big phase difference changes
(which is important for the stability of the system) and the big flow changes (which is important
for thermal safety of a line). Notice that the disturbance values can be defined also based on
the phase angle of the nodes instead of the power flows using (2.6).
In the following lemma, we provide the key step in computing the disturbance value of a
failure analytically and efficiently in Corollary 4.2.







k|ks´1. From (4.2), we know Y´1{2k¯|k¯ ∆~fk¯ “ ΦY
´1{2
k|k ~fk.
Lemma 4.4. ΦtΦ “ ´I`C.
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Proof. To make equations cleaner in the proof, define H :“ Y1{2RY1{2. From Lemma 4.3,
H2 “ H. Hence, if we use block multiplication, then Hk|k “ H2k|k `Hk|k¯Hk¯|k. Thus,
Hk|k “ H2k|k `Hk|k¯Hk¯|k ñ Hk|krI´Hk|ks “ Hk|k¯Hk¯|k
ñ Hk|k “ Hk|k¯Hk¯|krI´Hk|ks´1.
It is easy to see that Φ “ Hk¯|krI´Hk|ks´1. Hence, using equation above,
ΦtΦ “ rI´Hk|ks´1Hk|k¯Hk¯|krI´Hk|ks´1
“ rI´Hk|ks´1Hk|k
“ rI´Hk|ks´1Hk|k ´ rI´Hk|ks´1 ` rI´Hk|ks´1
“ ´rI´Hk|ks´1r´Hk|k ` Is ` rI´Hk|ks´1
“ ´I` rI´Hk|ks´1 “ ´I`C.

Corollary 4.2. ∆~f t
k¯
Y´1
k¯|k¯∆~fk¯ “ ~f tkY
´1{2
k|k r´I`CsY´1{2k|k ~fk.
Corollary 4.2 provides a very important tool for contingency analysis in the power grids. It
shows that the disturbance value of a k-line failure can be computed in Opk3q time which is
independent of the size of the network and only depends on the size of the initial failures. Since
most of the times in contingency analysis k ăă m, Opk3q « Op1q. Corollary 4.2 can be used
for fast ranking of the contingencies based on the disturbance values and pruning most of the
cases based on this value. This can significantly reduce the time complexity of the contingency
analysis for large k.
Moreover, notice that following Lemma 4.1, matrix C is well defined if, and only if, the k-line
failure does not disconnect the grid. Therefore, Corollary 4.2 can also indicate in Op1q whether
a k-line failure disconnects the grid.
We computed the disturbance values for all possible choices of 3-line failures in the IEEE





˘ “ 1, 055, 240 possible choices for the initial set of failures. Using Corollary 4.2,
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we could compute the disturbance values for all set of failures (and detect cases that disconnect
the grid) in less than a minute. Out of those, 159, 591 of them make the graph disconnected.
The cumulative distribution function of the disturbance values for the rest of 895,649 cases
are shown in Fig. 4.1. As can be seen, most of the cases do not result in a high (more than
5,000) disturbance value. Only 10% of the cases have a significant disturbance value. The figure
suggests that disturbance values can provide a separation between the failures with higher impact
and lower impact.
Fig. 4.1 also shows the cumulative distribution function of the disturbance values for all
possible 3-line failures in IEEE 300-bus system that do not disconnect the grid (5,473,725 cases).
As can be seen, again most of the cases do not result in a high disturbance value and only less
than 10% of the total cases have a significant disturbance value (more than 35,000).2
The numerical results support our previous statement that the disturbance values can sig-
nificantly reduce the total number of cases that are needed to be considered in the contingency
analysis of the grids. Moreover, since Corollary 4.2 provides a very fast way of computing the
disturbance values, it can significantly decrease the time complexity of the contingency analysis
in power grids.
4.4 Approximating the Disturbance Values
In the previous section, we demonstrated that using Corollary 4.2, the disturbance value of a
k-line failure can be computed efficiently in Op1q. However, to analyze all the k-line failure






Opmkq time. To alleviate this issue, in this section we provide an approximation for the distur-
bance values that allows one to focus on the lines with high 1-line disturbance values instead of
all the lines.
2Notice that the threshold level for “high disturbance value” depends on the level of safety that a system
operator likes to maintain. As can be seen in Fig. 4.1, more than 80% of the cases result in a very small
disturbance value. Hence, 1% to 20% of the cases with the highest disturbance values can be selected for deeper
analysis depending on the level of safety.
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Figure 4.1: The cumulative distribution function of the disturbance values for all 3-line failures
in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems that do not disconnect the grid.
The idea of our approximation lies in the structure of the matrix R. As shown in Fig. 4.2,
most of the entries of matrix R in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems have very small values
compare to its diagonal entries. Hence, we can approximate R by its diagonal entries as R «




k¯|k¯∆~fk¯ “ ~f tkY
´1{2
k|k r´I` rI´Y1{2k|kRk|kY1{2k|ks´1sY´1{2k|k ~fk
















In another words, we approximate the disturbance value of a k-line failure as the sum of the
disturbance values of the k single line failures:
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(a) IEEE 118-bus (b) IEEE 300-bus
Figure 4.2: Heatmap for the absolute value of the entries of matrix R for the IEEE 118- and
300-bus systems. Darker points have higher values.
The advantage of this approximation is that to detect k-line failures with high disturbance











Another advantage of using the approximation (4.3) for disturbance values is that it can
used to quantify the effect of k-line failures that disconnect the grid as well. Although failures
that disconnect the grid may have more devastating effect because of the imbalance they may
cause between supply and demand, we believe that this approximation can be used to rank these
failures among themselves. Validating the usefulness of approximation (4.3) for the failures that
disconnect the grid is part of the future work.




δkpi1, i2, . . . , ikq ´řkj“1 δ1pijqˇˇˇ
δkpi1, i2, . . . , ikq ˆ 100.
Fig. 4.3 shows the approximation error in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems. As can
be seen, in both systems, for most of the cases the error is less than 10%. In particular, the
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(a) IEEE 118-bus (b) IEEE 300-bus
Figure 4.3: Approximation error percentage of the approximate disturbance values for all the
3-line failures than do not disconnect the grid in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems.
approximation error in the important cases (the ones with high disturbance value) is very low
(see orange lines in Fig. 4.3). Moreover, the correlation between the approximation and actual
disturbance values is about 0.98 in both the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems.
4.5 Cascading Failures
To show that disturbance values effectively rank k-line failures, we numerically compute the
relationship between disturbance value of all 3-line failures and the severity of the initiated
cascades in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems.
We for cascade model as described in Subsection 3.2.1 with deterministic outage rule: namely,
a line e “ ti, ju fails when the magnitude |fe| of the flow on that line exceeds its capacity ce.
The line flow capacities are estimated as ce “ p1`αqmaxt|fij |, fu, where f is the median of the
initial magnitude of line flows and α “ 0.2 is the lines’ factor of safety. To measure the severity
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(a) Yield (b) Number of Line Failures
Figure 4.4: The relationship between the disturbance values and the average severity of cascades
initiated by all the 3-line failures than do not disconnect the grid in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus
systems.
of a cascade, we compute yield (the ratio between the demand supplied at the end of a cascade
and the original demand) and total number of line failures at the end of the cascade.
Fig. 4.4 depicts the relationship between the disturbance values and the average severity of
cascades initiated by all the 3-line failures than do not disconnect the grid in the IEEE 118- and
300-bus systems. As can been seen in Fig. 4.4a, in both systems, the average yield decreases
as the disturbance value increases. Moreover, Fig. 4.4b shows that the average number of line
failures at the end of the cascade increases on average, as the disturbance value increases.
The results in this section suggest that although the disturbance value does not take into
account the capacities of the lines, it can predict the average severity of the cascade initiated by
a failure.
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(a) IEEE 118-bus (b) IEEE 300-bus
Figure 4.5: Scatter plot of the disturbance values under the AC and DC power flows for all the
3-line failures that do not disconnect the grid in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems.
4.6 Disturbance Values under the AC Power Flow Model
In this section, we numerically show the usefulness of the disturbance values in predicting the
changes under the more detailed AC power flows after a k-line failure. To solve the AC power
flows, we used the MATPOWER AC power flow solver [164].
We first computed the disturbance values under the AC power flows. To do so, we used the
phase angles of the nodes computed before and after a k-line failure under the AC model (recall
that the disturbance values can be defined also based on the phase angle). Fig. 4.5 shows the
relationship between the disturbance values computed under DC (using corollary 4.2) and AC
power flows. As can be seen, the disturbance values under the AC and DC are only different in
scale. The correlation between these two values is 0.99 and 0.93 in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus
systems, respectively. Hence, detecting the important cases based on the disturbance values in
the DC is almost similar to the AC model.
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(a) IEEE 118-bus (b) IEEE 300-bus
Figure 4.6: Mean sum squared of the voltage changes for the 3-line failures that do not disconnect
the grid with the disturbance value less than a certain value in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus
systems.
Second, we studied the correlation between the voltage changes after a k-line failure and
disturbance values. For this purpose, we computed the mean sum squared of the voltage changes
after all 3-line failures that do not disconnect the grid in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems.
As can be seen in Fig. 4.6, on average, 3-line failures with higher disturbance values cause more
voltage changes as well. This demonstrates that the disturbance values which can be computed
very efficiently using corollary 4.2, can also predict the disturbances in the node voltages whose
computation is of higher complexity.
Finally, since the AC power flow equations are nonlinear (see Appendix 2.2), there are 3-line
failures after which the AC power solver does not converge to a solution. The CDF of the
disturbance values for these 3-line failures is depicted in Fig. 4.7. As can be seen, for all such
failures in the IEEE 118-bus system the disturbance values are above 5000, meaning that they
are between the top 10% of all the 3-line failures in terms of the disturbance values (see Fig. 4.1).
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Figure 4.7: The CDF of the disturbance values for the 3-line failures that do not disconnect
the grid but produce enough instability such that the AC power solver does not converge to a
solution.
The same is true in the IEEE 300-bus system. Most of the 3-line failures that result in
the divergence of the AC power flow solver, are between the top 10-20% cases in terms of the
disturbance values.
Overall, the results in this section demonstrate that the disturbance values can be useful
for predicting the changes under the AC power flow model. Since following corollary 4.2 the
disturbance values can be computed much faster compared to the computation of steady state
changes under the AC power flows (which requires solving a nonlinear set of equations several
times), this significantly reduces the computational complexity associated with the contingency
analysis in the grid.
4.7 Conclusion
The results in this chapter provide efficient tools for quantifying the effect of k-line failures. The
most unique aspect of our approach is the use of the matrix of equivalent reactance values to
efficiently capture the effect of k-line failures. We defined the disturbance value of a failure and
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show that this metric can be computed for any set of failures in Op1q. Moreover, based on the
approximation of the disturbance values, the total number of cases that need to be considered
can be significantly reduced as well. Our numerical results showed that disturbance values
provide a clear separation between the failures with higher impact and lower impact under both
the AC and DC power flows.
Despite providing a fast and useful measure for quantifying the severity of a k-line failure,
the disturbance value does not capture the thermal capacity of the lines as well as further
instabilities caused by separation of the grid into several islands. Hence, the disturbance values
alone cannot be used to detect important contingencies. Since thorough contingency analysis
for all high order scenarios is intractable, however, disturbance values can be used to reduce the
total number of cases needed to be analyzed in contingency analysis and can significantly reduce
the computational complexity associated with this analysis.
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Chapter 5
Cyber-physical Attacks (DC Model)
Power grids are comprised of two components: (i) the physical infrastructure of the power
transmission system (power lines, substations, power stations), and (ii) the Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system that monitors and controls the grid (the control network)
(Fig. 5.1). The physical infrastructure is the target of physical attacks and SCADA is the target
of cyber attacks.
In the case of a physical attack, the system’s stability can be maintained if SCADA receives
precise information about the location of the attack and takes proper action accordingly. If
however, the flow of information is obstructed by a cyber attack, the SCADA is prevented from
taking necessary and appropriate actions. This problem, the joint cyber and physical attacks
on power grids, is the focus of our work. We develop methods to estimate the state of the power
grid following a joint cyber and physical attack, and study the resilience of different topologies
as well as the resilience to different kinds of attacks.
We use the DC power flow model to describe the state of the grid. We also use a modified
version of the control network model [85] that includes Phasor Measurement Units (PMU),
Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC), and a control center (Fig. 5.1). We define a zone as a set
of buses (nodes), power lines (edges), PMUs, and an associated PDC. We analyze an attack
that disconnects lines within a zone (physical attack) and obstructs the flow of information from
the PMUs within the zone to the control center (cyber attack). For example, an adversary can
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Figure 5.1: Components of the power grid and potential attacks: physical attacks target the
physical infrastructure (lines, substations, etc.); Cyber attacks target the SCADA system – an
adversary can obstruct the flow of information from the PMUs within the zone to the control
center.
perform the cyber attack by disabling the zone’s associated PDC. Alternatively, the adversary
can attack the communication network between the PMUs and the PDC, or between the PDC
and the control center. Because our control network model is a generic model of SCADA that
monitors the status of the grid, most of the results and methods provided in this chapter can
be interpreted and used for more complicated control systems and scenarios.
As a result of an attack, some lines get disconnected, and the phase angles and the status of
the lines within the attacked zone H “ pVH , EHq become unavailable (Fig. 5.2). Our objective
is to recover the phase angles and detect the disconnected lines using the information available
outside of the attacked zone.
Recall from Chapter 2 that power flows are governed by the laws of physics, where a line
failure results in changes to flows and node phase angles throughout the power grid. We use





Figure 5.2: The attack model. G is the power grid graph and H is an induced subgraph of G
that represents the attacked zone. An adversary attacks a zone by disconnecting some of its
power lines (red dashed lines) and disallowing the information from the PMUs within the zone
to reach the control center.
this property and show that it is possible to estimate the state in the attacked zone using
the information available outside of the zone. Specifically, we develop methods for retrieving
information from the attacked zone by applying matrix analysis and graph theoretical tools to
the matrix representation of the DC equations.
First, we prove that it is NP-hard to detect the set of line failures given the phase angle of the
nodes before and after the attack in general case. However, we present necessary and sufficient
conditions on the structure of a zone such that our methods are guaranteed to recover the state
of the grid inside the attacked zone. We prove that if there is a matching between the nodes
inside and outside the attacked zone that covers the inside nodes (VH), then the phase angles of
the nodes in the attacked zone are recoverable by solving a set of linear equations of size |VH |.
We also prove that if H is acyclic, the disconnected lines in H are detectable by solving a set
of linear equations of size |EH |. Moreover, we show that if H is planar, under some constraints,
the disconnected lines are detectable by solving a Linear Programming (LP) problem.
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We develop another method for simultaneous recovery of phase angles and detection of
disconnected lines by solving a single LP problem. We show that this method is guaranteed to
recover the information under certain constraints on the attack (i.e., on the disconnected lines)
if there is a partial matching between the nodes inside and outside of H, and if H is planar.
Based on these results, we present the Post-Attack Recovery and Detection (PARD) Algorithm.
We propose that our methods can be generalized to the case where multiple zones are attacked
simultaneously. We show that if the attacked zones are relatively distant from each other, any
of the methods provided in this chapter can be applied to recover the information and detect
the failures in the attacked zones.
We briefly study the problem of information recovery in the presence of measurement noise.
By relaxing some of the constraints introduced in developing the methods used in the PARD
Algorithm, we provide a method for information recovery in the noisy scenarios as well. We
numerically evaluate the performance of the method and show that if the Signal to Noise Ratio
(SNR) is high enough, it can successfully recover the information.
We study the problem of partitioning power grids into the minimum number of attack-
resilient zones (i.e., zones in which the information can be recovered by the methods mentioned
above). We show that this problem is not approximable to within n1´ for all  ą 0, unless
P=NP. However, since power grids are often represented by planar graphs, we introduce our
Zone Selection (ZS) Algorithm and demonstrate that the ZS Algorithm provides a constant ap-
proximation ratio for these graphs. We present numerical results to demonstrate the operation
of the ZS Algorithm on several power grids. This algorithm can also be used for designing a
secure control network for smart grids. Finally, we present numerical results to assess the rela-
tionship between the structural properties of the power grid and its resilience to joint attacks.
5.1 Related Work
The vulnerability of general networks to attacks has been studied extensively (e.g., [16, 90, 112]
and references therein). In particular, attacks and failures in power grids has been studied using
probabilistic failure propagation models (e.g., [38, 42, 156], and references therein) as well as
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using deterministic DC power flows [27, 30, 62, 96]. Malicious data attacks on the power grid
control network have also been studied [55, 89, 98, 148]. To the best of our knowledge however,
no previous work has focused on vulnerability of power grids to joint cyber and physical attacks.
In Section 5.4, we study the problem of recovering the phase angles and detecting discon-
nected lines after a joint cyber and physical attack, a problem related to line outage identification
from changes in phase angles [73,142,143]. These studies however, were based on complete kno-
wledge of phase angle measurements and in the case of [142,143] were limited to two line failures.
The problem of line failure identification in an internal system using the information from an
external system was studied in [163], where a heuristic algorithm was proposed for only one and
two line failures.
In Section 5.7, we disucss the problem of partitioning the power grid into the minimum
number of attack-resilient zones. This problem is similar to PMU placement problems [88, 102,
161]. Recently, PMU placemnet problem has attracted much attention in India after the major
blackouts of 2013 [88]. In [161] the problem of PMU placement for line outage detection was
studied. However, none of these previous works addressed the problem of PMU placement from
the security point of view where both the PDC/PMUs and the physical network are under
attack.
In Section 5.7, we reduce the attack-resilient zone partitioning problem to the problem
of partitioning a graph into subgraphs where each subgraph is (i) acyclic, and (ii) there is a
matching between nodes inside and outside the subgraph that covers all the subgraph nodes.
This problem is closely related to the problems of vertex arboricity (which is known to be NP-
hard to be determined [74, p.193]) and k-matching cover of a graph (which can be found in
Opn3q time [150]). However, to the best of our knowledge, the joint problem ((i) and (ii) above)
was not studied before.
5.2 Model and Preliminaries
In this Chapter, we use the DC power flows as described in Section 2.3.
CHAPTER 5. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS (DC MODEL) 74
5.2.1 Control Network
We use a modified version of the model described in [85] to model the SCADA system to which
we refer as the control network. Fig. 5.1 illustrates the components of the control network. We
assume that there is a Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) at each node of G. The PMU at node i
reports the phase angle θi as well as the status of the lines (either operational or failed) adjacent
to node i. Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC) gather the data collected by PMUs. The data
gathered by PDCs is sent to a control center which monitors and controls the entire grid. A
zone is a subgraph induced by a subset of nodes with a single associated PDC.
5.2.2 Attack Model
We study attacks on power grids that affect both the physical infrastructure and the control
network. We assume that an adversary attacks a zone by: (i) disconnecting some edges within
the attacked zone (physical attack), and (ii) obstructing the flow of information from the PMUs
within the zone to the control center (cyber attack). An adversary can perform the cyber attack
by, for example, disabling the zone’s associated PDC. Alternatively, the communication network
between the PMUs and the PDC or between the PDC and the control center can be attacked.
We assume that disconnecting edges within a zone does not make G disconnected.
Fig. 5.2 shows an example of an attack on the zone represented by H. Due to the attack,
some edges are disconnected (we refer to these edges as failed lines) and the phase angles and
the status of the lines within the attacked zone become unavailable. We denote the set of failed
lines in zone H by F Ď EH . Upon failure, the failed lines are removed from the graph and the
flows are redistributed according to (2.5)-(2.6).
Notation. Throughout this and next chapter, we denote an attacked zone by H “ pVH , EHq.
Without loss of generality we assume that the indices are such that VH “ t1, 2, . . . , |VH |u and
EH “ te1, e2, . . . , e|EH |u. We denote the complement of the zone H by H¯ “ GzH. If X,Y are
two subgraphs of G, AX|Y and AVX |VY both denote the submatrix of the admittance matrix
of G with rows from VX and columns from VY . For instance, A can be written in any of the









We use the very same notation for the vectors. For instance ~θH and ~θH¯ are the vectors of phase
angle of the nodes in H and H¯, respectively. We use the prime symbol p1q to denote the values
after an attack. For instance, G1, A1, and ~θ1 are used to represent the graph, the admittance
matrix of the graph, and the phase angles of the nodes after an attack. DH P t´1, 0, 1u|VH |ˆ|EH |
is the submatrix of D as defined in Subsection 2.3.1, with rows from VH and columns from EH .
5.2.3 Graph Theoretical Terms
In this chapter, we use several graph theoretical terms and theorems mostly borrowed from [36].
We briefly review some of the important definitions in this subsection.
Subgraphs, Cuts, and Cycles: Let X and Y be subsets of the nodes of a graph G. GrXs
denotes the subgraph of G induced by X. We denote by ErX,Y s the set of edges of G with
one end in X and the other end in Y . We denote the complement of a set X by X¯ “ V zX.
The coboundary of X is the set ErX, X¯s and is denoted by BpXq. Bpvq denotes the coboundary
of X “ tvu. GrX, X¯s denotes the subgraph of G induced by the edges from ErX, X¯s. NpXq
is the set of neighbors of the nodes in X excluding X itself, and NcpXq “ X Y NpXq. We
say that Q Ď E is G-separable, if there are pairwise edge-disjoint cycles Cqpq P Qq, such that
@q P Q, q P Cq [123].
Planar Graphs: A graph G is planar, if it can be drawn in the plane so that its edges intersect
only at their ends. A planar graph G partitions the rest of the plane into a number of edgewise-
connected open sets called the faces of G.
Given a planar graph G, its dual graph G˚ is defined as follows. Corresponding to each face
c of G there is a node c˚ of G˚, and corresponding to each edge e of G there is an edge e˚ of G˚.
Two nodes c1˚ and c2˚ are joined by the edge e
˚ in G˚, if and only if their corresponding faces c1
and c2 are separated by the edge e in G. It is easy to see that the dual G
˚ of a planar graph G
is itself a planar graph [36].
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5.3 Hardness
Using the notation provided in the previous section, the problem can be stated as follows: Given
A, ~θ,H, and ~θ1¯
H
, recover phase angles ~θ1H and detect the line failures F . In this section, we study
the computational complexity of this and related problems.
First, we prove that the problem of finding the set of line failures given the phase angle of the
nodes before and after the attack is NP-hard. We prove this by reduction from the 3-partition
problem.
Definition 5.1. Given set S “ ts1, s2, . . . , s3ku of 3k elements and a bound B, such thatř3k
i“1 si “ kB and for 1 ď i ď 3k, B{4 ă si ă B{2, the 3-partition problem is the pro-
blem of whether S can be partitioned into k disjoint sets S1, . . . , Sk such that for 1 ď i ď k,ř
sjPSi sj “ B (note that each Si must therefore contain exactly 3 elements from S).
Lemma 5.1 (Garey and Johnson, 1975 [74]). The 3-partition problem is strongly NP-complete.
Lemma 5.2. Given A, ~θ, and ~θ1, it is strongly NP-hard to determine the set of line failures F .
Proof. We reduce the 3-partition problem to this problem. Assume S is a given set as described
in Def. 5.1, we form a bipartite graph G “ pV,Eq such that V “ X Y Y , E “ ttx, yu|x P X, y P
Y u, X “ t1, . . . , ku, and Y “ tk ` 1, . . . , 4ku. For all edges in G, we set the reactance values
equal to 1. For each i P X, we set pi “ B and for each j P Y we set pj “ ´sj´k. Define the
vector of phase angles ~θ as follows:
θi “
$’&’%0 i ď k´si´k{k i ą k.
If A is the admittance matrix of G, it is easy to check that A~θ “ ~p. Now define ~θ1 as follows:
θ1i “
$’&’%0 i ď k´si´k i ą k.
We prove that there exist a set of line failures F such that A1~θ1 “ ~p if, and only if, there exist
a solution to the 3-partition problem.
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First, lets assume that there exist a solution to the 3-partition problem such as S1, . . . , Sk.
Set ES “ tti, ju|sj´k P Siu. We show that F “ EzES implies A1~θ1 “ ~p. Notice that F “ EzES
means that G1 “ pV,ESq. Given the pi and the reactance values, it is easy to check that the
defined ~θ1 satisfies the DC power flow equations (2.5)-(2.6) in G1. Hence, A1~θ1 “ ~p.
Now, lets assume there exist a set of line failures F such that A1~θ1 “ ~p. Set ES “ EzF and
G1 “ pV,ESq. Given the phase angles ~θ1, it is easy to see that for any ti, ju P ES , pij “ sj´k.
This implies that for j P Y , at most one edge in ES is incident to j. On the other hand,
using (2.5), for any i P X, řjPNpiq1 sj´k “ B in which by Npiq1 we mean the set of neighbors
of node i in G1. Given that each node j P Y is incident to at most one edge in ES , defining
Si “ tsj´k|j P Npiq1u for 1 ď i ď k gives a good solution to the 3-partition problem.
Hence the problem of finding the set of line failures from changes in the phase angle measu-
rements is at least as hard as finding a solution to the 3-partition problem and therefore it is an
NP-hard problem in the strong sense. 
In Lemma 5.2, we proved that given the phase angle of the nodes before and after the attack,
it is NP-hard to detect the set of line failures F . In the following lemma, we show that even if
the attack area H is known (since ~θ1H is not given) the problem remains NP-hard.
Lemma 5.3. Given A, ~θ, H, and ~θ1¯
H
, it is strongly NP-hard to determine the set of line failures
F .
Proof. The idea of the proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 5.2. Again we reduce the
3-partition problem with a given set S as described in Def. 5.1 to this problem. Consider sets
X1 “ t1, . . . , ku, X2 “ tk ` 1, . . . , 2ku, Y2 “ t2k ` 1, . . . , 5ku, Y1 “ t5k ` 1, . . . , 8ku. We form
a bipartite graph G “ pV,Eq such that V “ X1 Y X2 Y Y2 Y Y1 and E “ tti, k ` iu|1 ď i ď
ku Y ttx, yu|x P X2, y P Y2u Y ttj, j ` 3ku|2k ` 1 ď j ď 5ku. Notice that the defined bipartite
graph here is very similar to the one defined in the proof of Lemma 5.2 except that here for
each node in X2 and Y2 there exist a dummy node in X1 and Y1, accordingly, that is directly
connected to its counterpart. We set H “ GrX2 Y Y2s, it is easy that H has exactly the same
topology as the graph G in the proof of Lemma 5.2. Again for all edges in G, we set the reactance
values equal to 1. For each i P X2 Y Y2 we set pi “ 0, for each i P X1, we set pi “ B, and for
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each j P Y1 we set pj “ ´sj´5k. Define the vector of phase angles ~θ as follows:
θi “
$’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’%
B 1 ď i ď k
0 k ` 1 ď i ď 2k
´si´2k{k 2k ` 1 ď i ď 5k
´si´5k{k ´ si´5k 5k ` 1 ď i ď 8k
If A is the admittance matrix of G, it is easy to check that A~θ “ ~p. Now define ~θ1 as follows:
θ1i “
$’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’%
B 1 ď i ď k
0 k ` 1 ď i ď 2k
´si´2k 2k ` 1 ď i ď 5k
´2si´5k 5k ` 1 ď i ď 8k
Now given ~θ1¯
H
, we later show in Section 5.4 that ~θ1H can be uniquely recovered by solving a set
of linear equations in polynomial time. So without loss of generality, for now we can assume
that ~θ1 is given. We prove that there exist a set of line failures F in H such that A1~θ1 “ ~p if, and
only if, there exist a solution to the 3-partition problem. Given the way we build the graph G
and since the set of failures should be in H, the rest of the proof is exactly similar to the proof
of Lemma 5.2. 
Lemma 5.3 clearly indicates that the problem of detecting the line failures after an attack
as described in Subsection 5.2.2 is NP-hard. However, in the following sections, we provide
sufficient conditions on the structural properties of the attacked area H and the set of line
failures F such that the phase angles can be recovered and the line failures can be detected
efficiently after the attack.
5.4 Attack Analysis
In this section, we study the effects of an attack and provide analytical methods for recovering
the phase angles and detecting failed lines in the attacked zone H. We find conditions on
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the structural properties of a zone and constraints on the failed lines for which these methods
successfully recover the phase angles and detect the failed lines. These conditions depend on the
connections between VH and V¯H as well as the inner connections of the nodes in H. Therefore,
we refer to them as external and internal conditions on H, respectively. Finally, we briefly
study the case in which multiple zones are attacked simultaneously. Table 5.1 summarizes the
results regarding the resilience of a zone based on its internal and external conditions, and the
constraints on the set of failed lines F .
In this section, when we describe our methods, we assume that there are no edges ti, ju P EH
for which θ1i “ θ1j (we refer to these edges as null-edges). Following (2.6), a null-edge does
not carry any flow. Thus, we cannot detect the status of those edges since they cannot be
distinguished from failed lines. However, we can detect the null-edges and treat them separately
(we consider this in the PARD Algorithm provided in the next section).
5.4.1 Recovery of Phase Angles
In this subsection, we introduce a method to recover the phase angles of the nodes in an attacked
zone H. We provide sufficient conditions on GrVH , V¯Hs such that the method recovers the phase
angles of the nodes in VH successfully. As we mentioned, since these conditions depend only on
the connections between VH and V¯H , we refer to them as the external conditions on H.
The following lemma is the first step towards designing the method for recovering the phase
angles and for detecting the failed lines (see Subsection 5.4.2).
Lemma 5.4. supppAp~θ ´ ~θ1qq Ď VH .
Proof. Suppose F “ tei1 , ei2 , . . . , eiku Ď EH are the edges that are disconnected from the grid
after the attack on the zone H. Define the column vectors ~x1, ~x2 . . . ~xk P t´1, 0, 1un associated
with the failed lines as follows. If eij “ tsj , tju then ~xj is 1 in its s thj entry, ´1 in its tthj entry,
and 0 everywhere else. It is easy to see that A1 is related to A as A1 “ A´řkj“1 asjtj ~xj ~xjt. Since
the graph G does not get disconnected after an attack, the flow equations in G1 are A1~θ1 “ ~p.
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On the other hand, A~θ “ ~p, therefore A~θ ´A1~θ1 “ 0. Thus,





ñ supppAp~θ ´ ~θ1qq Ď
kď
i“1
tsj , tju Ď VH .

One of the immediate results of Lemma 5.4 is the following corollary. This corollary gives
a true statement about ~θ1 (recall that ~θ1 is partly unknown). It states that ~θ1 is in the solution
space of the matrix equation (5.1).
Corollary 5.1. For any U Ď H¯, AU |NcpUqp~θNcpUq ´ ~θ1NcpUqq “ 0. In particular, when U “ H¯,
AH¯|Gp~θ ´ ~θ1q “ 0. (5.1)
For simplicity of the notations and equations, through the most of this chapter, we consider
the case in which U “ H¯. However, as we briefly describe in Subsection 5.4.4, using a smaller
U allows the recovery of the phase angles after an attack on multiple zones.
We find sufficient conditions such that the solution ~θ1H to (5.1) is unique (given ~θ and ~θ1¯H),
and consequently ~θ1H can be recovered after any attack on H. We first define a well-supported
zone.
Definition 5.2. A zone H is called well-supported, if ~θ1H can be recovered after any attack on
H.
Using Corollary 5.1, the following theorem gives sufficient condition for a zone H to be
well-supported.
Theorem 5.1. A zone H is well-supported, if AH¯|H has linearly independent columns.
Proof. From Corollary 5.1 we know that AH¯|Gp~θ´~θ1q “ 0, therefore AH¯|H~θ1H “ AH¯|H¯p~θH¯´~θ1¯Hq`
AH¯|H~θH . The only unknown in this equation is ~θ1H . Now since AH¯|H has linearly independent
columns, this equation has a unique solution ~θ1H which can be computed in polynomial time.
Thus, ~θ1H can be recovered in this case and zone H is well-supported. 
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It can be seen that the sufficient condition in Theorem 5.1 depends on the reactance values.
However, the following corollary relaxes the condition in Theorem 5.1. It shows that if GrVH , V¯Hs
has a matching that covers VH , then for almost any reactance values for the edges in ErVH , V¯Hs,
H is well-supported. The idea is that the set of reactance values for the edges in ErVH , V¯Hs
for which AH¯|H does not have linearly independent columns is a measure zero set in the real
space [119].
Corollary 5.2. If there is a matching in GrVH , V¯Hs that covers VH , then H is well-supported
almost surely.1
Proof. SupposeM “ pU, VHq is the matching forGrVH , V¯Hs that covers VH , and suppose U Ď V¯H
are the matched nodes which are in V¯H . Since M is the matching in GrVH , V¯Hs that covers H,
thus |U | “ |VH |. Regarding Theorem 5.1, to show that H is well-supported almost surely, we
need to show that the columns of the matrix AH¯|H are linearly independent almost surely. For
this reason, we show that detpAU |VH q ‰ 0 almost surely. detpAU |VH q can be considered as a
polynomial of the nonzero entries of the admittance matrix using Leibniz formula. Now assume
U “ tu1, u2, . . . , u|VH |u are matched to VH “ tv1, v2, . . . , v|VH |u in order. It can be seen thatś|VH |
i“1 auivi is a term with nonzero coefficient in detpAU |VH q. Therefore, detpAU |VH q is not a
zero polynomial in terms of its nonzero entries. Now since the set of reactance values for the
edges in ErVH , V¯Hs such that detpAU |VH q “ 0 is a measure zero set in the real space, thus
detpAU |VH q ‰ 0 almost surely. 
In reality, since the reactance values are derived by the physical properties of the lines, we
expect that these values are relatively random around a mean value. Thus, following Corol-
lary 5.2, the existence of a matching that covers every node in VH is enough for a zone to be
well-supported (see Fig. 5.3 for an example of a graph in which every node in a zone is covered
by a matching). Hence, in the following sections we consider the existence of a matching as a
sufficient external condition on H to be well-supported.
1In probability theory, one says that an event happens almost surely, if it happens with probability one.
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Table 5.1: Summary of the results in Section 5.4. The external/internal conditions on the
structural properties of a zone H such that after an attack with certain constraints, the phase
angles can be recovered and the failed lines can be detected by solving (5.5). Matching and partial
matching refer to matchings in GrVH , V¯Hs that cover VH and VHzpV inH Y V outH q, respectively.
External conditions Internal conditions Attack constraints Resilience Results
Matching Acyclic None attack-resilient Corollary 5.2/Lemma 5.6
Matching Planar
@ cycle C, |C X F | ă |CzF |
F˚ is H˚-separable
weakly-attack-resilient Corollary 5.2/Theorem 5.2
Partial
matching




No cycle contains an
inner-connected-
node
@ cycle C, |C X F | ă |CzF |
@v P V inH ,
|Bpvq X F |b ă |BpvqzF |b
F˚ is H˚-separable





Figure 5.3: An example of a graph and set of zones such that each zone is both well-supported
and acyclic.
5.4.2 Detecting Failed Lines
In this subsection, we assume that after an attack, the phase angles are recovered using the
method in Subsection 5.4.1 (i.e., by solving (5.1)). We introduce methods to detect the failed
lines using ~θ1. We provide sufficient conditions on H such that these methods detect the failed
lines successfully. As we mentioned, since these conditions depend only on the connections
between the nodes in H, we refer to them as internal conditions on H.
The following Lemma is the foundation for our approach to find the failed lines. It limits
the set of failed lines to the solution space of the matrix equation (5.2). It can be considered as
the complement of Corollary 5.1.
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Lemma 5.5. There exists a vector ~x P R|EH | such that
suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u and
DH~x “ AH|Gp~θ ´ ~θ1q. (5.2)
Moreover, for any W Ď G such that NcpHq ĎW , DH~x “ AH|W p~θW ´ ~θ1W q.
Proof. We use the notation that we used in proof of Lemma 5.4. Recall from the proof of
Lemma 5.4 that Ap~θ ´ ~θ1q “ ´řkj“1 asjtj ~xj ~xjt~θ1. It is easy to see that if ~d1, ~d2, . . . , ~dm are
the columns of the incidence matrix D, then @jp1 ď j ď kq, there exists bj P R such that
bj ~dij “ ´asjtj ~xj ~xjt~θ1. Therefore, Ap~θ ´ ~θ1q “
řk
j“1 bj ~dij . Thus, if we define ~y P Rm such that
@eij P F, yij “ bj and 0 elsewhere, then Ap~θ´ ~θ1q “ D~y and suppp~yq Ď ti1, i2, . . . , iku. However,
from the Corollary 5.1 we know that AH¯|Gp~θ ´ ~θ1q “ 0. Moreover, since F Ď EH , ~yH¯ “ 0.
Thus, we can restrict the equation only to the components of the zone H, which means that
AH|Gp~θ´ ~θ1q “ DH~yH . Now it is easy to see that since we assumed that no null-edges are in F ,
all the bis are nonzero and suppp~yHq “ ti1, i2, . . . , iku. Therefore, ~x “ ~yH is a solution to (5.2)
and suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u. Now, since for any i P H and j R NcpHq we have aij “ 0, it is easy
to see that for any W Ď G such that NcpHq ĎW , DH~x “ AH|W p~θW ´ ~θ1W q. 
Lemma 5.5 provides important information regarding the failed lines. It states that there
exists a solution ~x to (5.2) such that suppp~xq reveals the set of failed lines. However, the solution
to (5.2) may not be unique. Again, for simplicity of the notations and equations, through the
most of this chapter, we consider the case in which W “ G. However, as we briefly describe in
Subsection 5.4.4, using a smaller W allows the failed lines detection after an attack on multiple
zones.
The lemma below provides a necessary and sufficient condition on H such that the solution
to (5.2) is unique.
Lemma 5.6. The solution to (5.2) is unique and suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u, if and only if H is
acyclic.
Proof. It is easy to see that the solution to (5.2) is unique if and only if DH has linearly
independent columns. It is known that rankpDHq “ |VH | ´ c in which c is the number of
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connected components of H [22, Theorem 2.3]. Therefore, DH has linearly independent columns
if and only if each connected component of DH is a tree, which means that DH should be
acyclic. 
According to Lemma 5.6 the set of failed lines for any attack can be detected, if and only if
H is acyclic. Fig. 5.3 shows an example of a graph and set of zones such that each zone is both
well-supported and acyclic (case I in Table 5.1).
Although Lemma 5.6 requires H to be an acyclic graph in order for the solution of (5.2)
to be unique, by setting some constraints on the failed lines F , we provide a method to detect
the failed lines in broader class of graphs. The underlying idea is that the set of failed lines is
expected to be relatively sparse compared to the overall set of edges within a zone. Thus, we
are interested in the solutions of (5.2) that are relatively sparse. The `0-norm should be used
to capture the sparseness of a vector. However, since minimizing `0-norm is a combinatorial
problem in general cases, we prefer to use `1-norm which is known to be a good approximation
of the `0-norm. Thus, we consider the following minimization problem,
min }~x}1 s.t. DH~x “ AH|Gp~θ ´ ~θ1q. (5.3)
Notice that (5.3) is still linear and can be solved using Linear Programming. Moreover, when the
solution to (5.3) also appears to be sparse, which is usually the case in the considered scenario,
there are very fast algorithms to solve it [64].
The Lemma below states that by solving (5.3), the failed lines can be detected in more cases
than by solving (5.2). The idea that we use in proof of Lemma 5.7 is the core idea in proofs of
Theorems 5.2 and 5.3, as well. Namely, the null space of DH is in one-to-one correspondence
with the cycle space of the graph H. Therefore, there are graph theoretical interpretations to
the solution space of (5.2). Hence, by using tools from graph theory and linear algebra, we find
the solution to (5.2) with the minimum `1-norm.
Lemma 5.7. If H is a cycle and |EH X F | ă |EHzF |, the solution to (5.3) is unique and
suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u.
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Proof. Here without loss of generality, we assume that DH is the incidence matrix of H when
edges of H has been oriented clockwise. Since H is connected, it is known that rankpDHq “
|VH | ´ 1 [22, Theorem 2.2]. Therefore, dimpNullpDHqq “ 1. Suppose ~e P R|EH | is the all one
vector. It is easy to see that DH~e “ 0. Since dimpNullpDHqq “ 1, ~e is the basis for the null
space of D. Suppose ~x is a solution to (5.2) such that suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u (from Lemma 5.5
we know that such a solution exists). To prove that ~x is the unique solution for (5.3), we only
need to prove that @c P Rzt0u, }~x}1 ă }~x´ c~e}1. Without loss of generality we can assume that
x1, x2, . . . , xk are the nonzero elements of ~x, in which k “ |F |. From the assumption we know
















Thus, the solution to (5.3) is unique. 
Corollary 5.3. If all the cycles in H are edge-disjoint and for any cycle C in H, |C X F | ă
|CzF |, then the solution to (5.3) is unique and suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u.
The following Theorem extends the idea in the proof of Lemma 5.7 and provides sufficient
conditions for failed lines in a planar graph H to be detected by solving (5.3) (recall from
subsection 5.2.3 that H˚ is the dual of the planar graph H and F ˚ is the dual of the set of failed
lines). For the proof details see Section 5.B.
Theorem 5.2. In a planar graph H, the solution to (5.3) is unique and suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u,
if: (i) for any cycle C in H, |C X F | ă |CzF |, and (ii) F ˚ is H˚-separable.
Fig. 5.4 shows an example of a zone H for which the set of failed lines can be detected by
solving (5.3) based on Theorem 5.2 (case II in Table 5.1).
The Corollary below states that in planar bipartite graphs, condition (ii) in Theorem 5.2
immediately holds, if condition (i) holds. For the proof details see Section 5.B.
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𝑂3
∗
Figure 5.4: An example of a zone H and a set of failed lines (shown by red dashed lines) that
can be detected by solving (5.3) based on Theorem 5.2. The diamond orange nodes are the
nodes of the dual graph H˚. As can be seen, the dual of the failed lines can be covered by three
edge disjoint cycles O1˚ , O2˚ , O3˚ (shown by dotted lines) in H
˚. Thus, as Theorem 5.2 requires,
F ˚ is H˚-separable.
Corollary 5.4. In a planar bipartite graph H, the solution to (5.3) is unique and suppp~xq “
ti|ei P F u, if for any cycle C in H, |C X F | ă |CzF |.
Theorem 5.2 and Corollary 5.4 are important since power grids are usually considered to be
planar. For instance, lattice graphs are planar bipartite.
5.4.3 Simultaneous Phase Angles Recovery and Failed Lines Detection
In Subsection 5.4.1 we showed that the phase angles of the zone H are recoverable, if there is a
matching in GrVH , V¯Hs that covers VH . However, in reality, this condition might be very difficult
and costly to maintain (i.e., it may require to increase the number of zones). Therefore, in this
subsection, using similar ideas as in subsection 5.4.2, we relax the external conditions on H.
The key idea which is summarized in the following Lemma, is to combine Corollary 5.1 and
Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 5.8. There exist vectors ~x P R|EH | and ~δH P R|VH | such that suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u,
~δH “ ~θH ´ ~θ1H , and
DH~x “ AH|H~δH `AH|H¯~δH¯ (5.4)
AH¯|H~δH `AH¯|H¯~δH¯ “ 0
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where ~δH¯ “ ~θH¯ ´ ~θ1¯H and is known.
From Subsections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 we know that the solution to (5.4) is unique, if and only if
H is acyclic and AH¯|H has linearly independent columns. Therefore, to deal with cases for which
AH¯|H does not have linearly independent columns, we consider a similar optimization problem
as in (5.3) but with more constraints. For this reason, as we mentioned in Subsection 5.4.2, since
the set of failed lines is expected to be relatively sparse compared to the overall set of edges, we
consider the following optimization problem,
min }~x}1 s.t. (5.5)
DH~x “ AH|H~δH `AH|H¯~δH¯
AH¯|H~δH `AH¯|H¯~δH¯ “ 0.
The following Lemma states that if there is an independent set of nodes in H with no
neighbors in H¯, then under some conditions on F , we can recover F and ~θ1H by solving (5.5)
even when AH¯|H does not have linearly independent columns (case III in Table 5.1). First, we
define inner-connected nodes.
Definition 5.3. A node v P VH is called H-inner-connected if Npvq Ď VH . It is called H-outer-
connected if Npvq Ď VH¯ . We denote the set of H-inner-connected and H-outer-connected nodes
by V inH and V
out
H , respectively.
For any L Ď E, define its size weighted by the susceptance values, as |L|b :“ řePL |be|, in
which be is the susceptance of the line e. Notice that when the susceptance values for all the
lines equal to ´1, then |L|b “ |L|.
Lemma 5.9. Suppose H-inner-connected nodes form an independent set in H. If H is acyclic,
rankpAH¯|Hq “ |VH |´ |V inH |, and @v P V inH , |BpvqXF |b ă |BpvqzF |b, then the solution ~x, ~δ to (5.5)
is unique. Moreover, suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u and ~δH “ ~θH ´ ~θ1H .
Proof. The idea of the proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 5.7. Suppose ~x, ~δH is the
solution to (5.4) such that suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u and ~δH “ ~θH ´ ~θ1H . From Lemma 5.8 we know
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that such a solution exists. We show that this solution is the unique solution to (5.5) in this
setting.
Without loss of generality in addition to assuming VH “ t1, 2, 3, . . . , |VH |u and EH “
te1, e2, . . . , e|EH |u, we can assume the labeling of the nodes in G is such that V inH “ t1, 2, . . . , tu
is the set of H-inner-connected nodes. Suppose ~α1, ~α2, . . . , ~αt P R|VH | are the coordinate vec-
tors, in other words ~αi is 1 at its i
th entry and 0 everywhere else. It is easy to see that
@i P V inH : AH¯|H~αi “ 0. On the other hand, since rankpAH¯|Hq “ |VH | ´ t and ~αis are linearly
independent, ~α1, ~α2, . . . , ~αt form a basis for NullpAH¯|Hq.
Assume DH is the incidence matrix of H when its edges are oriented such that for each
i P V inH , the edges are coming out of i. Now suppose ~z is another solution to (5.5), it is easy to
see that DHp~z ´ ~xq “ AH|H~α for a vector ~α P NullpAH¯|Hq. Since ~α P NullpAH¯|Hq, there are
unique coefficients c1, c2, . . . , ct P R such that ~α “ c1 ~α1 ` c2 ~α2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` ct ~αt. Thus,
DHp~z ´ ~xq “ AH|H~α “ AH|Hpc1~α1 ` c2~α2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` ct~αtq
“ c1AH|H~α1 ` c2AH|H~α2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` ctAH|H~αt.
Suppose ~dj is the column associated with edge ej in DH . Notice that for each i P V inH ,
Bpiq Ď EH . Therefore, @i P V inH and @ej P Bpiq, ~dj is a column of DH . It can be seen that for any
i P V inH ,
ř
j:ejPBpiq´bej ~dj “ AH|H~αi. If for any i P V inH , we define vector ~βi P R|EH | as follows,
βij :“
$’&’%´bej if ej P Bpiq0 otherwise,
then DH ~βi “ AH|H~αi for any i P V inH . Thus,
DHpc1~β1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` ct~βtq “ c1AH|H~α1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` ctAH|H~αt
ñ DHp~z ´ ~xq “ DHpc1~β1 ` c2~β2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` ct~βtq.
Now since H is acyclic, DH has linearly independent columns. Thus, from the equation above
we can conclude that,
~z ´ ~x “ c1~β1 ` c2~β2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` ct~βt
ñ ~z “ ~x` c1~β1 ` c2~β2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` ct~βt.
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Using equation above, we show that }~z}1 ą }~x}1 unless c1 “ c2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ ct “ 0. First,
notice that since V inH is an independent set, @i ‰ j P V inH , Bpiq X Bpjq “ H. Suppose @i P
V inH , |Bpiq X F |b “ ki, we have


















p|Bpiq|b ´ 2kiq|ci| `
ÿ
jPFXBpiq
`|xj ` bejci| ` |bejci|˘¯`ÿ





























`p|Bpiq|b ´ 2kiq|ci|˘` }~x}1.
Now, since from the assumptions @i P V inH , ki ă |Bpiq|b{2, it is easy to see that
ř
iPV inH pp|Bpiq|b ´
2kiq|ci|q ` }~x}1 ą }~x}1, unless c1 “ c2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ ct “ 0. Since ~z is a solution to (5.5), we
should have c1 “ c2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ ct “ 0, and ~z “ ~x. Thus, ~x is the unique solution to (5.5) and
suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u. From the proof, it is easy to see that ~δH is also unique. 
To generalize Lemma 5.9, first let us consider cases in which H contains H-outer-connected
nodes. The Lemma below shows that the value of δ for these nodes is unique.
Lemma 5.10. If v is H-outer-connected and ~δH is a solution to (5.4), then δv is unique and
equal to δv “ 1{avvřuPNpvq´avuδu.
Proof. First, notice that since v is H-outer-connected, Npvq Ď V¯H . Now, let us compute the
vth entry of the vectors on the both side of the equation DH~x “ AH|H~δH ` AH|H¯~δH¯ . Since
v is H-outer-connected, the vth row of DH is a zero vector. Thus, pDH~xqv “ 0 for any ~x.
One the other hand, from the definition of admittance matrix A, pAH|H~δHqv “ avvδv and
pAH|H¯~δH¯qv “
ř
uPNpvq avuδu. Since pDH~xqv “ pAH|H~δHqv ` pAH|H¯~δH¯qv, we can conclude that
δv “ 1{avvřuPNpvq´avuδu. Thus, the proof is complete. 
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Zone H
Figure 5.5: An example of a zone H and an attack such that the phase angles can be recovered
and the failed lines can be detected by solving (5.5) based on Theorem 5.3. The squared green
nodes are the H-inner-connected nodes. The failed lines are shown by red dashed edges.
In the following theorem, we generalize Lemma 5.9. This theorem combines Lemma 5.9 and
Theorem 5.2, and provides a broader class of graphs in which solving (5.5) recovers phase angles
and detects the failed lines after an attack. For the proof details see Section 5.B.
Theorem 5.3. In a planar graph H, the solution ~x, ~δH to (5.5) is unique with suppp~xq “ ti|ei P
F u and ~δH “ ~θH ´ ~θ1H , if the following conditions hold: (i) @v P V inH , |Bpvq X F |b ă |BpvqzF |b,
(ii) for any cycle C in H, |C X F | ă |CzF |, (iii) F ˚ is H˚-separable, (iv) in AH¯|H , columns
associated with nodes that are neither H-inner-connected nor H-outer-connected are linearly
independent, (v) no cycle in H contains a H-inner-connected node, and (vi) H-inner-connected
nodes form an independent set.
Note that when H is well-supported, there are no H-inner-connected or H-outer-connected
nodes. Thus, conditions (i), (iv), (v), and (vi) immediately hold and Theorem 5.3 reduces to
Theorem 5.2.
Fig. 5.5 shows an example of a zone H and an attack such that the phase angles can be
recovered and the failed lines can be detected by solving (5.5) using Theorem 5.3 (case IV in
Table 5.1). As it can be seen, this theorem covers a broad set of graphs and attacks for which we
can recover the phase angles and detect the failed lines. Notice that here, with similar argument
as in Corollary 5.2 we can replace condition (iv) in Theorem 5.3 with a simpler matching
condition as follows.
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Corollary 5.5. If there is a matching in GrVH , V¯Hs that covers VHzpV inH YV outH q, then condition
(iv) in Theorem 5.3 holds almost surely.
To conclude, we define the attack-resilient and weakly-attack-resilient notions to summarize
the resilience of a zone to joint cyber and physical attacks.
Definition 5.4. A zone H is called attack-resilient, if it is both well-supported and acyclic.
Definition 5.5. A zone H is called weakly-attack-resilient, if ~θ1H and F can be uniquely found
after a constrained attack on the zone H by solving (5.5).
It is easy to see that an attack-resilient zone is also weakly-attack-resilient.
5.4.4 Recovery and Detection After Attacks on Multiple Zones
In this subsection, we study the case in which multiple zones are attacked simultaneously. When
the attacked zones are close to each other, it may not always be possible to recover information.
However, if the attacked zones are relatively distant from each other, any of the methods provided
in the previous subsections (depending on the conditions on the zones and attacks) can be applied
to recover the information and detect the failures in the attacked zones.
The idea is to use Corollary 5.1 and Lemma 5.5 for sets U and W much smaller than H¯ and
G, respectively. Assume H1 and H2 are two attacked zones. Let U1 and U2 be two sets with
the minimum size such that U1 Ď H¯1, H1 Ď NcpU1q, U2 Ď H¯2, and H2 Ď NcpU2q. Following
Corollary 5.1, AU1|NcpU1qp~θNcpU1q ´ ~θ1NcpU1qq “ 0 and AU2|NcpU2qp~θNcpU2q ´ ~θ1NcpU2qq “ 0. Now
if NcpU1q X H2 “ NcpU2q X H1 “ H (i.e., H1 and H2 are distant enough), and both AU1|H1
and AU2|H2 have linearly independent columns, then similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1, the
phase-angles of the nodes in H1 and H2 can be recovered by solving a set of linear equations.
To detect the failed lines, let W1 and W2 be two sets with the minimum size such that
W1,W2 Ď G, NcpH1q Ď W1, and NcpH2q Ď W2. Following Lemma 5.5, there exist vectors
~x1, ~x2 P R|EH | such that suppp ~x1q and suppp ~x2q give the failed lines in H1 and H2, and also
DH1 ~x1 “ AH1|W1p~θW1 ´ ~θ1W1q and DH2 ~x2 “ AH2|W2p~θW2 ´ ~θ1W2q. Now, if H1 and H2 are acyclic
and W1 X H2 “ W2 X H1 “ H, then similar to the Lemma 5.6, the solutions to DH1 ~x1 “
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AH1|W1p~θW1 ´ ~θ1W1q and DH2 ~x2 “ AH2|W2p~θW2 ´ ~θ1W2q are unique and the failed lines can be
detected by suppp ~x1q and suppp ~x2q.
Notice that the methods in subsection 5.4.3 can also be simply used to recover the phase
angles and detect the failed lines in the attacked zones that are distant enough. The following
corollary summarizes our discussion in this subsection.
Corollary 5.6. The phase angles and the failed lines can be recovered/detected after a simulta-
neous attack on zones H1, H2, . . . ,Hk, if followings hold: (i) for any 1 ď i ď k, if Hi was the only
attacked zone, then the phase angle of the nodes and the failed lines could be recovered/detected
using the methods in subsections 5.4.1,5.4.2, and 5.4.3, (ii) there exist U1, U2, . . . , Uk Ď G and
W1,W2, . . .Wk Ď G such that:
1. For any 1 ď i ď k, Ui Ď H¯i, Hi Ď NcpUiq, and NcpHiq ĎWi.
2. For any 1 ď i ‰ j ď k, NcpUiq XHj “ H and Wi XHj “ H.
Proof. For any 1 ď i ď k, consider equations AUi|NcpUiqp~θNcpUiq ´ ~θ1NcpUiqq “ 0 and DHi ~xi “
AHi|Wip~θWi ´ ~θ1Wiq instead of (5.1) and (5.2). Then, recover the phase angle of the nodes and
detect the failed lines at each Hi separately using any of the methods provided in subsecti-
ons 5.4.1,5.4.2, and 5.4.3. 
5.5 Post-Attack Recovery and Detection Algorithm
In this section, we present the Post-Attack Recovery and Detection (PARD) Algorithm for
recovering the phase angles and detecting the failed lines after an attack on a zone H. Based on
the results provided in previous subsections, if a zone H is weakly-attack-resilient, the PARD
Algorithm will recover the phase angles and detect the failed lines after a constrained attack.
Notice that if there are some failed lines but no data is missing, then from the data that
is gathered by the PDCs from the PMUs, all the information regarding the status of the lines
and phase angles is available and there is no need for the algorithm. Thus, as the first step, the
PARD Algorithm detects the attacked zone H by checking the missing data (line 1). Then, it
solves (5.5) by Linear Programming to obtain ~x, ~δH . If H is weakly-attack-resilient, from the
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Algorithm 4 - Post-Attack Recovery & Detection (PARD)




1: Detect the attacked zone H by checking for missing data.
2: Compute ~x, ~δH the solution to (5.5) by Linear Programming.
3: Compute ~θ1H “ ~θH ´ ~δH .
4: Compute F “ tei|i P suppp~xqu.
5: Detect the set of null-edges that appear after the attack as N “ tti, ju P EH |θ1i “ θ1ju.
6: return N , F , ~θ1H .
results in previous subsections, we know that ~x, ~δH are unique, ~θ
1
H “ ~θH ´ ~δH (line 3), and
F “ tei|i P suppp~xqu (line 4). Finally, using ~θ1 computed in previous line, the PARD Algorithm
detects the set of null-edges N (line 5), and returns N , F , and ~θ1H .
5.6 Attack Analysis in the Presence of Measurement Noise and
Uncertainty
In this section, we briefly discuss the problem of information recovery after an attack in the
presence of a measurement noise and uncertainty. We follow [89] and model the measurement
noise by changing (2.7) to Ap~θ´~eq “ ~p where ~e P R|V |ˆ1 is a Gaussian measurement noise with
a diagonal covariance matrix Σ. Following [163], ~e can also account for the perturbations in ~p
after failures. It is obvious that in the presence of noise, the optimization problem (5.5) has
no feasible solution. However, since the `1-norm is relatively robust against noise, one possible
approach to generalize the optimization problem (5.5) to the noisy case is to relax the conditions
as follows:
min }~x}1 s.t. (5.6)
}DH~x´AH|H~δH ´AH|H¯~δH¯}2 ă 
}AH¯|H~δH `AH¯|H¯~δH¯}2 ă .
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Algorithm 5 - 3-Acyclic Partition of Planar (3APP)
Input: A non-empty planar graph G.
1: Find a node v P V such that degpvq ď 5.
2: if Gzv “ H then set Q1 “ Q2 “ Q3 “ H.
3: else Find 3-partition of Gzv using 3APP Algorithm as
Q1, Q2, Q3.
4: Add v to the partition that |Npvq XQi| is minimum.
5: return Q1, Q2, Q3.
It is easy to see that the optimization problem (5.6) is a second-order cone program that can be
solved using gradient decent methods. After solving (5.6), the line failures can then be detected
as before by F “ tei|i P suppp~xqu.
Generalizing Theorem 5.3 to take into account the noisy case modeled by (5.6) is part of
the future work. However, in Section 5.8, we show via simulation that solving the optimization
problem (5.6) can correctly recover the phase angles and detect the failed lines depending on
the level of the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR).2
5.7 Zone Selection Algorithm
In this section we use the results from Section 5.4 to provide an algorithm for partitioning
the power grid into the minimum number of attack-resilient zones. From Lemma 5.6 and Corol-
lary 5.2, for a zone H to be attack-resilient, it is sufficient that H is acyclic and there is a
matching in GrVH , V¯Hs that covers every node in VH . Fig. 5.3 shows an example of a partiti-
oning such that each zone is attack-resilient. Thus, we define a matched-forest partition of a
graph G as follows.
Definition 5.6. A matched-forest partition of a graph G into H1, H2, . . . ,Hk is a partition such
that for any i, Hi is acyclic and GrVHi , V¯His has a matching that covers VHi.
2We define the SNR (in dB) as 20 log10p}~θ}2{}~e}2q.
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Algorithm 6 - Zone Selection (ZS)
Input: A connected graph G.
1: Find an optimal matching cover M1,M2, . . . ,Mt of G [150].
2: For each Mi, separate the matched nodes into two set of nodes V2i´1, V2i such that @tv, uu P M ,
v P V2i´1 and u P V2i.
3: For any 1 ď i ď 2t, Qi “ VizŤi´1j“1Qj .
4: for each Qi do
5: if GrQis is acyclic then continue
6: if GrQis is a planar graph then
7: Use 3APP Algorithm to partition GrQis.
8: else
9: Use any greedy algorithm to partition GrQis into acyclic subgraphs.
10: Name the resulted partitions P1, . . . , Pk.
11: return P1, . . . , Pk.
The problem of finding a matched-forest partition of G is closely related to two previously
known problems of vertex arboricity and k-matching cover of a graph. The vertex arboricity
apGq of a graphG is the minimum number of subsets into which the nodes ofG can be partitioned
so that each subset induces an acyclic graph. It is known that determining apGq is NP-hard [74,
p.193].
A k-matching cover of a graph G is a union of k matchings of G which covers V . The
matching cover number of G, denoted by mcpGq, is the minimum number k such that G has
a k-matching cover. An optimal matching cover of a graph on n nodes can be found in Opn3q
time [150].
Using these results, we study the time complexity of the minimum matched-forest partition
problem.3 The following Lemma shows that it is hard to find the minimum matched-forest
partition of a graph. For the proof details see Section 5.B.
3To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the problem is studied.
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Lemma 5.11. The problem of finding the minimum matched-forest partition of a graph G is
NP-hard.
Moreover, we show that finding the minimum matched-forest partition is even hard to ap-
proximate. We use the well-known result by Zuckerman [165] that for all  ą 0, it is NP-hard
to approximate chromatic number to within n1´.
Lemma 5.12. For all  ą 0, it is NP-hard to approximate the minimum matched-forest partition
of a graph G to within n1´.
Proof. For a graph G, assume χpGq is its chromatic number. Since each color gives an inde-
pendent set of G, induced subgraph by the nodes with the same color is acyclic with no edges.
Thus, it is easy to see that apGq ď χpGq. Suppose there is an α-approximation algorithm for the
minimum matched-forest problem. Define Gˆ as in proof of Lemma 5.11. Assume this algorithm
partitions Gˆ into k subsets. From the proof of Lemma 5.11, it is easy to see that k ď αapGq. On
the other hand, since each acyclic graph has the chromatic number of at most 2, this algorithm
gives the 2k coloring of graph G. However, 2k ď 2αapGq ď 2αχpGq. Thus, this algorithm gives a
2α-approximation of the chromatic number of G. However, the result by Zuckerman [165] states
that for all  ą 0, it is NP-hard to approximate chromatic number to within n1´. Therefore,
for all  ą 0, it is NP-hard to approximate the minimum matched-forest problem to within n1´
as well. 
Despite these hardness results, we provide the polynomial-time Zone Selection (ZS) Algo-
rithm to find a matched-forest partition of a graph. We prove that the ZS Algorithm provides
a constant approximation for the minimum matched-forest partition of a graph G when G is
planar.
Before describing the ZS Algorithm in detail, we first describe an algorithm that is used in
the ZS Algorithm, when G is planar. It is known that for a planar graph G, apGq ď 3 [41]. Based
on the proof provided in [41], we introduce a recursive 3-Acyclic Partition of Planar (3APP)
Algorithm. The Lemma below shows the correctness of this Algorithm.
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Lemma 5.13. The 3APP Algorithm partitions the nodes of a planar graph G into 3 subsets
such that each subset induces an acyclic graph.
Proof. It is known that every planar graph has a node of degree less than or equal to 5 [154].
Therefore, line 1 of the algorithm can always find v. At line 4, recursively we know that subgraphs
induced by Q1, Q2, Q3 in Gzv are acyclic. Now since degpvq ď 5, there exists a partition such
that |Npvq XQi| ď 1. Without loss of generality we can assume that |Npvq XQ1| ď 1. Hence,
adding v to Q1 does not produces any cycles. Thus, subgraphs induced by Q1 Y tvu, Q2, Q3 in
G are acyclic. 
We now present the ZS Algorithm. The ZS Algorithm first finds an optimal matching cover
M1,M2, . . . ,Mt of G using an Opn3q algorithm introduced in [150] (line 1). Then, in lines 2 and
3, it uses this matching cover to partition V into Q1, Q2, . . . , Q2t. It is easy to see that for each
Qi, Mri{2s X ErQi, Q¯is is the matching in GrQi, Q¯is that covers nodes in Qi. Then, in order to
satisfy the acyclicity condition on the partitions, it partitions Qis that do not induce an acyclic
graph, into subsets so that each subset induces an acyclic graph. When GrQis is a planar graph,
it uses 3APP Algorithm to partition GrQis. When it is not, it uses any greedy algorithm to
do so. Thus, the resulted partition P1, P2, . . . , Pk satisfies the conditions of a matched-forest
partition.
The lemma below states that when G is planar, the ZS Algorithm provides a constant
approximation of the optimal matched-forest partition. We demonstrate the results obtained by
the algorithm in the following section. For the proof details see Section 5.B.
Lemma 5.14. If G is planar, the ZS Algorithm provides a 6-approximation of the minimum
matched-forest partition of G in Opn3q.
Notice that the planarity of G is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the successful
execution of the 3APP Algorithm. Hence, as we show in Section 5.8, the ZS algorithm can be
applied to almost any power grid network without checking its planarity as long as the 3APP
algorithm is executed successfully.
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5.8 Numerical Results
5.8.1 Evaluating grid structural robustness and the performance of the ZS
Algorithm
In this section, we (i) numerically study the relationship between the structural properties of
a grid and its resilience to joint cyber and physical attacks, and (ii) demonstrate the results
obtained by the ZS Algorithm in several known power grid networks.
To assess the relationship between the structural properties of a grid and its resilience to
attacks, we quantify the resilience by the fraction of the node induced subgraphs of G that
form attack-resilient zones. Recall from Section 5.4 that a zone H is attack-resilient, if it is
well-supported and acyclic. We first study the relationships between the number of edges and
the fraction of induced subgraphs that form well-supported, acyclic, and attack-resilient zones.
These relationships can be best demonstrated in random graphs [68], since by increasing p (the
probability that two nodes are connected), the total number of edges increases.
We generated random graphs with n “ 30 and n “ 50 nodes with various p values. For each
p, we generated 100 random graphs and in each graph randomly selected 100 subgraphs of size
10. We then computed the fraction of subgraphs that form well-supported, acyclic, and attack-
resilient zones. As can be seen in Fig. 5.6, as p increases, the fraction of subgraphs that form
acyclic zones decreases and the fraction that form well-supported zones increases. In Fig. 5.6(a),
when p « 0.14 these two fractions are equal and the fraction of attack-resilient subgraph is
maximized. As can be seen in Fig. 5.6(b), the value of p for which these two fractions are equal
(i.e., the fraction of attack-resilient subgraphs is maximized) decreases as n increases.
We also illustrate the relationships between the size of the zone |VH | and the fraction of
induced subgraphs that form well-supported, acyclic, and attack-resilient zones. It is known that
scale-free graphs are relatively good representatives of power grid networks [23], and therefore,
we focus here on such graphs. Fig. 5.7 shows the relationships in scale-free graphs with n “ 30
nodes and m “ 56 or 104 edges. As can be seen in 5.7(a), as the size of the zone increases,
the fraction of zones that are well-supported decreases faster than the fraction of zones that
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(a) n “ 30











(b) n “ 50
Figure 5.6: The relationships between the number of edges in random graphs (or equivalently
p), and the fraction of induced subgraphs that form well-supported and acyclic zones of size
|VH | “ 10. For each p, 100 random graphs were generated and in each graph, 100 subgraphs
were chosen randomly.
are acyclic. Thus, the well-supportedness is the restricting factor for attack-resilience. However,
this trend is different in 5.7(b). Since the graph has more edges, as the size of the zone increases,
the fraction of zones that are acyclic decreases faster than the fraction of zones that are well-
supported. Here, the acyclicity is the restricting factor.
Overall, these results show that the structure of the grid plays an important role in its
resilience and should be considered when designing a control network.4
We now demonstrate results obtained by the ZS Algorithm in several known power networks.
Table 5.2 lists the considered grids and number of resulting partitions. For example, Fig. 5.8
shows the partitions obtained by ZS Algorithm in the IEEE 14-Bus and 30-Bus benchmark
systems [5]. As can be seen, in both cases the graphs can be partitioned into two attack-
resilient zones. We also evaluated the ZS Algorithm on the IEEE 118 and 300-bus systems, the
4Clearly, random and scale free graphs do not model power grids perfectly. However, we used them to gain
insight into the relations between structural properties and resilience. In future work, we will study more realistic
network topologies [133].
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(a) n “ 30,m “ 56













(b) n “ 30,m “ 104
Figure 5.7: The relationship between the size of the zone |VH | in scale-free graphs, and the
fraction of induced subgraphs that form well-supported and acyclic zones of size |VH |. For each
case, 1000 subgraphs were chosen randomly.
Polish grid (available with MATPOWER [164]), the Colorado state grid, and the U.S. Western
Interconnection network.5 For example, the 6 zones into which the Colorado grid is partitioned
appear in Fig. 5.9. Recall form Section 5.7 that when G is planar, the ZS Algorithm is a 6-
approximation algorithm for the minimum matched-forest problem. However, as can be seen
from the examples above, in practice, it partitions the networks into few zones.
We note that the ZS Algorithm does not take the geographical constraints into account.
Thus, when partitioning very large networks such as the Western Interconnection (see Fig. 5.10),
the nodes in the same partition may be geographically distant from each other. This is impracti-
cal, since the PMUs from the same zone should send the data to a single PDC. However, it is
easy to see that if a zone is attack-resilient, any of its subgraphs is also attack-resilient. The-
refore, the partitions obtained by the ZS Algorithm can be further divided into smaller zones
based on geographical constraints (e.g., into zones within different states in Fig. 5.10). This
5The data of the Western Interconnection (and of Colorado) was obtained from the Platts Geographic Infor-
mation System (GIS) [3].
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Table 5.2: Number of partitions into which the ZS Algorithm divides different networks.
Network Nodes Edges Partitions
IEEE 14-Bus 14 20 2
IEEE 30-Bus 30 41 2
IEEE 118-Bus 118 179 5
IEEE 300-Bus 300 409 14
Polish grid 3120 3684 10
Colorado state grid 662 864 6
Western interconnection 13135 16860 9
Zone 1
Zone 2
(a) IEEE 14 bus
Zone 1
Zone 2
(b) IEEE 30 bus
Figure 5.8: Partitioning of the IEEE 14 and IEEE 30 bus systems into 2 attack resilient zones
(using the ZS Algorithm).
approach does not result in an optimal partitioning. Hence, obtaining an efficient partitioning
with geographical constraints is a subject of future work.
5.8.2 Recovering the Information in the Presence of a Measurement Noise
In this subsection, we show via simulation that solving the optimization problem (5.6) can
correctly recover the phase angles and detect the failed lines in the presence of the measurement
noise depending on the SNR level. To evaluate the results, we count number of false negatives
and false positives. False negatives are the failed lines that are not detected in the solution
of (5.6). False positives are the edges that are detected as failed lines in the solution of (5.6)
CHAPTER 5. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS (DC MODEL) 102
Figure 5.9: Partitioning of the Colorado state grid into 6 attack-resilient zones (using the ZS
Algorithm). Nodes with the same color are in the same zone.
despite the fact that they were not failed. We use the Matlab-based solver CVX [78] for solving
the optimization problem (5.6).
We provide simulation results with the graph and zone H shown in Fig. 5.11 (it is easy to
see that H is attack-resilient). Notice that the graph in Fig. 5.11 can be part of a much bigger
graph, however following Corollary 5.1 and Lemma 5.5, only the local information is needed
to recover the information inside the attacked zone. As we mentioned in Section 5.6, in the
simulations, we assume that the readings from the PMUs somewhat differ from the solution of
(2.7) (i.e., to the DC power flow). Hence, if ~θ and ~θ1 are the phase angles obtained from the
PMUs (before and after the attack, respectively), then Ap~θ ´ ~eq “ ~p and A1p~θ1 ´ ~e1q “ ~p for
unknown Gaussian noise vectors ~e and ~e1 with equal covariance matrices.
Figs. 5.12 and 5.13 show two attack scenarios with different SNR values and the information
recovered by solving (5.6). Fig. 5.14 shows the average number of false negatives and positives in
detecting line failures by solving (5.6) versus the SNR level for different numbers of line failures.
As can be seen, for any number of line failures, when the SNR is above a certain level (e.g.,
40 dB) the solution to (5.6) can detect the line failures with acceptable accuracy (less than
one false negative and zero false positives on average). Using the CVX solver, the solution to
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Figure 5.10: Partitioning of the U.S. Western Interconnection into 9 attack-resilient zones (using
the ZS Algorithm). Nodes with the same color are in the same zone.
the optimization problem (5.6) can be found in 0.07 sec in our system with Intel Core i7-2600
@3.40GHz CPU and 16GB RAM for the graph depicted in Fig. 5.11.
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1 2 3 4 5
9 8 7 6
Zone H
10
𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3 𝑒4
𝑒5𝑒7𝑒9
𝑒6𝑒8
Figure 5.11: The graph and the zone H that are used in the simulations in Subsection 5.8.2. All
the edges in the graph have admittance value equal 1. The supply/demand values are chosen
randomly.
𝑒6
1 2 3 4 5
9 8 7 6
Zone H
10



















 𝑥 -0.0074 -0.0068 0 0 0 -0.0857 0 0 0
supp(  𝑥) 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
SNR = 50dB
Figure 5.12: An example of an attack and recovered information in the presence of the measu-
rement noise for SNR“ 50dB. Red dashed lines show the attacked lines. As can be seen, the
attacked lines can be detected successfully in this case.
CHAPTER 5. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS (DC MODEL) 105
𝑒8
1 2 3 4 5
9 8 7 6
Zone H
10



















 𝑥 0 0 0 0 0 -0.1938 0 -0.1164 0
supp(  𝑥) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
SNR = 30dB
Figure 5.13: An example of an attack and recovered information in the presence of the measu-
rement noise for SNR“ 30dB. Red dashed lines show the attacked lines. As can be seen, 2 out
of the 3 attacked lines can be detected in this case.
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(a) |F | “ 1














(b) |F | “ 2














(c) |F | “ 3














(d) |F | “ 4


























(e) |F | “ 5














(f) |F | “ 6














(g) |F | “ 7














(h) |F | “ 8
Figure 5.14: The average number of false negatives and positives in detecting line failures by
solving (5.6) in the presence of the measurement noise versus the SNR. Each data point is the
average over 100 trials. (a)-(h) Show this relationship for different number of line failures (|F |).
Figs. 5.12 and 5.13 provide the detailed information for two of the points in (c).
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5.9 Conclusion
We studied joint cyber and physical attacks on power grids. We developed methods to estimate
the state of the grid inside the attacked zone using only the information available outside of the
attacked zone. We identified graph topologies and constraints on the attacked edges for which
these methods are guaranteed to recover the state information. We briefly studied the problem
of information recovery in the presence of measurement noise and showed that by relaxing some
of the constraints the same methods can be used for information recovery in noisy scenarios.
Moreover, we showed that the problem of partitioning the grid into the minimum number of
attack-resilient zones is not approximable to within n1´ for all  ą 0 unless P=NP. However,
for planar graphs, we developed an approximation algorithm for the partitioning problem and
numerically illustrated the operation of the algorithm.
This is one of the first steps towards understanding the vulnerabilities of power grids to
joint cyber and physical attacks and developing methods to mitigate their effects. In the next
Chapter, we evaluate the performance of the recovery method presented in Section 5.6 when the
phase angles are obtained using the AC power flow model.
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5.A Preliminaries from Graph Theory
In this appendix, we provide some of the known theorems and definitions used in the proofs
provided in Section 5.B.
A bond of a graph is a minimal nonempty edge cut, that is, a nonempty edge cut none of
whose nonempty proper subsets is an edge cut.
A graph in which each node has even degree is called an even graph. A circuit is the union
of edge-disjoint cycles. It is easy to see that a cycle is also a circuit.
Theorem 5.4 (Theorem 5.2 [123]). Let G “ pV,Eq be a planar Eulerian graph, and let F Ď E.
Then the following are equivalent: (i) F is G-separable, (ii) for each bond D, |DXF | ď |D´F |.
Theorem 5.5 (Theorem 10.16 [37]). Let G be a connected planar graph, and let G˚ be a planar
dual of G. (i) If C is a cycle of G, then C˚ is a bond of G˚. (ii) If B is a bond of G, then B˚
is a cycle of G˚.
Theorem 5.6 (Theorem 6.1.16 [154]). The followings are equivalent for a planar graph G, (i)
G is bipartite, (ii) every face of G has even length, and (iii) the dual graph G˚ is Eulerian.
Theorem 5.7 (Euler’s formula [36]). For any planar graph G with n nodes, m edges, r faces,
and c connected components, the following formula holds, n` r ´m “ c.
Lemma 5.15 (Corollary 2.16 [36]). The symmetric difference of two even subgraphs is an even
subgraph.
5.B Proofs
In this appendix, we provide the omitted proofs.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Recall that we can assume VH “ t1, 2, . . . , |VH |u and EH “ te1, e2, . . . , e|EH |u.
We assign an arbitrary orientation to the edges of H and fix the embedding of H on the plane.
We show the set of oriented edges by EH “ t1, 2, . . . , |EH |u. Suppose H has r faces and
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C1, C2, . . . , Cr are the cycles that surrounded those faces. For each cycle Ci, define vector
~ci P t´1, 0, 1u|EH | as follows,
cij “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
0 if j R Ci,
1 if j P Ci and j traverse Ci clockwise,
´1 if j P Ci and j traverse Ci counterclockwise.
It is easy to see that @i,DH~ci “ 0. Therefore, ~ci P NullpDq. On the other hand it is easy to
see that ~cis are linearly independent. If c is the number of connected components of H, then
dimpNullpDqq “ |EH |´ |VH |` c which from Euler’s formula is equal to r. Thus, ~cis form a basis
for the null space of the incidence matrix D. Now suppose ~x is the solution to (5.2) such that
suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u (from Lemma 5.5 we know that such a solution exists). We need to prove
that for any ~z “ ~x` y1 ~c1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` yr ~cr, }~z}1 ď }~x}1 iff y1 “ y2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ yr “ 0. Please notice that
since ~cis are the cycles associated with the faces of the planar graph H, each edge ej appears in
at most two cycles Ct and Cs. Thus, the entries of ~z, zjs are in one of the following forms, (i)
zj “ 0, (ii) zj “ xj , (iii) zj “ xj ˘ yt, (iv) zj “ xj ˘ pyt ´ ysq, or (v) zj “ ˘pyt ´ ysq.
First, we show that }~z}1 ě }~x}1. Suppose F “ tei1 , ei2 , . . . , eiku. From the assumption, we
know that F ˚ is H˚-separable. Thus, there are pairwise edge-disjoint cycles Oj˚ p1 ď j ď kq
in H˚, such that @eij P F, ei˚j P Oj˚ . For each jp1 ď j ď kq define NOpjq “ tp|ep˚ P Oj˚ u.
From the definitions it is easy to see that @p, qp1 ď p ‰ q ď kq, NOppq X NOpqq “ H. Thus,
}~z}1 ě řkj“1 řpPNOpjq |zp|. On the other hand, from the triangle inequality, it is easy to see that
for all 1 ď j ď k, řpPNOpjq |zp| ě |xij |. Thus, }~z}1 ě řkj“1 řpPNOpjq |zp| ě řkj“1 |xij | “ }~x}1.
Now we show that }~z}1 “ }~x}1 is not possible unless y1 “ y2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ yr “ 0. If tj1, j2, . . . , jtu
are the indices for which yj1 “ yj2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ yjt “ w, then yj1 ~cj1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` yjt ~cjt “ w~c2 for which
from Lemma 5.15, ~c2 is the vector associated with the circuit C2 “ Cj1∆Cj2∆ . . .∆Cjt (∆ is
the symmetric difference). Therefore we can rewrite ~z as ~x`w1 ~c21`w2 ~c22` ¨ ¨ ¨ `wq ~c2q for which
w1 ą w2 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą wq. If q “ 0, then there is nothing left to prove. If q “ 1, then it can be easily
concluded from Lemma 5.7 that it is not possible to have }~z}1 “ }~x}1 unless w1 “ 0 ñ y1 “
y2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ yr “ 0. Now assume q ą 1, from what we showed previously, we know that in order
to have }~z}1 “ }~x}1, we should have }~z}1 “ řkj“1 řpPNOpjq |zp| “ řkj“1 |xij | “ }~x}1. Equality
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}~z}1 “ řkj“1 řpPNOpjq |zp| shows that suppp~zq Ď Ťkj“1NOpjq. Equality řkj“1 řpPNOpjq |zp| “řk
j“1 |xij | shows that w1 should appear in }~z}1, half of the time positive and half of the time
negative. However, since w1 has the largest value, it appears always as w1 ´wi in the instances
like |w1 ´ wi|. Now from assumption we know that |suppp~xq X C21 | ă |C21 |{2. Thus, there are
more than |C21 |{2 instances like |w1 ´ wi| or |w1| in }~z}1. Therefore, it is not possible that w1
appears half of the time positive and half of the time negative in }~z}1, which shows that if q ą 1
then }~z}1 ‰ }~x}1. Thus, the proof is complete. 
Proof of Corollary 5.4. H is bipartite, therefore from Theorem 5.6, H˚ is Eulerian. For any C
in H, |CXF | ă |CzF |, therefore from Theorem 5.5 for any bond C˚ in H˚, |C˚XF ˚| ă |C˚zF ˚|.
Combining these two, from Theorem 5.4 we can conclude that F ˚ is H˚-separable. Thus, we
can simply apply Theorem 5.2. 
Proof of Lemma 5.8. From Corollary 5.1 we know that ~δH “ ~θH´~θ1H is a solution to AH¯|H~δH`
AH¯|H¯~δH¯ “ 0. Now if ~δ “ ~θ ´ ~θ1, from Lemma 5.5 we know that there exists a vector ~x P R|EH |
such that suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u and DH~x “ AH|H~δH`AH|H¯~δH¯ . Thus, the proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3. First, using Lemma 5.10, since the phase angles for theH-outer-connected
nodes can be computed uniquely, without loss of generality and for simplicity, we can assume that
H does not contain any H-outer-connected nodes. Suppose ~c1, . . .~cr are the vectors associated
with the faces in H as we defined in the proof of Theorem 5.2. Suppose ~β1, . . . , ~βt are the vec-
tors associated with the coboundry of the H-inner-connected nodes as we defined in the proof of
Lemma 5.9. All we need to prove is that if ~x is the solution to (5.4) such that suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u
then for any solution ~z for (5.4), }~z}1 ą }~x ` y1~c1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` yr~c1 ` w1~β1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` wt~βt}1 unless
y1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ yr “ w1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ wt “ 0. The rest of the proof is exactly similar to proofs of
Lemma 5.9 and Theorem 5.2. The key is Condition (v) implies that the cycles (~cis) and coboun-
dries (~bis) are edge disjoint. Thus, since all the conditions for Lemma 5.9 and Theorem 5.2 also
hold here, with exactly the same approach as in the proofs of Lemma 5.9 and Theorem 5.2 we
can conclude this Theorem. 
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Proof of Lemma 5.11. We show that finding the minimum matched-forest partition is at least
as hard as vertex arboricity. Suppose G “ pV,Eq is given and we are interested in apGq. We
build a new graph Gˆ “ pVˆ , Eˆq by getting a copy of graph G, G2 “ pV 2, E2q and connect every
node in G to its counterpart in G2. Thus, Vˆ “ V Y V 2 and Eˆ “ E YE2Y ttvi, v2i u|vi P V u. We
prove that Gˆ has a matched-forest partition of size k if and only if apGq ď k. First, let us assume
Gˆ has a matched-forest partition of size k, namely Hˆ1, Hˆ2, . . . , Hˆk. Since subgraphs induced by
Hˆ1, Hˆ2, . . . , Hˆk in Gˆ are acyclic and partition Vˆ , it is easy to see that subgraphs induced by
Hˆ1 X V, Hˆ2 X V, . . . , Hˆk X V in G are acyclic and partition V . Thus, apGq ď k. Now, let us
assume apGq ď k. There should exists a partition of nodes of G into subsets H1, H2, . . . ,Hk such
that each subset induces an acyclic graph. Assume H21 , H22 , . . . ,H2k are the counterparts of these
subsets in G2. For any i, 1 ď i ď k ´ 1 define Hˆi “ Hi YH2i`1, and Hˆk “ Hk YH21 . It is easy
to see that Hˆ1, Hˆ2, . . . , Hˆk is a matched-forest partition of size k for Gˆ. Thus, we proved that
Gˆ has a matched-forest partition of size k if and only if apGq ď k. It means that the minimum
matched-forest partition of Gˆ is equal to apGq, which shows that the minimum matched-forest
partition is at least as hard as vertex arboricity and therefore it is NP-hard. 
Proof of Lemma 5.14. Suppose OPT is the minimum number of matched-forest partitions of
G and OPTm is the number of optimal matching cover of G. Since for any subset VH in the
partition of G “ pV,Eq into matched-forest partitions there exists a matching that covers VH ,
we can cover V with OPT matchings. Thus, OPTm ď OPT . Now since G is planar, ZS
Algorithm uses 3APP to partition Qis into atmost 3 subsets. Hence, if k is the number of
subsets returned by ZS Algorithm then k ď 3 ˆ 2 ˆ OPTm ď 6 ˆ OPT . Thus, ZS Algorithm
provides a 6-approximation of the minimum matched-forest partition of G.
As for the running time, ZS algorithm takes Opn3q time to find the optimal matching cover
of G and Op|Qi|q to partition Qi. Now since k ď n and |Qi| ď n, line 4 does not take more than
Opn2q. Thus, the total running time is Opn3q. 
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Chapter 6
Cyber-physical Attacks (AC Model)
We follow the model that was introduced in the Chapter 5 to study cyber-physical attacks on
power grids. Under this model, we assume that an adversary attacks an area by: (i) disconnecting
some lines within that area (failed lines), and (ii) obstructing the information from within the
area to reach the control center. Given the phase angles of the buses outside the attacked area
(before and after the attack), our objective is to estimate the phase angles and detect the failed
lines in the attacked area. Unlike the previous chapter which was based on the DC power flow
model, in this chapter, we assume that the phase angles are given under the more accurate AC
power flow model.
As we proved in Section 5.3, the problem of the line failures detection using phase angle
measurments is combinatorial in nature, since the solution space is the discrete set of all possible
line failures. Despite the complexities, we present the Convex OPtimization for Statistical State
EStimation (COPSSES) Algorithm to estimate the phase angles of the buses and detect the failed
lines inside the attacked area. The algorithm is based on a variation of the convex relaxation that
was introduced in Section 5.6 for information recovery under the noisy DC power flow model.
Here, we adapt a similar idea in the COPSSES Algorithm and show that it can estimates the
phase angles and detects the line failures accurately under the AC power flow model. The
novelty of our approach is the transformation of the line failures detection problem to a convex
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optimization problem. Therefore, the COPSSES Algorithm can be used to detect any number
of line failures without affecting its running time.
We evaluate the performance of the COPSSES Algorithm in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus
systems, and show that it estimates the phase angles of the buses with less that 1% error, and
can detect the line failures with 80% accuracy for single, double, and triple line failures. The
algorithm can detect failures beyond triple line failures.
In a recent work [73], a linear multinomial regression model is proposed as a classifier for
a single line failure detection using transient PMU data. Due to the time complexity of the
learning process for more than a single line failure, this method is impractical for detecting
higher order failures. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a method for
line failures detection under the AC power flow model that can be used to detect any number
of line failures.
6.1 State Estimation
We can formulate the state estimation problem after a cyber-physical attack similar to the
previous Chapter as follows: Given A, ~θ, and ~θ1¯
H
, the objective is to estimate ~θ1H and detect
F . To address this problem, we use and build on the idea that we introduced in the previous
Chapter. We proved in Chapter 5 that if the phase angles of the nodes are given under the
DC power flow equations, there exist vectors ~x P R|EH | and ~δH P R|VH | satisfying following
optimization problem for 1 “ 2 “ 0, and that suppp~xq “ ti|ei P F u and ~δH :“ ~θH ´ ~θ1H :
min }~x}1 s.t.
}DH~x´AH|H~δH ´AH|H¯~δH¯}2 ď 1 (6.1)
}AH¯|H~δH `AH¯|H¯~δH¯}2 ď 2.
where ~δH¯ :“ ~θH¯ ´ ~θ1¯H .
The novelty of this method is that it provides a convex relaxation for the line failures de-
tection problem which is combinatorial in nature. Notice that for 1 “ 2 “ 0, the optimization
problem (6.1) is a Linear Program (LP). We proved that under several conditions on H, the
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solution to (6.1) is unique, therefore the relaxation is exact and the state of the grid can be
recovered by solving (6.1) (suppp~xq gives the failed lines and the phase angles can be computed
as ~θ1H “ ~θH ´ ~δH). In particular, when H is acyclic and there is a matching between the nodes
in H and H¯ that covers H, the solution to (6.1) is unique for any set of line failures.1
Since the DC power flows only provides an approximation of the phase angles, it is obvious
that if the phase angles of the nodes are given under the AC power flows, the optimization
problem (6.1) for 1 “ 2 “ 0 is no longer feasible. One way to overcome this challenge is to
relax the exact conditions by selecting 1, 2 ą 0.
It is easy to see that if 1, 2 ą 0, the optimization problem (6.1) becomes a second-order
cone program that can still be efficiently solved using gradient decent methods.
The only challenge in using (6.1) for state estimation is that 1 and 2 need to be determined.
To overcome this challenge, we present the Convex OPtimization for Statistical State EStimation
(COPSSES) Algorithm. The idea is to change i from si to ti and compute the solution to (6.1)
for each setup. If F is an array that contains all the detected line failures for each setup, then
the appearance frequency of each line in F gives a rough probability that the line is failed. PF
denotes the appearance frequency table of the lines in F . Moreover, the computed vector ~θH´~δH
in each iteration is an estimate of the phase angles inside the attacked zone. By computing the
mean and variance of all the estimated phase angle vectors in each iteration, it can improve this
estimation. We refer to the mean and variance of the estimated phase angles in H as ~µ1H , ~σ1H .
The COPSSES Algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 7.
6.2 Numerical Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the COPSSES Algorithm. We use the CVX [78]
for solving the optimization problem (6.1) and use MATPOWER [164] to compute ~θ and ~θ1
under the AC power flow model.
1We proved in Chapter 5 that the solution to (6.1) is unique under less restricted conditions. However, for
simplicity, we focus on the simplest case.
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Algorithm 7 Convex OPtimization for Statistical State EStimation (COPSSES)
Input: A connected graph G, attacked zone H, ~θ, and ~θ1¯
H
1: for 1 “ s1 to t1 do
2: for 2 “ s2 to t2 do
3: Compute ~x, ~δH the solution to (6.1) by second order cone programming;
4: Compute ~θH ´ ~δH as the estimated phase angles;
5: Compute F “ tei|i P suppp~xqu;
6: F “ rF , F s;
7: Θ1H “ rΘ1H , ~θH ´ ~δH s
8: Compute the appearance frequency of each line in F to form an appearance frequency table PF ;
9: Compute the row mean and variance of Θ1H as ~µH , ~σH ;





We use the IEEE 118- and 300-bus benchmark systems as the test networks [1] and consider
the attacked zones H1 and H2 within these networks, repectively. Fig. 6.1 shows the topology
of the attacked zone H1 within the 118-bus system. Fig. 6.2 also shows the topology of the
attacked zone H2 within the 300-bus system. It is easy to see from Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 that H1
and H2 are both acyclic. For both of the attacked zones there is also a matching between the
nodes in Hi and H¯i that covers Hi.
To compute the error in the estimated phase angles, we compute }~µ1Hi ´ ~θ1Hi}2{}~θ1Hi}2ˆ 100.
Recall that ~µ1Hi is the vector of average estimated phase angles of the nodes in the attacked zone
obtained by the COPSSES Algorithm and ~θ1Hi is the vector of the actual phase angles of the
nodes.
To quantify the performance of the COPSSES Algorithm in detecting the failed lines, we can
use the appearance frequency table PF to detect the most likely failed lines using a threshold
value t. The idea is that if a line is detected as failed in at least ptˆ 100q% of the settings, then
we consider that line as a line that is most likely failed. If t “ 0.5, then the solution is similar
to the maximum likelihood set of failures based on PF . We consider t “ 0.2, 0.5, 0.8.





















Figure 6.1: Topology of the attacked zone in the 118-bus system with 21 nodes and 22 lines
(referred to as H1).
In this section, in the COPSSES Algorithm, we use s1 “ 3, t1 “ 7, s2 “ 1, and s2 “ 20.
Therefore, the COPSSES Algorithm estimates the state under 100 different settings for 1 and
2. Notice that increasing the intervals rsi, tis increases the accuracy at the expense of the
running time.
6.2.1 Single line failures
In this subsection, we consider all possible single line failure scenarios in zones H1 and H2 as
the failed lines.
6.2.1.1 118-bus System
For all single line failure scenarios, the error in the estimated phase angles using the COPSSES
Algorithm is below 1%.
To show the results for the detected line failures, we use a heatmap matrix as in Fig. 6.3.
As can be seen, in most of the cases, the correct line is detected as the most probable failed line
by the COPSSES Algorithm. For example:
















Figure 6.2: Topology of the attacked zone in the 300-bus system with 16 nodes and 15 lines
(referred to as H2).
- For i “ 1, in 95% of the settings, line 1 is detected as the only failed line. In 5% of the
settings, however, no failure is detected.
- For i “ 15, in 100% of the settings, line 15 is detected as the failed line. However, in 3, 12,
16, 20, 20, 23, and 20% of the times, lines 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 are also detected
as the failed lines.
Fig. 6.4 also shows the number of false negatives and positives if we use the appearance
frequency table PF and a threshold value t to detect the most likely failed lines. As can be
seen, for t “ 0.5, for almost 80% of the cases there are no false negatives or false positives. For
t “ 0.2, for almost 95% of the cases, there are no false negatives while for almost 80% of the
cases there are no false positives either.
6.2.1.2 300-bus System
In this case, the phase angle estimation is also very accurate. For all single line failure scenarios,
the error in the estimated phase angles using the COPSSES Algorithm is below 2%.










































Figure 6.3: Detected line failures after all single line failures in zone H1 within the IEEE 118-bus
system. The color intensity of each pi, jq square shows the number of times line j is detected as
failed when only line i is actually failed.
Fig. 6.5 shows the heatmap matrix of the failed line and detected failed lines. As can be
seen, in this case also the actual failed line is detected as the most probable failed line by the
COPSSES Algorithm, most of the time. For example:
- For i “ 5, in 95% of the settings, line 5 is detected as the only failed line. In 5% of the
settings, however, the optimization problem (6.1) is infeasible.
- For i “ 7, in 75% of the settings, line 7 is detected as the failed line. However, in 40 and
13% of the settings, lines 3 and 5 are also detected as the failed lines, respectively. In 25%
of the settings, (6.1) is infeasible.
As in the 118-bus system case, Fig. 6.6 shows the number of false negatives and positives
using the appearance frequency table PF and a threshold value t. As can be seen, for t “ 0.2
and t “ 0.5, the number of false positive and negatives is zero for most of the cases.
6.2.2 Double line failures
In this subsection, we consider all double line failure scenarios in zones H1 and H2 as the failed
lines.
























































Figure 6.4: The CDF of the number of false negatives and positives in detecting single line
failures in H1 within the 118-bus system using the COPSSES Algorithm and a threshold value
t.
6.2.2.1 118-bus System
In this case, as in the single line failure, the phase angle estimation is very accurate. For
all double line failure scenarios, the error in the estimated phase angles using the COPSSES
Algorithm is below 2%.
Since there are many double line failure cases, we cannot show the failed lines detection
results as a matrix heatmap. However, as in the previous subsection, we can show the number
of false negatives and positives if we use the appearance frequency table PF and a threshold
value t to detect the most likely failed lines. As can be seen in Fig. 6.7, for t “ 0.2 for more
than 80% of the cases there is no false negative. Moreover, for more than 80% of the cases there
is less than a single false positive line detection.
6.2.2.2 300-bus System
In this case, as in the single line failure scenario and the 118-bus system, the phase angle
estimation is very accurate. For all double line failure scenarios, the error in the estimated
phase angles is below 2%.




































Figure 6.5: Detected line failures after all single line failures in zone H2 within the IEEE 300-bus
system. The color intensity of each pi, jq square shows the number of times line j is detected as
failed when only line i is actually failed.
To show the performance of the COPSSES Algorithm in detecting failures, as in the 118-bus
case, we compute the number of false negative and positive failure detections using PF and a
threshold value t. As can be seen in Fig. 6.8, in this case also for t “ 0.2, the detection is
relatively accurate. In almost 70% of the cases, there are no false negatives while in 80% of the
cases, there is no false positives either.
6.2.3 Triple line failures and beyond
Here, due to the page limit, we only consider up to 3 line failures in our numerical results.
However, the COPSSES Algorithm can be used to estimate the state in the attacked zone for
any number of line failures.
In this subsection, we consider 100 randomly sampled triple line failures from all possible
triple line failures in H1 and H2 as the failed lines.

























































Figure 6.6: The CDF of the number of false negatives and positives in detecting single line
failures in H2 within the 300-bus system using the COPSSES Algorithm and a threshold value
t.
6.2.3.1 118-bus System
The phase angle estimation is nearly perfect for the triple line failure scenarios as in the previous
cases. The error for the estimated phase angles is less that 1% for all the sampled triple line
failure cases.
Fig. 6.9 shows the number of false negatives and positives, if we use the appearance frequency
table PF and a threshold value t to detect the most likely failed lines. As can be seen, for t “ 0.2,
in 80% of the times there is no false negatives while in 80% of the times there is at most 1 false
positive.
6.2.3.2 300-bus System
The phase angle estimation of the COPSSES Algorithm is surprisingly perfect for the triple line
failures scenarios in the H2. The error for the estimated phase angles is 0% for all the sampled
triple line failure cases.
As in the previous cases, to evaluate the performance of the COPSSES Algorithm in detecting
failures, we compute the number of false positives and negatives by selecting different threshold
values t. As can be seen in Fig. 6.10, for t “ 0.2, the Algorithm performs relatively well. In 70%
























































Figure 6.7: The CDF of the number of false negatives and positives in detecting double line

























































Figure 6.8: The CDF of the number of false negatives and positives in detecting double line
failures in H2 within the 300-bus system using the COPSSES Algorithm and a threshold value
t.
of the cases, there is no false negatives while for more than 80% of the cases, there is no false
positives either.























































Figure 6.9: The CDF of the number of false negatives and positives in detecting triple line
failures in H1 within the 118-bus system using the COPSSES Algorithm and a threshold value
























































Figure 6.10: The CDF of the number of false negatives and positives in detecting triple line
failures in H2 within the 300-bus system using the COPSSES Algorithm and a threshold value
t. 100 randomly sampled triple line failures are considered.
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6.3 Conclusion
We provided an algorithm to estimate the state of the grid following a cyber-physical attack
under the AC power flow model. We studied its performance under different scenarios (single,
double, and triple line failures) in IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems and showed that it can
estimate the phase angles almost perfectly (with less that 1% error) in these scenarios. Moreover,
we showed that our algorithm can detect line failures with less that 20% chance of producing
false positives and negatives.
We believe that the COPSSES Algorithm can accurately estimate the state of the grid for
less constrained attacked zones as well as in different scenarios such as false data injection.
Exploring these directions can be of interest to researchers.
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Chapter 7
Power Grid Islanding
Power Grid Islanding is an effective method to mitigate cascading failures in power grids [140].
The objective is to partition the network into smaller connected components, called islands,
such that each island can operate independently for a while. Power gird islanding is performed
in the early stages of a cascading failure to prevent the system to be separated into unbalanced
parts. It also expedites the restoration of the grid after a major failure, by reducing transient
stability problems during system reconnection.
In order for an island to operate, it is necessary that the power supply and demand at
that island are almost equal.1 Equality of supply and demand in an island, however, may not
be sufficient for its independent operation. It is also important that the infrastructure in that
island has the physical capacity to safely transfer the power from the supply nodes to the demand
nodes. When the island is large enough compared to the initial network, it is more likely that
it has enough capacity. This problem has been studied in the power systems community but
almost all the algorithms provided in the literature are heuristic methods that have been shown
to be effective only by simulations [71,107,121,139].
Motivated by this application, we formally introduce and study the Doubly Balanced Con-
nected graph Partitioning (DBCP) problem: Let G “ pV,Eq be a connected graph with a
1If the supply and demand are not exactly equal but still relatively close, load shedding/generation curtailing
can be used in order for the island to operate.
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weight (supply/demand) function p : V Ñ Z satisfying ppV q “ řjPV ppjq “ 0. The objective is
to partition V into pV1, V2q such that GrV1s and GrV2s are connected, |ppV1q|, |ppV2q| ď cp, and
maxt |V1||V2| ,
|V2|
|V1|u ď cs, for some constants cp and cs. We also consider the case that ppV q ‰ 0, in
which the excess supply/demand should be split roughly evenly.
The problem calls for a partition into two connected subgraphs that simultaneously balances
two objectives, (1) the supply/demand within each part, and (2) the sizes of the parts. The
connected partitioning problem with only the size objective has been studied previously. In
the most well-known result, Lova´z and Gyori [80, 99] independently proved, using different
methods, that every k-connected graph can be partitioned into k arbitrarily sized connected
subgraphs. However, neither of the proofs is constructive, and there are no known polynomial-
time algorithms to find such a partition for k ą 3. For k “ 2, a linear time algorithm is provided
in [141] and for k “ 3 an Op|V |2q algorithm is provided in [149].2 The complexity of the problem
with the size objective and related optimization problems have been studied in [43, 48, 65] and
there are various NP-hardness and inapproximability results. Note that the size of the cut is not
of any relevance here (so the extensive literature on finding balanced partitions, not necessarily
connected, that minimize the cut is not relevant.)
The objective of balancing the supply/demand alone, when all ppiq are ˘1, can also be seen
as an extension for the objective of balancing the size (which corresponds to ppiq “ 1). Our
bi-objective problem of balancing both supply/demand and size, can be seen also as an extension
of the problem of finding a partition that balances the size for two types of nodes simultaneously:
Suppose the nodes of a graph are partitioned into red and blue nodes. Find a partition of the
graph into two large connected subgraphs that splits approximately evenly both the red and the
blue nodes.
We now summarize our results and techniques. Since the power grids are designed to wit-
hstand a single failure (“N ´ 1” standard) [29], and therefore 2-connected, our focus is mainly
on the graphs that are at least 2-connected. We first, in Section 7.4, study the connected partiti-
oning problem with only the supply/demand balancing objective, and show results that parallel
2For k “ 2, a much simpler approach than the one in [141] is to use the st-numbering [94] for 2-connected
graphs.
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the results for balancing size alone, using similar techniques: The problem is NP-hard in general.
For 2-connected graphs and weights ppiq “ ˘1, there is always a perfectly balanced partition
and we can find it easily using an st-numbering. For 3-connected graphs and weights ppiq “ ˘1,
there is a perfectly balanced partition into three connected graphs, and we can find it using a
nonseparating ear decomposition of 3-connected graphs [46] and similar ideas as in [149].
The problem is more challenging when we deal with both balancing objectives, supply/demand
and size. This is the main focus and occupies the bulk of this chapter. Our main results are
existence results and algorithms for 2- and 3-connected graphs. It is easy to observe that we
cannot achieve perfection in one objective (cp “ 0 or cs “ 1) without sacrificing completely the
other objective. We show that allowing the supply/demand of the parts to be off balance by at
most the weight of one node suffices to get a partition that is roughly balanced also with respect
to size.
First, in Section 7.4.1, we study the case of 3-connected graphs since we use this later as the
basis of handling 2-connected graphs. We show that if @i, ppiq “ ˘1, there is a partition that
is perfectly balanced with respect to both objectives, if |V | ” 0pmod 4q (otherwise the sizes are
slightly off for parity reasons); for general p, the partition is perfect in both objectives up to
the weight of a single node. Furthermore, the partition can be constructed in polynomial time.
Our approach uses the convex embedding characterization of k-connectivity studied by Linial,
Lova´z, and Wigderson [95]. We need to adapt it for our purposes so that the convex embedding
also has certain desired geometric properties, and for this purpose we use the nonseparating ear
decomposition of 3-connected graphs of [46] to obtain a suitable embedding.
Then, in Section 7.4.2, we analyze the case of 2-connected graphs. We reduce it to two
subcases: either (1) there is a separation pair that splits the graph into components that are not
very large, or (2) we can perform a series of contractions to achieve a 3-connected graph whose
edges represent contracted subgraphs that are not too large. We provide a good partitioning
algorithm for case (1), and for case (2) we extend the algorithms for 3-connected graphs to
handle also the complications arising from edges representing contracted subgraphs. Finally, in
Section 7.5, we briefly discuss the problem of finding a connected partitioning of a graph with
two types of nodes that splits roughly evenly both types.
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7.1 Related Work
Power grid islanding is widely studied in power engineering community [71, 121, 140, 146]. Effi-
cient search algorithms for splitting the grid into two balanced (in terms of supply and demand
values) parts is studied in [140, 160]. These algorithm are shown to be effective for small grids.
However, since they depend on searching the entire solution space they are impractical in larger
grids.
Islanding methods using mixed integer programming were studied in [71, 107]. These met-
hods consider operational constraints as well as balancing conditions on the islands to partition
the network into two or more islands. Therefore, from engineering view point, these methods
consider the most realistic constraints between all previous works. However, since these methods
rely on integer variables, they do not guarantee to find the optimal solution in polynomial time.
Moreover, no approximation bounds are provided for these algorithms. These algorithms are
shown to be effective for small networks by simulations.
In a recent series of works, spectral clustering techniques in graph theory are used for power
grid islanding [69,109,121]. Although spectral clustering methods can be implemented efficiently,
since these methods are not bounded by any balancing or operational constraints, the solutions
obtained by these methods are not guaranteed to results in balanced or operable islands. These
methods are shown to perform well by simulations on small networks.
Finally, power grid islanding is also used to group synchronized generators together at the
time of frequency disturbance events. Effective heuristic methods with no guarantee of perfor-
mance are provided to partition the grid during these events in [97,146,158].
7.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide a short overview of the definitions and tools used in our work. Most of
the graph theoretical terms used in this chapter are relatively standard and borrowed from [36]
and [154].
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7.2.1 Terms from Graph Theory
Cutpoints and Subgraphs: A cutpoint of a connected graph G is a node whose deletion
results in a disconnected graph. Let X and Y be subsets of the nodes of a graph G. GrXs
denotes the subgraph of G induced by X. We denote by ErX,Y s the set of edges of G with one
end in X and the other end in Y .
Connectivity: The connectivity of a graph G “ pV,Eq is the minimum size of a set S Ă V
such that GzS is not connected. A graph is k-connected if its connectivity is at least k.
7.2.2 st-numbering of a Graph
Given any edge ts, tu in a 2-connected graph G, an st-numbering for G is a numbering for the
nodes in G defined as follows [94]: the nodes of G are numbered from 1 to n so that s receives
number 1, node t receives number n, and every node except s and t is adjacent both to a lower-
numbered and to a higher-numbered node. It is shown in [70] that such a numbering can be
found in Op|V | ` |E|q.
7.2.3 Series-Parallel Graphs
A Graph G is series-parallel, with terminals s and t, if it can be produced by a sequence of the
following operations:
1. Create a new graph, consisting of a single edge between s and t.
2. Given two series parallel graphs, X and Y with terminals sX , tX and sY , tY respectively,
form a new graph G “ P pX,Y q by identifying s “ sX “ sY and t “ tX “ tY . This is
known as the parallel composition of X and Y .
3. Given two series parallel graphs X and Y , with terminals sX , tX and sY , tY respectively,
form a new graph G “ SpX,Y q by identifying s “ sX , tX “ sY and t “ tY . This is known
as the series composition of X and Y .
It is easy to see that a series-parallel graph is 2-connected if, and only if, the last operation is a
parallel composition.
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7.2.4 Nonseparating Induced Cycles and Ear Decomposition
Let H be a subgraph of a graph G. An ear of H in G is a nontrivial path in G whose ends
lie in H but whose internal vertices do not. An ear decomposition of G is a decomposition
G “ P0 Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y Pk of the edges of G such that P0 is a cycle and Pi for i ě 1 is an ear of
P0 Y P1 Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y Pi´1 in G. It is known that every 2-connected graph has an ear decomposition
(and vice-versa), and such a decomposition can be found in linear time.
A cycle C is a nonseparating induced cycle of G if GzC is connected and C has no chords.
We say a cycle C avoids a node u, if u R C.
Theorem 7.1 (Tutte [145]). Given a 3-connected graph GpV,Eq let tt, ru be any edge of G and
let u be any node of G, r ‰ u ‰ t. Then there is a nonseparating induced cycle of G through
tt, ru and avoiding u.
Notice that since G is 3-connected in the previous theorem, every node in C has a neighbor in
GzC. Cheriyan and Maheshwari showed that the cycle in Theorem 7.1 can be found in OpEq [46].
Moreover, they showed that any 3-connected graph G has a nonseparating ear decomposition
G “ P0 Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y Pk defined as follows: Let Vi “ V pP0q Y V pP1q ¨ ¨ ¨ Y V pPiq, let Gi “ GrVis and
Gi “ GrV zVis. We say that G “ P0 Y P1 Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y Pk is an ear decomposition through edge tt, ru
and avoiding vertex u if the cycle P0 contains edge tt, ru, and the last ear of length greater than
one, say Pm, has u as its only internal vertex. An ear decomposition P0 Y P1 ¨ ¨ ¨ Y Pk of graph
G through edge tt, ru and avoiding vertex u is a nonseparating ear decomposition if for all i,
0 ď i ă m, graph Gi is connected and each internal vertex of ear Pi has a neighbor in Gi.
Theorem 7.2 (Cheriyan and Maheshwari [46]). Given an edge tt, ru and a vertex u of a 3-
connected graph G, a nonseparating induced cycle of G through tt, ru and avoiding u, and a
nonseparating ear decomposition can be found in time Op|V | ` |E|q.
7.2.5 Partitioning of Graphs to Connected Subgraphs
The following theorem is the main existing result in partitioning of graphs into connected
subgraphs and is proved independently by Lova´z and Gyori [80,99] by different methods.
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Theorem 7.3 (Lova´z and Gyori [80, 99]). Let G “ pV,Eq be a k-connected graph. Let n “
|V |, v1, v2, . . . , vk P V and let n1, n2, . . . , nk be positive integers satisfying n1`n2`¨ ¨ ¨`nk “ n.
Then, there exists a partition of V into pV1, V2 . . . , Vkq satisfying vi P Vi, |Vi| “ ni, and GrVis is
connected for i “ 1, 2, . . . , k.
Although the existence of such a partition has long been proved, there is no polynomial-time
algorithm to find such a partition for k ą 3. For k “ 2, it is easy to find such partition using
st-numbering. For k “ 3, Wada and Kawaguchi [149] provided an Opn2q algorithm using the
nonseparating ear decomposition of 3-connected graph.
7.2.6 Convex Embedding of Graphs
In this subsection, we provide a short overview of the beautiful work by Linial, Lova´z, and
Wigderson [95] on convex embedding of the k-connected graphs. Let Q “ tq1, q2, . . . , qmu be
a finite set of points in Rd. The convex hull convpQq of Q is the set of all points řmi“1 λiqi
with
ř
i“1 λi “ 1. The rank of Q is defined by rankpQq “ 1 ` dimpconvpQqq. Q is in general
position if rankpSq “ d ` 1 for every pd ` 1q-subset S Ď Q. Let G be a graph and X Ă V .
A convex X-embedding of G is any mapping f : V Ñ R|X|´1 such that for each v P V zX,
fpvq P convpfpNpvqqq. We say that the convex embedding is in general position if the set fpV q
of the points is in general position.
Theorem 7.4 (Linial, Lova´z, and Wigderson [95]). Let G be a graph on n vertices and 1 ă k ă
n. Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
1. G is k-connected
2. For every X Ă V with |X| “ k, G has a convex X-embedding in general position.
Notice that the special case of the Theorem for k “ 2 asserts the existence of an st-numbering
of a 2-connected graph. The proof of this theorem is inspired by physics. The embedding is
found by letting the edges of the graph behave like ideal springs and letting its vertices settle.
A formal summary of the proof (1 Ñ 2) is as follows (for more details see [95]). For each
vi P X, define fpviq arbitrary in Rk´1 such that fpXq is in general position. Assign to every
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edge pu, vq P E a positive elasticity coefficient cuv and let c P R|E| be the vector of coefficients.
It is proved in [95] that for almost any coefficient vector c, an embedding f that minimizes the
potential function P “ řtu,vuPE cuv}fpuq ´ fpvq}22 provides a convex X-embedding in general





cuvfpuq for all v P V zX,
in which cv “ řuPNpvq cuv. Hence, the embedding can be found by solving a set of linear
equations in at most Op|V |3q time (or matrix multiplication time).
7.3 Balancing the Supply/Demand Only
In this section, we study the single objective problem of finding a partition of the graph into
connected subgraphs that balances (approximately) the supply and demand in each part of the
partition, without any regard to the sizes of the parts. We can state the optimization problem as
follows, and will refer to it as the Balanced Connected Partitioning with Integer weights (BCPI)
problem.
Definition 7.1. Given a graph G “ pV,Eq with a weight (supply/demand) function p : V Ñ Z
satisfying
ř
jPV ppjq “ 0. The BCPI problem is the problem of partitioning V into pV1, V2q such
that
1. V1 X V2 “ H and V1 Y V2 “ V ,
2. GrV1s and GrV2s are connected,
3. |ppV1q| ` |ppV2q| is minimized, where ppViq “ řjPVi ppjq.
Clearly, the minimum possible value for |ppV1q| ` |ppV2q| that we can hope for is 0, which
occurs iff ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0. It is easy to show that the problem of determining whether
there exists such a ‘perfect’ partition (and hence the BCPI problem) is strongly NP-hard. The
proof is very similar to analogous results concerning the partition of a graph into two connected
subgraphs with equal sizes (or weights, when nodes have positive weights) [43,65]
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Proposition 7.1. (1) It is strongly NP-hard to determine whether there is a solution to the
BCPI problem with value 0, even when G is 2-connected.
(2) If G is not 2-connected, then this problem is NP-hard even when @i, ppiq “ ˘1.
Proof. We use the proof of [43, Theorem 2] with a modest change. The reduction is from the
X3C problem [108], which is a variant of the Exact Cover by 3-sets and defined as follows:
Given a set X with |X| “ 3q and a family C of 3-element subsets of X such that |C| “ 3q and
each element of X appears in exactly 3 sets of C, decide whether C contains an exact cover
for X. Given an instance pX,Cq of X3C, let G “ pV,Eq be the graph with the vertex set
V “ X Y C Y ta, bu and edge set E “ Ť3qj“1rtCjxi|xi P Cju Y tCjau Y tCjbus. Set ppaq “ 2q,
ppbq “ 9q2` q, ppCjq “ ´1, and ppxiq “ ´3q. It is easy to verify that C contains an exact cover
for X if and only if the BCPI problem has a solution such that ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0. This shows
the first claim.
For the second claim, attach to nodes a, b, and the xis, paths of length 2q, 9q
2 ` q, and 3q,
respectively, and set the supply/demand values of a, b, the xi’s and the new nodes equal to `1
(for the paths for a and b) or ´1 (for the xi’s). 
Although it is NP-hard to tell whether there is a solution satisfying ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0, even
when @i, ppiq “ ˘1, in this case, if the graph G is 2-connected there is always such a solution.
For general weights p, there is a solution such that |ppV1q|, |ppV2q| ď maxjPV |ppjq|{2 and it can
be found easily in linear time using the st-numbering between two nodes.
Proposition 7.2. Let G be a 2-connected graph and u, v any two nodes in V such that ppuqppvq ą
0.
(1) There is a solution such that u P V1, v P V2, and |ppV1q| “ |ppV2q| ď maxjPV |ppjq|{2.
(2) If @i, ppiq “ ˘1, we can find a solution such that u P V1, v P V2, and ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0.
In both cases, the solution can be found in Op|E|q time.
Proof. Clearly, part (2) follows immediately from part (1) because in this case, ppV1q, ppV2q are
integer and maxjPV |ppjq|{2 “ 1{2. To show part (1), pick two arbitrary nodes u, v P V with
ppuqppvq ą 0. Since we want to separate u and v, we can assume wlog that initially tu, vu P G.
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Since G is 2-connected, an st-numbering between nodes u and v as u “ v1, v2, . . . , vn “ v can be
found in Op|V |`|E|q [70]. Define V piq1 :“ tv1, v2, . . . , viu. It is easy to see that ppV p1q1 q “ ppuq ą 0
and ppV pn´1q1 q “ ´ppvq ă 0. Hence, there must exist an index 1 ď i˚ ă n such that |ppV pi
˚q
1 q| ą 0
and |ppV pi˚`1q1 q| ď 0. Since |ppV piq1 q´ ppV pi`1q1 q| “ |ppi˚` 1q|, either |ppV pi
˚q
1 q| ď |ppi˚` 1q|{2 or
|ppV pi˚`1q1 q| ď |ppi˚` 1q|{2; Accordingly set V1 “ V pi
˚q
1 or V1 “ V pi
˚`1q
1 . Let V2 “ V zV1. Hence,
pV1, V2q is a solution with |ppV1q| “ |ppV2q| ď |ppi˚ ` 1q{2| ď maxjPV |ppjq|{2. It is easy to see
that i˚ can be found in Op|V |q. 
Remark 7.1. The bound in Proposition 7.2 (1) is tight. A simple example is a cycle of length
4 like pv1, v2, v3, v4q with ppv1q “ ´p, ppv2q “ ´p{2, ppv3q “ p, and ppv4q “ p{2. It is easy to
see that in this example |ppV1q| ` |ppV2q| “ maxjPV |ppjq| “ p is the best that one can do.
7.3.1 Connected Partitioning into Many Parts
The BCPI problem can be extended to partitioning a graph into k “ 3 or more parts. Let
G “ pV,Eq be a graph with a weight function p : V Ñ Z satisfying řjPV ppjq “ 0. The
BCPIk problem is the problem of partitioning G into pV1, V2, . . . , Vkq such that for any 1 ď i ď k,
GrVis is connected and řki“1 |ppViq| is minimized.
In the following proposition, we show that for k “ 3, if ppiq “ ˘1,@i, then there is always
a perfect partition (i.e., with ppV1q “ ppV2q “ ppV3q “ 0) and it can be found efficiently. For
general p, we can find a partition such that |ppV1q| ` |ppV2q| ` |ppV3q| ď 2 maxjPV |ppjq|. The
proof and the algorithm use a similar approach as the algorithm in [149] for partitioning a
3-connected graph to three connected parts with prescribed sizes, using the nonseparating ear
decomposition of 3-connected graphs as described in Subsection 7.2.4.
Proposition 7.3. Let G be a 3-connected graph and u, v, w three nodes in V such that ppuq, ppvq, ppwq ą
0 or ppuq, ppvq, ppwq ă 0.
(1) There is a solution such that u P V1, v P V2, w P V3, and |ppV1q| ` |ppV2q| ` |ppV3q| ď
2 maxjPV |ppjq|.
(2) If @i, ppiq “ ˘1, then there is a solution such that u P V1, v P V2, w P V3, and |ppV1q| “
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|ppV2q| “ |ppV3q| “ 0.
In both cases, the solution can be found in Op|E|q time.
Proof. Consider the case of general function p, and let pmax “ maxjPV |ppjq|. We will show
that we can find a solution such that u P V1, v P V2, w P V3 with |ppV1q|, |ppV2q| ď pmax{2.
Since |ppV3q| “ |ppV1q ` ppV2q| (recall ppV q “ 0), this implies that |ppV3q| ď pmax, and hence
|ppV1q|` |ppV2q|` |ppV3q| ď 2pmax. Furthermore, if ppiq “ ˘1 for all i P V , hence pmax “ 1, then
|ppV1q|, |ppV2q| ď pmax{2 implies that ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0, and therefore also ppV3q “ 0. Thus,
both claims will follow.
Assume u, v, w P V and ppuq, ppvq, ppwq ą 0 (the case of negative ppuq, ppvq, ppwq is sym-
metric). Since we want to separate u from v, we can assume without loss of generality that
tu, vu P E. Using [46], there is a non-separating ear decomposition through the edge tu, vu
and avoiding node w. Ignore the ears that do not contain any internal nodes, and let Q0 Y
Q1 Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y Qr be the decomposition consisting of the ears with nodes; we have w P Qr. Let
Vi “ V pQ0q Y V pQ1q ¨ ¨ ¨ Y V pQiq, let Gi “ GrVis and Gi “ GrV zVis. We distinguish two cases,
depending on whether ppV0q ď 0 or ppV0q ą 0.
(i) If ppV0q ď 0, then consider an st-numbering between u and v in V0, say u “ v1, v2, . . . , vs “
v. Define V
piq
0 “ tv1, v2, . . . , viu. Since ppuq, ppvq ą 0 and ppV0q ď 0, there must exist
indices 1 ď i˚ ď j˚ ă s such that ppV pi˚q0 q ą 0, ppV pi
˚`1q
0 q ď 0 and ppV0zV pj
˚`1q
0 q ą
0, ppV0zV pj˚q0 q ď 0.
(a) If i˚ “ j˚, since ppV pi˚q0 q ` ppvi˚`1q ` ppV0zV pi
˚`1q
0 q “ ppV0q ă 0, we have ppV pi
˚q
0 q `
ppV0zV pi˚`1q0 q ď |ppvi˚`1q|. Now, one of the following three cases happens:
- If ppV pi˚q0 q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2 and ppV0zV pi
˚`1q
0 q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2, then it is easy to see
that V1 “ V pi˚q0 , V2 “ V0zV pi
˚`1q
0 , and V3 “ V zpV1 Y V2q is a good partition.
- If ppV pi˚q0 q ą |ppvi˚`1q|{2 and ppV0zV pi
˚`1q
0 q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2, then ppV pi
˚q
0 q `
ppvi˚`1q “ ppV pi
˚`1q
0 q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2. Hence, V1 “ V pi
˚`1q
0 , V2 “ V0zV pi
˚`1q
0 ,
and V3 “ V zV0 is a good partition.
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- If ppV pi˚q0 q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2 and ppV0zV pi
˚`1q
0 q ą |ppvi˚`1q|{2, then ppV0zV pi
˚`1q
0 q`
ppvi˚`1q “ ppV0zV pi
˚q
0 q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2. Hence, V1 “ V pi
˚q
0 , V2 “ V0zV pi
˚q
0 , and
V3 “ V zV0 is a good partition.
(b) If i˚ ă j˚, then either ppV pi˚q0 q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2 or |ppV pi
˚`1q
0 q| ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2, accor-
dingly set V1 “ V pi˚q0 or V1 “ V pi
˚`1q
0 . Similarly, either ppV0zV pj
˚`1q
0 q ď |ppvj˚`1q|{2
or |ppV0zV pj˚q0 q| ď |ppvj˚`1q|{2, so accordingly set V2 “ V0zV pj
˚`1q
0 or V2 “ V0zV pj
˚q
0 .
Set V3 “ V zpV1 Y V2q. It is easy to check that pV1, V2, V3q is a good partition.
(ii) If ppV0q ą 0, then since ppwq ą 0 and therefore ppVr´1q ă 0, there must exist an index
0 ď j ă r ´ 1 such that ppVjq ą 0 and ppVj`1q ď 0. Consider an st-numbering between u
and v in GrVjs as u “ v1, v2, . . . , vs “ v and define V piqj “ tv1, v2, . . . , viu. The ear Qj`1 is
a path of new nodes q1, q2, . . . , qt attached to two (distinct) nodes vx, vy of GrVjs through
edges tvx, q1u, tqt, vyu P E; assume wlog that 1 ď x ă y ď s. For simplicity, we will use
below Qj`1 to denote also the set tq1, q2, . . . , qtu of internal (new) nodes of the ear. Also
define Q
piq
j`1 “ tq1, q2, . . . , qiu and Qp0qj`1 “ H. One of the following cases must happen:
(a) Suppose there is an index 1 ď i˚ ă py´ 1q such that ppV pi˚qj q ą 0 and ppV pi
˚`1q
j q ď 0
or there is an index x ` 1 ă i˚ ă s such that ppVjzV pi˚´1qj q ą 0 and ppVjzV pi
˚q
j q ď
0. Let’s assume there is an index 1 ď i˚ ă py ´ 1q, such that ppV pi˚qj q ą 0 and
ppV pi˚`1qj q ď 0 (the other case is exactly similar). Then either ppV pi
˚q
j q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2
or |ppV pi˚`1qj q| ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2, accordingly set either V1 “ V pi
˚q
j or V1 “ V pi
˚`1q
j . Set
V 12 “ VjzV1. One of the following cases happens:
- If V1 “ V pi˚qj and ppV 12q ď 0, then since ppV pi
˚`1q
j q ď 0, we have ppVjzV pi
˚`1q
j q ą
0. Hence, ppV 12ztvi˚`1uq ą 0. So, it is either |ppV 12q| ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2 or ppV 12ztvi˚`1uq ď
|ppvi˚`1q|{2. Now if ppV 12ztvi˚`1uq ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2, since also ppV1q ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2,
ppVjq ď 0 which contradicts with the assumption. Therefore, |ppV 12q| ď |ppvi˚`1q|{2.
Set V2 “ V 12 and V3 “ V zpV1 Y V2q. It is easy to check that pV1, V2, V3q is a good
partition.
- If V1 “ V pi˚qj and ppV 12q ą 0, then since ppVj Y Qj`1q ă 0, there is an index
0 ă t˚ ď t, such that ppV 12 Y pQj`1zQpt
˚q
j`1qq ą 0 and ppV 12 Y pQj`1zQpt
˚´1q
j`1 qq ď 0.
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Hence, either ppV 12 Y pQj`1zQpt
˚q
j`1qq ď |ppqt˚q|{2 or |ppV 12 Y pQj`1zQpt
˚´1q
j`1 qq| ď
|ppqt˚q|{2, accordingly set V2 “ V 12 Y pQj`1zQpt
˚q
j`1q or V2 “ V 12 Y pQj`1zQpt
˚´1q
j`1 q.
Set V3 “ V zpV1 Y V2q. It is easy to see that pV1, V2, V3q is a good partition.
- If V1 “ V pi˚`1qj , then since ppV1q ď 0, we have ppV 12q ą 0. The rest is exactly like
the previous case when V1 “ V pi˚qj and ppV 12q ą 0.
(b) Suppose that for every 1 ď i ă y, ppV piqj q ą 0 and for every x ă i ă s, ppVjzV piqj q ą
0. Set V 11 “ V py´1qj and V 12 “ VjzV 11 . Based on the assumption ppV 11q, ppV 12q ą 0.





j`1 q ď 0 and ppV 12 Y pQj`1zQpj
˚`1q
j`1 qq ą 0, ppV 12 Y pQj`1zQpj
˚q
j`1 qq ď 0. The
rest of the proof is similar to case (i) when ppV0q ď 0.

7.4 Balancing Both Objectives
In this section, we formally define and study the Doubly Balanced Connected graph Partitioning
(DBCP) problem.
Definition 7.2. Given a graph G “ pV,Eq with a weight (supply/demand) function p : V Ñ Z
satisfying ppV q “ řjPV ppjq “ 0 and constants cp ě 0, cs ě 1. The DBCP problem is the
problem of partitioning V into pV1, V2q such that
1. V1 X V2 “ H and V1 Y V2 “ V ,
2. GrV1s and GrV2s are connected,
3. |ppV1q|, |ppV2q| ď cp and maxt |V1||V2| ,
|V2|
|V1|u ď cs, where ppViq “
ř
jPVi ppjq.
Remark 7.2. Our techniques apply also to the case that ppV q ‰ 0. In this case, the requirement
3 on ppV1q and ppV2q is |ppV1q ´ ppV q{2|, |ppV2q ´ ppV q{2| ď cp, i.e., the excess supply/demand
is split approximately evenly between the two parts.
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Figure 7.1: Series-parallel graphs with 2s ` 1 paths of length 4t ` 2 used in Observations 7.1
and 7.2.
We will concentrate on 2-connected and 3-connected graphs and show that we can construct
efficiently good partitions. For most of the section we will focus on the case that ppiq “ ˘1,@i P
V . This case contains all the essential ideas. All the techniques generalize to the case of arbitrary
p, and we will state the corresponding theorems.
We observed in Section 2 that if the graph is 2-connected and ppiq “ ˘1,@i P V then there
is always a connected partition that is perfect with respect to the weight objective, ppV1q “
ppV2q “ 0, i.e., (3) is satisfied with cp “ 0. We know also from [80, 99] that there is always a
connected partition that is perfect with respect to the size objective, |V1| “ |V2|, i.e., condition
3 is satisfied with cs “ 1. The following observations show that combining the two objectives
makes the problem more challenging. If we insist on cp “ 0, then cs cannot be bounded in
general, (it will be Ωp|V |q), and if we insist on cs “ 1, then cp cannot be bounded. The series-
parallel graphs of Figure 7.1 provide simple counterexamples.
Observation 7.1. If cp “ 0, then for any cs ă |V |{2 ´ 1, there exist a 2-connected graph G
such that the DBCP problem does not have a solution even when @i, ppiq “ ˘1.
Proof. In the graph depicted in Figure 7.1, set t “ 0. 
Observation 7.2. If cs “ 1, then for any cp ă |V |{6, there exist a 2-connected graph G such
that the DBCP problem does not have a solution even when @i, ppiq “ ˘1.
Proof. In the graph depicted in Figure 7.1, set s “ 1. 
CHAPTER 7. POWER GRID ISLANDING 139
Thus, cp has to be at least 1 to have any hope for a bounded cs. We show in this section
that cp “ 1 suffices for all 2-connected graphs. We first treat 3-connected graphs.
7.4.1 3-Connected Graphs
Let G “ pV,Eq be a 3-connected graph. Assume for the most of this section that @i, ppiq “ ˘1
and ppV q “ 0 (we will state the results for general p at the end). We show that G has a
partition that is essentially perfect with respect to both objectives, i.e., with cp “ 0 and cs “ 1.
We say “essentially”, because ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0 and |V1| “ |V2| imply that |V1| “ |V2| are
even, and hence V must be a multiple of 4. If this is the case, then indeed we can find such a
perfect partition. If |V | ” 2pmod 4q (|V | has to be even since ppV q “ 0), then we can find an
‘almost perfect’ partition, one in which |ppV1q| “ |ppV2q| “ 1 and |V1| “ |V2| (or one in which
ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0 and |V1| “ |V2| ` 2).
We first treat the case that G contains a triangle (i.e., cycle of length 3). In the following
Lemma, we use the embedding for k-connected graphs introduced in [95] and as described in
Subsection 7.2.6, to show that if G is 3-connected with a triangle and all weights are ˘1, then
the DBCP problem has a perfect solution.
Lemma 7.1. If G is 3-connected with a triangle, @i, ppiq “ ˘1, and |V | ” 0pmod 4q, then there
exists a solution to the DBCP problem with ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0 and |V1| “ |V2|. If |V | ” 2pmod 4q,
then there is a solution with ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0 and |V1| “ |V2| ` 2. Moreover, this partition can
be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that |V | ” 0pmod 4q; the proof for the case |V | ” 2pmod 4q is similar. In [95] as
described in Subsection 7.2.6, it is proved that if G is a k-connected graph, then for every X Ă V
with |X| “ k, G has a convex X-embedding in general position. Moreover, this embedding can
be found by solving a set of linear equations of size |V |. Now, assume v, u, w P V form a triangle
in G. Set X “ tv, u, wu. Using the theorem, G has a convex X-embedding f : V Ñ R2 in general
position. Consider a circle C around the triangle fpuq, fpvq, fpwq in R2 as shown in an example
in Fig. 7.2. Also consider a directed line L tangent to the circle C at point A. If we project the
nodes of G onto the line L, since the embedding is convex and also tu, vu, tu,wu, tw, vu P E, the
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order of the nodes’ projection gives an st-numbering between the first and the last node (notice
that the first and last nodes are always from the set X). For instance in Fig. 7.2, the order of
projections give an st-numbering between the nodes u and v in G. Hence, if we set V1 to be the
|V |{2 nodes whose projections come first and V2 are the |V |{2 nodes whose projections come
last, then GrV1s and GrV2s are both connected and |V1| “ |V2| “ |V |{2. The only thing that
may not match is ppV1q and ppV2q. Notice that for each directed line tangent to the circle C,
we can similarly get a partition such that |V1| “ |V2| “ |V |{2. So all we need is a point D on
the circle C such that if we partition based on the directed line tangent to C at point D, then
ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0. To find such a point, we move L from being tangent at point A to point B
(AB is a diameter of the circle C) and consider the resulting partition. Notice that if at point A,
ppV1q ą 0, then at point B since V1 and V2 completely switch places compared to the partition
at point A, ppV1q ă 0. Hence, as we move L from being tangent at point A to point B and
keep it tangent to the circle, in the resulting partitions, ppV1q goes from some positive value to a
non-positive value. Notice that the partition pV1, V2q changes only if L passes a point D on the
circle such that at D, L is perpendicular to a line that connects fpiq to fpjq for some i, j P V .
Now, since the embedding is in general position, there are exactly two points on every line that
connects two points fpiq and fpjq, so V1 changes at most by one node leaving V1 and one node
entering V1 at each step as we move L. Hence, ppV1q changes by either ˘2 or 0 value at each
change. Now, since |V | ” 0pmod 4q, ppV1q has an even value in all the resulting partitions.
Therefore, as we move L from being tangent at point A to point B, there must be a point D
such that in the resulting partition ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0.
Note that the order of the projected points and V1 may change only when a line that passes
through 2 nodes of graph G is perpendicular to L. We can sort first the slopes of all the
lines connecting two nodes of G (or alternatively we can use a priority queue) and then rotate
the line L from the initial position A until we find the point D that yields a partition with
ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0 in Op|V |2 log |V |q time. 
When G is a triangle-free 3-connected graph, however, the proof in Lemma 7.1 cannot be
directly used anymore. The reason is if for example tu, vu R E and we project the nodes of G onto









Figure 7.2: Proof of Lemma 7.1.
the line L, this time the order of the nodes projection does not give an st-numbering between
the first and the last node if for example u and w are the first and last node, since some of the
middle nodes may only be connected to v. To prove a similar result for triangle-free 3-connected
case, we first provide the following two Lemmas. The main purpose of the following two Lemmas
are to compensate for the triangle-freeness of G in the proof of Lemma 7.1. The idea is to show
that in every 3-connected graph, there is a triple tu,w, vu P V , such that tu,wu, tw, vu P E and
in every partition that we get by the approach used in the proof of Lemma 7.1, if u and v are
in Vi, so is a path between u and v.
Lemma 7.2. If G is 3-connected, then there exists a set tu, v, wu P V and a partition of V into
pV 11 , V 12q such that:
1. V 11 X V 12 “ H and V 11 Y V 12 “ V ,
2. GrV 11s and GrV 12s are connected,
3. tu,wu, tv, wu P E,
4. w P V 11, u, v P V 12, and u, v are not cutpoints of GrV 12s,
5. |V 12 | ď |V |{2.
Moreover, such a partition and tu, v, wu can be found in Op|E|q time.
















Figure 7.3: Proof of Lemma 7.3 and Theorem 7.5.
Proof. Using the algorithm presented in [46], we can find a non-separating cycle C0 in G such
that every node in C0 has a neighbor in GzC0 in Op|E|q time. Now, we consider two cases:
(i) If |C0| ď |V |{2 ` 1, then select any three consecutive nodes pu,w, vq of C0 and set V 12 “
C0ztwu and V 11 “ V zV 12 .
(ii) If |C0| ą |V |{2 ` 1, since every node in C0 has a neighbor in GzC0, there exists a node
w P V zC0 such that |Npwq X C0| ě 2. Select two nodes u, v P Npwq X C0. There exists a
path P in C0 from u to v such that |P | ă |V |{2` 1. Set V 12 “ P and V 11 “ V zV 12 . 
Lemma 7.3. Given a partition pV 11 , V 12q of a 3-connected graph G with following properties:
1. V 11 X V 12 “ H and V 11 Y V 12 “ V ,
2. GrV 11s and GrV 12s are connected,
3. w P V 11, u, v P V 12, and u, v are not cutpoints of GrV 12s,
G has a convex X-embedding in general position with mapping f : V Ñ R2 such that:
1. X “ tu,w, vu, fpuq “ p0, 0q, fpvq “ p1, 0q, and fpwq “ p0, 1q,
2. Every node i in V 11 is mapped to a point pf1piq, f2piqq with f2piq ě 1{2,
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3. Every node i in V 12 is mapped to a point pf1piq, f2piqq with f1piq ě f2piq and f1piq`2f2piq ď
1.
Moreover, such an embedding can be found in in polynomial time.
Proof. Set X “ tv, u, wu. Using [95], G has a convex X-embedding in R2 in general position
with mapping f : V Ñ R2 such that fpuq “ p0, 0q, fpvq “ p1, 0q, and fpwq “ p0, 1q. In the X-
embedding of the nodes, we have a freedom to set the elasticity coefficient vector ~c to anything
that we want (except a measure zero set of vectors). So for any edge ti, ju P GrV 11s YGrV 12s, set
cij “ g; and for any ti, ju P ErV 11 , V 12s, set cij “ 1. Assume L1 is the line y “ 0.5, L2 is the line
x` 2y “ 1, and L3 is the line x “ y.
First, we show that there exist a g for which all the nodes in V 11 will be embedded above
the line L1. To show this, from [95], we know the embedding is such that it minimizes the total
potential Ppf,~cq “ řti,juPE cij}fpiq ´ fpjq}2. Notice that we can independently minimize P on

















Now, notice that if we place all the nodes in V 11 at point (0,1) and all the nodes in V 12 on the
line uv, then Py ď |E|. Hence, if f2 minimizes Py, then Pypf2, cq ď |E|. Set g ě 4|V |2|E|. We
show that if f2 minimizes Py, then for all edges ti, ju P GrV 11sYGrV 12s, pf2piq´f2pjqq2 ď 1{p4|V |2q.
By contradiction, assume there is an edge ti, ju P GrV 11s Y GrV 12s such that pf2piq ´ f2pjqq2 ą
1{p4|V |2q. Then, cijpf2piq ´ f2pjqq2 “ gpf2piq ´ f2pjqq2 ą |E|. Hence, Pypf2, cq ą |E| which
contradicts with the fact the f2 minimizes Py. Therefore, if g ě 4|V |2|E|, then for all ti, ju P
GrV 11sYGrV 12s, |f2piq´ f2pjq| ď 1{p2|V |q. Now, since GrV 11s is connected, all the nodes in V 11 are
connected to w with a path of length (in number of hops) less than |V | ´ 1. Hence, using the
triangle inequality, for all i P V 11 :
|f2pwq ´ f2piq| ď p|V | ´ 1q{p2|V |q ă 1{2 ñ |1´ f2piq| ă 1{2,
which means that all the nodes in V 11 are above L1.
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With the very same argument, if g ě t2|V |2|E|, then for all i P V 12 , f2piq ă 1{t.
Now, we want to prove that there is a g such that all the nodes in V 12 will be embedded
below the lines L2 and L3. Define n1piq :“ |Npiq X V 11 | and n2piq :“ |Npiq X V 12 |. From [95],
we know the embedding is such that for all i P V ztu, v, wu, fpiq “ 1{ciřjPNpiq cijfpjq, where
cj “ řjPNpiq cijfpjq. Since GrV 12s is connected and u is not a cutpoint of GrV 12s, for every
i P V 12ztu, vu there is a path i “ v1, v2, . . . , vr “ v in V 12 not containing node u. Using this
ordering: $’&’%f1pvjq ě
1
n2pvjqg`n1pvjqgf1pvj`1q ě p1{|V |qf1pvj`1q, @j P t1, . . . , r ´ 1u
f1pvrq “ f1pvq “ 1
ñ @i P V 12ztu, vu : f1piq ě p1{|V |qr ě p1{|V |q|V |.
On the other hand, from the previous part, if we set g ě |V |2|V |`2|E|, then for all i P V 12 ,
f2piq ď p1{|V |q|V |. Hence, for all i P V 12 , f2piq ď f1piq, which means that all the nodes in V 12 will
be placed below the line L3.
With the very same idea, we show that there exist a g for which all the nodes in V 12 will be
placed below the line L2. Since GrV 12s is connected and v is not a cutpoint of GrV 12s, for every
i P V 12ztu, vu there is a path u “ u1, u2, . . . , ut “ i in V 12 not containing node v. Notice that for
all i P V ztu, v, wu, 1 ´ f1piq “ 1{ciřjPNpiq cijp1 ´ f1pjqq. Hence, since @j P V : f1pjq ď 1, we
have, $’&’%1´ f1pujq ě
1
n2pujqg`n1pujqgp1´ f1pui´1qq ě p1{|V |qp1´ f1pui´1qq, @j P t2, . . . , tu
1´ f1puq “ 1´ f1pu1q “ 1
ñ @i P V 12ztu, vu : 1´ f1piq ě p1{|V |qt ě p1{|V |q|V |.
From the previous part, if we set g ě 4|V |2|V |`2|E|, then for all i P V 12 , f2piq ď 1{2p1{|V |q|V |.
Hence, for i P V 12 , f1piq ` 2f2piq ď 1, which means that all the nodes in V 12 will be placed below
the line L3. Therefore, if we set g ě 4|V |2|V |`2|E|, then we will get an embedding as depicted
in Fig. 7.3. Note that a polynomial number of bits suffices for g.
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Notice that if ~c is a “good” vector, then so is ~c ` ~ in which ~ is a vector with very small
Euclidean norm. Hence, we can always find a “good” vector ~c which results in a X-embedding
in general position. 
Using Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, we are now able to prove that for any 3-connected graph G such
that all the weights are ˘1, the DBCP problem has a solution for cp “ 0 and cs “ 1. The idea
of the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.1, however, we need to use Lemma 7.2 to find a
desirable partition pV 11 , V 12q and then use this partition to find an embedding with properties as
described in Lemma 7.3. By using this embedding, we can show that in every partition that we
obtain by the approach in the proof of Lemma 7.1, if u and v are in Vi, so is a path between u
and v. This implies then that GrV1s and GrV2s are connected. So we can use similar arguments
as in the proof of Lemma 7.1 to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7.5. If G is 3-connected, @i, ppiq “ ˘1, and |V | ” 0pmod 4q, then there exists a
solution to the DBCP problem with ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0 and |V1| “ |V2|. If |V | ” 2pmod 4q, then
there is a solution with ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0 and |V1| “ |V2| ` 2. Moreover, this partition can be
found in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that |V | ” 0pmod 4q; the proof for the case |V | ” 2pmod 4q is similar. Using
Lemma 7.2, we can find tu, v, wu P V and a partition pV 11 , V 12q of V with properties described
in the Lemma. Set X “ tu, v, wu. Using Lemma 7.3, we can find a convex X-embedding of G
in general position with properties described in the Lemma as depicted in Fig. 7.3. The rest
of the proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 7.1. We consider again a circle C around
fpuq, fpvq, fpwq in R2 as shown in Fig. 7.3. Also consider a directed line L tangent to the circle
C at point A. If we project the nodes of G onto the line L, this time the order of the nodes
projection gives an st-numbering between the first and the last node only if u and v are the first
and last node. However, if we set V1 to be the |V |{2 nodes whose projections come first and V2
are the |V |{2 nodes whose projections come last, then GrV1s and GrV2s are both connected even
when u and v are not the first and last nodes. The reason lies on the special embedding that we
considered here. Assume for example w and v are the first and the last projected nodes, and V1
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and V2 are set of the |V |{2 nodes which projections come first and last, respectively. Two cases
might happen:
(i) If u,w P V1 and v P V2, then since tu,wu P E, both GrV1s and GrV2s are connected because
of the properties of the embedding.
(ii) If w P V1 and u, v P V2, since |V 12 | ď |V |{2 and |V2| “ |V |{2, then either V2 “ V 12 or
V2 X V 11 ‰ H. If V2 “ V 12 , and hence V1 “ V 11 then there is nothing to prove. So assume
there is a node z P V2 X V 11 . From the properties of the embedding, the triangle tz, u, vu
contains all the nodes of V 12 . Since tz, u, vu P V2, and V2 contains all the nodes that are
on a same side of a halfplane, we should also have V 12 Ă V2. Now, from the properties
of the embedding, it is easy to see that every node in V2 has a path either to u or v.
Since V 12 Ă V2, there is also a path between u and v. Thus, GrV2s is connected. From the
properties of the embedding, GrV1s is connected as before.
The rest of the proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 7.1. We move L from being
tangent at point A to point B (AB is a diameter of the circle C) and consider the resulting
partition. Notice that if at point A, ppV1q ą 0, then at point B since V1 and V2 completely
switch places compared to the partition at point A, ppV1q ă 0. Hence, as we move L from being
tangent at point A to point B and keep it tangent to the circle, in the resulted partitions, ppV1q
goes from some positive value to a negative value. Notice that the partition pV1, V2q changes
only if L passes a point D on the circle such that at D, L is perpendicular to a line that connects
fpiq to fpjq for i, j P V . Now, since the embedding is in general position, there are exactly two
points on every line that connects two points fpiq and fpjq, so V1 changes at most by one node
leaving V1 and one node entering V1. Hence, ppV1q changes by either ˘2 or 0 value at each
change. Now, since |V | ” 0pmod 4q, ppV1q has an even value in all the resulting partitions.
Therefore, as we move L from being tangent at point A to point B, there should be a point D
such that in the resulted partition ppV1q “ ppV2q “ 0.

It is easy to check for a 3-connected graph G, by using the same approach as in the proof
of Lemma 7.1 and Theorem 7.5, that even when the weights are arbitrary (not necessarily ˘1)
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and also ppV q ‰ 0, we can still find a connected partition pV1, V2q for G such that |ppV1q ´
ppV q{2|, |ppV1q ´ ppV q{2| ď maxiPV |ppiq| and |V1| “ |V2|.
Corollary 7.1. If G is 3-connected, then the DBCP problem (with arbitrary p, and not neces-
sarily satisfying ppV q “ 0) has a solution for cp “ maxiPV |ppiq| and cs “ 1. Moreover, this
solution can be found in polynomial time.
7.4.2 2-Connected Graphs
We first define a pseudo-path between two nodes in a graph as below. The definition is inspired
by the definition of the st-numbering.
Definition 7.3. A pseudo-path between nodes u and v in G “ pV,Eq, is a sequence of nodes
v1, . . . , vt such that if v0 “ u and vt`1 “ v, then for any 1 ď i ď t, vi has neighbors vj and vk
such that j ă i ă k. Note that the pseudo-path does not include the ending points u and v.
Using the pseudo-path notion, in the following lemma we show that if G is 2-connected and
has a separation pair such that none of the resulting components are too large, then the DBCP
problem always has a solution for some cp “ cs “ Op1q. The idea used in the proof of this
lemma is one of the building blocks of the proof for the general 2-connected graph case.
Lemma 7.4. Given a 2-connected graph G, if @i : ppiq “ ˘1 and G has a separation pair
tu, vu Ă V such that for every connected component Hi “ pVHi , EHiq of GrV ztu, vus, |VHi | ă
t2|V |{3u, then the DBCP problem has a solution for cp “ 1, cs “ 2, and it can be found in
Op|E|q time.
Proof. There is a separation pair tu, vu P V such that if H1, . . . ,Hk are the connected com-
ponents of Gztu, vu, for every i, |VHi | ă t2|V |{3u. Since G is 2-connected, H1, . . . ,Hk can be
represented by pseudo-paths P1, . . . , Pk between u and v. Assume P1, . . . , Pk are in increasing
order based on their lengths. We can partition the pseudo-paths into two subsets S1 and S2
such that S1 X S2 “ H, S1 Y S2 “ tP1, . . . , Pku and řPjPSi |Pj | ě r|V |{3s ´ 1 for i “ 1, 2. The
proof is very simple. Add greedily pseudo-paths in order to S1 until
ř
PjPS1 |Pj | becomes at least
r|V |{3s´1. Let S1 “ tP1, . . . , Piu, and S2 “ tPi`1, . . . , Pku. Since |Pk| ă t2|V |{3u, we have i ă k
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and S2 ‰ H. We have to show that řPjPS2 |Pj | ě r|V |{3s´1. If |Pk| ě r|V |{3s´1, then the claim
really holds. If |Pk| ă r|V |{3s´1, then |Pi| ď |Pk| ă r|V |{3s´1, and |P1|`¨ ¨ ¨`|Pi´1| ă r|V |{3s´1
implies that |Pi`1| ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` |Pk| ě r|V |{3s´ 1.
Now, if we put all the pseudo-paths in S1 back to back, they will form a longer pseudo-path
Q1 between u and v. Similarly, we can form another pseudo-path Q2 from the pseudo-paths
in S2 (Fig. 7.4a). Without loss of generality we can assume |Q1| ě |Q2|. From u, including u
itself, we count r|V |{3s of the nodes in Q1 towards v and put them in a set V 1. Without loss
of generality, we can assume ppV 1q ě 0. If ppV 1q “ 0, then pV 1, V zV 1q is a good partition and
we are done. Hence, assume ppV 1q ą 0. We keep V 1 fixed and make a new set V 2 by adding
nodes from Q1 to V
1 one by one before we get to v. If ppV 2q hits 0 as we add nodes one by
one, we stop and let V1 “ V 2 and V2 “ V zV 2, then pV1, V2q is a good partition and we are done
(Fig. 7.4b).
So, assume V 2 “ Q1 Y tuu and ppV 2q ą 0. Since |Q2 Y tvu| ě r|V |{3s, |V 2| ď t2|V |{3u. If
|V 2| ă r2|V |{3s, we add nodes from Q2 Y tvu one by one toward u until either ppV 2q “ 0 or
|V 2| “ r2|V |{3s. If we hit 0 first, or at the same time, i.e., ppV 2q “ 0 and |V 2| ď r2|V |{3s),
define V1 “ V 2ztuu; then pV1, V zV1q is a good partition (Fig. 7.4c). So assume |V 2| “ r2|V |{3s
and ppV 2q ą 0. Define V 3 “ V zV 2. Since ppV 2q ą 0 and |V 2| “ r2|V |{3s, then ppV 3q ă 0 and
|V 3| “ t|V |{3u. Also notice that V 3 Ď Q2. We consider two cases. Either |ppV 1q| ě |ppV 3q| or
|ppV 1q| ă |ppV 3q|.
If |ppV 1q| ě |ppV 3q| we start from u and pick nodes one by one from Q1 in order until we get
a subset V 11 ‰ H of V 1 such that ppV 11q “ |ppV 3q| (i.e., ppV 11 Y V 3q “ 0). Define V1 “ V 11 Y V 3.
Then ppV1q “ 0, |V1| ě |V 3| ` 1 ě r|V |{3s and |V1| ď 2t|V |{3u (note that |V1| is even since
ppV1q “ 0 and |V1| ď |V 1 Y V 3| “ t|V |{3u ` r|V |{3s). Hence, pV1, V zV1q is a good partition
(Fig. 7.4d).
If |ppV 1q| ă |ppV 3q|, the argument is similar. We can build a new set V1 by adding nodes
one by one from V 3 to V 1 until ppV1q “ 0; then |V1| ď t2|V |{3u. Hence, pV1, V zV1q is a good
partition (Fig. 7.4e). 
































Figure 7.4: Proof of Lemma 7.4.
Corollary 7.2. If G is a 2-connected series-parallel graph and @i : ppiq “ ˘1, then the DBCP
problem has a solution for cp “ 1, cs “ 2, and the solution can be found in Op|E|q time.
Proof. Every series-parallel graph G has a separation pair tu, vu such that every connected
component of GrV ztu, vus has less than t2|V |{3u nodes, and furthermore, such a separation pair
can be found in linear time. To see this, consider the derivation tree T of the construction
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of G. The root of T corresponds to G, the leaves correspond to the edges, and every internal
node i corresponds to a subgraph Gi “ pVi, Eiq that is the series or parallel composition of the
subgraphs corresponding to its children. Starting at the root of T , walk down the tree following
always the edge to the child corresponding to a subgraph with the maximum number of nodes
until the number of nodes becomes ď r2|V |{3s. Thus, we arrive at a node i of the tree such that
|Vi| ą r2|V |{3s and |Vj | ď r2|V |{3s for all children j of i. Let ui, vi be the terminals of Gi. Note
that ui, vi separate all the nodes of Gi from all the nodes that are not in Gi. Since |Vi| ą r2|V |{3s,
we have |V zVi| ă |V |{3. If Gi is the parallel composition of the graphs corresponding to the
children of i, then the separation pair tui, viu has the desired property, i.e. all the components
of GrV ztu, vus have less than t2|V |{3u nodes.
Suppose Gi is the series composition of the graphs Gj , Gk corresponding to the children j, k
of i, and let w be the common terminal of Gj , Gk; thus, Gi has terminals ui, w, and Gk has
terminals w, vi. Assume wlog that |Vj | ě |Vk|. Then r|V |{3s ă |Vj | ď r2|V |{3s. The pair tui, wu
of terminals of Gj separates all the nodes of Vjztui, wu from all the nodes of V zVj , and both
these sets have less than t2|V |{3u nodes. Thus, tui, wu has the required property. 
The graph in Figure 7.1 with s “ 1 shows that these parameters are the best possible for
series parallel graphs: if cp “ Op1q then cs must be at least 2.
To generalize Lemma 7.4 to all 2-connected graphs, we need to define the contractible
subgraph and the contraction of a given graph as below.
Definition 7.4. We say an induced subgraph H of a 2-connected graph G is contractible, if
there is a separating pair tu, vu Ă V such that H “ pVH , EHq is a connected component of
GrV ztu, vus. Moreover, if we replace H by a weighted edge e1 with weight wpe1q “ |VH | between
the nodes u and v in G to obtain a smaller graph G1, we say G is contracted to G1.
Remark 7.3. Notice that every contractible subgraph of a 2-connected graph G can also be
represented by a pseudo-path between its associated separating pair. We use this property in the
proof of Theorem 7.6.
Using the notion of the graph contraction, in the following lemma, we show that to partition
a 2-connected graph, we can reduce it to one of two cases: either G can be considered as a graph






















































Figure 7.5: Lemma 7.5.
with a set of short pseudo-paths between two nodes, or it can be contracted into a 3-connected
graph as illustrated in Fig. 7.5.
Lemma 7.5. In every 2-connected graph G “ pV,Eq, one of the following cases holds, and we
can determine which in Op|E|q time:
1. There is a separation pair tu, vu Ă V such that if H1, . . . ,Hk are the connected components
of GrV ztu, vus, for all i, |VHi | ă t2|V |{3u.
2. After a set of contractions, G can be transformed into a 3-connected graph G˚ “ pV ˚, E˚q
with weighted edges representing contracted subgraphs such that for every e˚ P E˚, wpe˚q ď
r|V |{3s´ 2.
Proof. If there is no separation pairs in G, then G is 3-connected and there is nothing left to
prove. So assume tu, vu Ă V is a separation pair and H1, . . . ,Hk are the connected components
of GrV ztu, vus. If @i, |VHi | ă t2|V |{3u, we are done. So let’s assume there is a connected
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component Hj such that |VHj | ě t2|V |{3u. Then all the other components Hi, i ‰ j, can be
contracted and represented by an edge of weight at most r|V |{3s´ 2 between u and v. Now, we
repeat the process by considering the weight of the edges in the size of each connected component
(a weighted edge can be contracted again as part of a new connected component and its weight
will be added to the total number of nodes in that connected component). An example for each
case is shown in Fig. 7.5 for q “ 3. We can find either a suitable separation pair as in case 1 or
a suitable contracted graph G˚ as in case 2 in linear time using the Hopcroft-Tarjan algorithm
for finding the 3-connected components [84]. 
Definition 7.5. In a graph G˚ with weighted edges representing contracted subgraphs, define
the weight for a subset of nodes U˚ Ă V ˚ as wpU˚q “ wpG˚rU˚sq :“ |U˚| `řePG˚rU˚swpeq.
The following lemma strengthens and extends Lemma 7.2 to weighted graphs.
Lemma 7.6. If G˚ “ pV ˚, E˚q is a 3-connected graph obtained after a set of contractions on
G such that for every e˚ P E˚, wpe˚q ď r|V |{3s´ 2, then there exists a set tu, v, wu P V ˚ and a
partition of V ˚ into pV1˚ , V2˚ q such that:
1. V1˚ X V2˚ “ H and V1˚ Y V2˚ “ V ˚,
2. G˚rV1˚ s and G˚rV2˚ s are connected,
3. tu,wu, tv, wu P E˚,
4. w P V1˚ , u, v P V2˚ , and u, v are not cutpoints of G˚rV2˚ s,
5. wpV2˚ q ď t|V |{3u` 1.
Moreover, such a partition and tu, v, wu can be found in Op|E|q time.
Proof. If G˚ has a triangle tu, v, wu then since G˚ is 3-connected, V2˚ “ tu, vu and V1˚ “ V ˚zV2˚
is a good partition. So assume G˚ is a triangle-free graph and therefore |V ˚| ą 3. Using the
algorithm presented in [46], we can find a non-separating ear decomposition G˚ “ P0˚ YP1˚ ¨ ¨ ¨Y
Pk˚ . A property of their construction that we will use is that if |Pi˚ | ą 3, then each internal node
of Pi˚ has degree two in Gi˚ .
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Consider a (triangle-free) counterexample graph G˚ and its non-separating ear decomposi-
tion. We will show a series of properties for the graph and its decomposition, leading eventually
to a contradiction.
Claim 1. For any 0 ď i ă k, if Gi˚ has two adjacent degree-2 nodes, then wpGi˚ q ď t2|V |{3u. In
particular, wpP0˚ q ď t2|V |{3u, and if |Pi˚ | ą 3 then wpGi˚ q ď t2|V |{3u.
Proof. Suppose that wpGi˚ q ě t2|V |{3u ` 1 and that Gi˚ has two adjacent degree-2 nodes w, v.
Since G˚ is 3-connected, w and v are adjacent respectively to some nodes u, z of Gi˚ . Note that
u ‰ z because G˚ does not have a triangle. If u is not a cutpoint of Gi˚ , set V1˚ “ Gi˚ ztvu and
V2˚ “ V ˚zV1˚ . From the properties of the non-separating ear decomposition, it is easy to see that
pV1˚ , V2˚ q is a good partition: GrV1˚ s is connected, since Gi˚ is biconnected, GrV2˚ s is connected
since Gi˚ is connected, u, v are not cutpoints of GrV2˚ s, and |V2˚ | ď |V | ´ t2|V |{3u “ r|V |{3s.
Otherwise, if u is a cutpoint of Gi˚ , let H
˚ be the connected component of Gi˚ ztuu that contains
node z. Set V2˚ “ H˚ Y tu, vu and V1˚ “ V ˚zV1˚ . It is easy to see again that this is a good
partition. Notice that since G˚ztu, vu is connected, it follows that G˚rV1˚ s is connected.
The nodes of P0˚ have degree 2 in G0˚ , hence the claim holds for P0˚ , and more generally for
any i such that |Pi˚ | ą 3, since the internal nodes of Pi˚ have degree 2 in Gi˚ . ˝
We consider now the first ear P1˚ and the corresponding graph G1˚ .
Claim 2. G1˚ consists of three parallel disjoint paths of length at least 3 between two nodes, and
wpG1˚q ď t2|V |{3u.
Proof. Suppose first that |P1˚ | “ 3, and let P1˚ “ u,w, v. At least one of the two u ´ v paths
of the cycle P0˚ has weight at most wpP0˚ q{2` 1. Let V2˚ be this path and V1˚ “ V ˚zV2˚ . Since
wpP0˚ q ď t2|V |{3u, it follows that wpV2˚ q ď t|V |{3u`1. Clearly GrV1˚ s and GrV2˚ s are connected,
and all the desired properties are satisfied, so this is a good partition.
Therefore, |P1˚ | ą 3. All the internal nodes of P1˚ have degree 2. By Claim 1, wpG1˚q ď
t2|V |{3u, and G1˚ consists of three disjoint paths between two nodes x, y, the endpoints of the
ear P1˚ . If one of the paths is an edge px, yq, then let Q be the lighter of the other two paths.
Set w “ x, u “ y, let v be the node of Q adjacent to x, V2˚ “ Qztxu, and V1˚ “ V ˚zV2˚ ; it is
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easy to see that this is a good partition. If one of the paths has length 2, then let Q again be
the lighter of the other two paths. Setting u “ x, v “ y, w the internal node of Q, V2˚ “ Q,
V1˚ “ V ˚zV2˚ gives a good partition. Note that wpQq ď pwpG1˚q` 1q{2 ď pt2|V |{3u` 1q{2, hence
wpQq ď r|V |{3s.
We conclude that G1˚ satisfies the claim. ˝
Thus G1˚ consists of three paths of length at least 3 between two nodes x, y, and wpG1˚q ď
t2|V |{3u. We consider now the next ear P2˚ .
Claim 3. |P2˚ | ą 3 and wpG2˚q ď t2|V |{3u.
Proof. Suppose that |P2˚ | “ 3 and let P2˚ “ u,w, v. Let R1, R2 be two disjoint paths in G1˚
connecting u and v, and assume without loss of generality that wpR2q ď wpR1q. Set V2˚ “ R2
and V1˚ “ V ˚zV2˚ . Note that every degree-2 node of G1˚ ´ R2 has an edge to G1˚ , and if x or
y is not in R2 then it is adjacent to at least one degree-2 node of G1˚ ´ R2. Hence GrV2˚ s is
connected. Also, wpR2q ď wpG1˚q{2 ď |V |{3.
We conclude that |P2˚ | ą 3, and hence by Claim 1, wpG2˚q ď t2|V |{3u. ˝
We can finish now the proof of the lemma. G1˚ consists of three paths of length at least 3
between two nodes x, y. Since |P2˚ | ą 3, all internal nodes of P2˚ have degree 2 in G2˚ . The
endpoints of the path P2˚ are either internal nodes of different paths of G1˚ (in which case G2˚ is
homeomorphic to K4, the complete graph on 4 nodes), or they both lie on one of the three paths
of G1˚ (either or both endpoints may coincide with the degree-3 nodes x, y of G1˚). The graph
G2˚ is a planar graph in either case. Consider a planar embedding of G2˚ . It has four faces. The
sum of the weights of the four faces is 2wpG2˚q ` 4 (every edge is counted twice and every node
is counted as many times as its degree). Therefore at least one of the faces has weight at most
wpG2˚q{2 ` 1 ď p|V |{3q ` 1. Let C be the bounding cycle of such a face. If the cycle C has a
chord (the chord of course must be embedded outside the face), then let pw, uq be a chord such
that one of the paths of C connecting w to u is chordless, let R be this path,and let v be its
node adjacent to w. Set V2˚ “ Rztwu and V1˚ “ V ˚zV2˚ . Then wpV2˚ q ď t|V |{3u, and it is easy
to check also that GrV1˚ s is connected. If C is chordless, then let u,w, v be three consecutive
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nodes of C. Set V2˚ “ Cztwu and V1˚ “ V ˚zV2˚ . Again, it is easy to check that the partition
satisfies the required properties of the lemma.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Using Lemma 7.5, then Lemma 7.4, and the idea of the proof for Theorem 7.5, we can prove
that when G is 2-connected and all ppiq “ ˘1, the DBCP problem has a solution for cp “ 1 and
cs “ 2. We find a suitable convex embedding of the 3-connected graph G˚ using Lemma 7.6 and
Lemma 7.3, and then embed the nodes of the contracted pseudo-paths appropriately along the
segments corresponding to the weighted edges. Some care is needed to carry out the argument
as in the proof for Theorem 7.5, since as the line tangent to the circle rotates, the order of the
projections of many nodes may change at once, namely the nodes on an edge perpendicular to
the rotating line.
Theorem 7.6. If G is 2-connected, @i, ppiq “ ˘1, then the DBCP problem has a solution for
cp “ 1 and cs “ 2. Moreover, this solution can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Using Lemma 7.5, we consider two cases:
(i) There is a separation pair tu, vu P V such that if H1, . . . ,Hk are the connected components
of Gztu, vu, for all i, |VHi | ă t2|V |{3u. In this case Lemma 7.4 proves the theorem.
(ii) After a set of contractions, G can be transformed into a 3-connected graph G˚ “ pV ˚, E˚q
with weighted edges such that for any edge e˚ P E˚, wpe˚q ď r|V |{3s´ 2. In this case the
proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.5. Notice that if G˚ contains a triangle then the
proof is much simpler as in the proof of Lemma 7.1 but here to avoid repetition, we use
the approach in the proof of Theorem 7.5 and prove the theorem once for all cases of G˚.
Using Lemma 7.6, we can find tu, v, wu P V ˚ and a partition pV1˚ , V2˚ q of V ˚ with properties
described in the lemma. Set X “ tu, v, wu. Using Lemma 7.3, G˚ has a convex X-
embedding in general position, f˚ : V ˚ Ñ R2, as described in the lemma and depicted in
Fig. 7.3. Now, from this embedding, we get a convex X-embedding f : V Ñ R2 for G
as follows. For any i P V X V ˚, fpiq “ f˚piq. For any edge ti, ju P E˚ such that ti, ju
represents an induced subgraph of G, we represent it by a pseudo-path P of G between
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i and j and place the nodes of P in order on random places on the line segment that
connects fpiq to fpjq. If the edge ti, ju P E˚ is between a node in V1˚ and a node in V2˚
and represents a pseudo-path P in G , we place the nodes in P in order on random places
on the segment that connects fpiq to fpjq but above the line L1. Hence, by this process,
we get a convex X-embedding for G which is in general position (almost surely) except
for the nodes that are part of a pseudo-path. From Lemma 7.3, the embedding has the
following property. Consider any line on the plane, and the subset of nodes whose points
lie on the same side of the line. If the subset has size at least t|V |{3u` 1 then it induces a
connected subgraph of G.
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.5. We consider again a circle C
around fpuq, fpvq, fpwq in R2 as shown in Fig. 7.3. Also consider a directed line L tangent
to the circle C at point A and project the nodes of G onto the line L (we consider a line
such that the projections are distinct). We label nodes based on their projection order
on the line L from left to right from 1pLq to |V |pLq. For each t “ 1, . . . , |V |, let V pLqptq “
t1pLq, . . . , tpLqu denote the set of the first t nodes in this ordering. Since the embedding f
has the properties described in Lemma 7.6 and 7.3, for all t|V |{3u` 1 ď t ď r2|V |{3s´ 1,
if we set V1 “ V pLqptq and V2 “ V zV1, then GrV1s and GrV2s are both connected. Define
V 11 “ V pLqpt|V |{3uq and V 12 “ V zV pLqpr2|V |{3sq, i.e., V 11 contains the first t|V |{3u nodes and
V 12 the last t|V |{3u nodes in the ordering. If ppV 11qppV 12q ě 0, then there must exist an index
j with t|V |{3u ď j ď r2|V |{3s such that ppV pLqpjqq “ řji“1 ppipLqq “ 0. Consequently,
there is an index t such that t|V |{3u ` 1 ď t ď r2|V |{3s ´ 1 and |ppV pLqptqq| ď 1: if
j “ t|V |{3u then let t “ j ` 1, if j “ r2|V |{3s then t “ j ´ 1, and otherwise let t “ j.
Hence, V1 “ V pLqptq “ t1pLq, . . . , tpLqu and V2 “ V zV1 is a good partition. Therefore, if
ppV 11qppV 12q ě 0 then we can obtain a good partition. We will show that there is a line
such that ppV 11qppV 12q ě 0.
Assume without loss of generality that in the initial position of the line, ppV 11q ą 0 and
ppV 12q ă 0. As we move L from being tangent at point A to point B where AB is a diameter
of the circle C, and consider the resulting partition at point B, since V 11 and V 12 completely
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switch places compared to the partition at point A, at point B we have ppV 11q ă 0 and
ppV 12q ą 0. Hence, as we move L from being tangent at point A to point B and keep
it tangent to the circle, in the resulting partitions, ppV 11q goes at some point from some
positive value to a nonpositive value. Notice that the ordering of the projections on the
line changes only if L passes a point D on the circle such that at D, L is perpendicular to
a line that connects fpiq to fpjq for i, j P V ˚; then the order of i and j is switched, and if
pi, jq is an edge of G˚ then also the ordering of the nodes in the corresponding pseudopath
is reversed. Note that all of these affected nodes are consecutive in the ordering. If ppV 11q
changes then V 11 must contain at least one of the affected nodes, and similarly for ppV 12q.
So assume ppV 11q ą 0 in a projection on a line Lb slightly before a perpendicular point
and ppV 11q ď 0 in a resulting projection on a line La slightly after a perpendicular point.
Define V 11b :“ t1pLbq, . . . , t|V |{3upLbqu, V 12b :“ tp|V | ´ t|V |{3u ` 1qpLbq, . . . , |V |pLbqu, V 11a :“
t1pLaq, . . . , t|V |{3upLaqu, and V 12a :“ tp|V |´ t|V |{3u`1qpLaq, . . . , |V |pLaqu. So ppV 11bq ą 0 and
ppV 11aq ď 0.
If ppV 11bqppV 12bq ě 0, as we argued previously, we can find a good partition pV1, V2q such
that V 11b Ď V1 and V 12b Ď V2, and we are done. So assume ppV 11bq ą 0 and ppV 12bq ă 0. Since
for any e˚ P E˚, wpe˚q ď r|V |{3s´2, the ordering of the nodes based on the projections on
lines Lb and La is different for at most r|V |{3s consecutive nodes (the ordering of at most
r|V |{3s consecutive nodes reverses as we move from Lb to La). Since V 11b ‰ V 11a (recall
ppV 11bq ą 0 and ppV 11aq ď 0), the set of reversed nodes includes one of the first t|V |{3u
nodes in the ordering, hence it cannot extend to include also one of the last t|V |{3u nodes;
therefore ppV 12aq “ ppV 12bq ă 0. Thus, ppV 11aqppV 12aq ě 0 and hence, as we argued before,
there is a good partition pV1, V2q such that V 11a Ď V1 and V 12a Ď V2.
Regarding the computation of a good partition, after we compute the contracted graph
G˚ and its convex embedding, the rest of the computation can be easily carried out in
Op|V |2 log |V |q time.

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Similar to Corollary 7.1, the approach used in the proof of Theorem 7.6, can also be used for
the case when the weights are arbitrary (not necessarily ˘1) and ppV q ‰ 0. It is easy to verify
that in this case, if G is 2-connected, the DBCP problem has a connected partition pV1, V2q such
that |ppV1q ´ ppV q{2|, |ppV2q ´ ppV q{2| ď maxjPV |ppjq| and |V1|, |V2| ě r|V |{3s.
Corollary 7.3. If G is 2-connected, then the DBCP problem (with general p and not necessarily
satisfying ppV q “ 0) has a solution for cp “ maxjPV |ppjq| and cs “ 2. Moreover, this solution
can be found in polynomial time.
7.5 Graphs with Two Types of Nodes
Assume G is a connected graph with nodes colored either red (R Ď V ) or blue (B Ď V ). Let
|V | “ n, |R| “ nr, and |B| “ nb. If G is 3-connected, set ppiq “ 1 if i P R and ppiq “ ´1 if
i P B. Corollary 7.1 implies then that there is always a connected partition pV1, V2q of V that
splits both the blue and the red nodes evenly (assuming nr and nb are both even), i.e., such that
|V1| “ |V2|, |R X V1| “ |R X V2|, and |B X V1| “ |B X V2|. (If nr and/or nb are not even, then
one side will contain one more red or blue node.)
Corollary 7.4. Given a 3-connected graph G with nodes colored either red (R Ď V ) or blue
(B Ď V ). There is always a partition pV1, V2q of V such that GrV1s and GrV2s are connected,
|V1| “ |V2|, |RX V1| “ |RX V2|, and |B X V1| “ |B X V2| (assuming |R| and |B| are both even).
Such a partition can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that nr ě nb and let nr´nb “ 2t and nr`nb “ n “ 2m.
Set ppiq “ 1 for i P R and ppiq “ ´1 for i P B. Then ppV q “ 2t. From the equations, we have
nr “ m` t and nb “ m´ t.
From Corollary 7.1 we can find a partition pV1, V2q such that |V1| “ |V2| and |ppV1q ´
ppV q{2|, |ppV1q ´ ppV q{2| ď 1. Let r1 “ |RX V1| and b1 “ |B X V1|. We have r1 ` b1 “ n{2 “ m
and t ´ 1 ď r1 ´ b1 ď t ` 1. Therefore, pm ` tq{2 ´ p1{2q ď r1 ď pm ` tq{2 ` p1{2q. Since
r1 is an integer and nr “ m ` t is even, it follows that r1 “ pm ` tq{2 “ nr{2. Hence,
b1 “ pm´ tq{2 “ nb{2. Therefore, V2 also contains nr{2 red nodes and nb{2 blue nodes. 
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If G is only 2-connected, we may not always get a perfect partition. Assume wlog that nr ď
nb. If for every v P R and u P B, we set ppvq “ 1 and ppuq “ ´nr{nb, Corollary 7.3 implies that
there is always a connected partition pV1, V2q of V such that both |p|RXV1|´nr{nb|BXV1|q| ď 1
and |p|RX V2| ´ nr{nb|BX V2|q| ď 1, and also maxt |V1||V2| ,
|V2|
|V1|u ď 2. Thus, the ratio of red to blue
nodes in each side Vi differs from the ratio nr{nb in the whole graph by Op1{nq. Hence if the
numbers of red and blue nodes are ωp1q, then the two types are presented in both sides of the
partition in approximately the same proportion as in the whole graph.
Corollary 7.5. Given a 2-connected graph G with nodes colored either red (R Ď V ) or blue
(B Ď V ), and assume wlog |R| ď |B|. We can always find in polynomial time a partition pV1, V2q
of V such that GrV1s and GrV2s are connected, |V1|, |V2| ě r|V |{3s, and the ratio of red to blue
nodes in each side Vi differs from the ratio |R|{|B| in the whole graph by Op1{nq.
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7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied power grid Islanding problem. We modeled it as the problem of
partitioning a graph into two connected subgraphs that satisfy simultaneouly two objectives:
(1) they balance the supply and demand within each side of the partition (or more generally,
for the case of ppV q ‰ 0, they split approximately equally the excess supply/demand between
the two sides), and (2) the two sides are large and have roughly comparable size (they are both
Ωp|V |q). We showed that for 2-connected graphs it is always possible to achieve both objectives
at the same time, and for 3-connected graphs there is a partition that is essentially perfectly
balanced in both objectives. Furthermore, these partitions can be computed in polynomial time.
This is a paradigmatic bi-objective balancing problem. We observed how it can be easily used
to find a connected partition of a graph with two types of nodes that is balanced with respect
to the sizes of both types. Overall, we believe that the novel techniques used in this chapter can
be applied to partitioning heterogeneous networks in various contexts.
There are several interesting further directions that suggest themselves. First, extend the
theory and algorithms to find doubly balanced connected partitions to more than two parts.
Second, even considering only the supply/demand objective, does the analogue of the results
of Lova´z and Gyori [80, 99] for the connected k-way partitioning of k-connected graphs with
respect to size (which corresponds to ppiq “ 1) extend to the supply/demand case (ppiq “ ˘1)
for k ą 3? And is there a polynomial algorithm that constructs such a partition? Finally, extend
the results of Section 7.5 to graphs with more than two types of nodes, that is, can we partition
(under suitable conditions) a graph with several types of nodes to two (or more) large connected
subgraphs that preserve approximately the diversity (the proportions of the types) of the whole
population?
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Chapter 8
Generating Synthetic Power Grids
Addressing most of the challenges facing the power grids requires real grid topologies with real
geographical coordinates. For example, to study the vulnerabilities of the grid to natural disas-
ters one needs to match the grid map with the paths of hurricanes or water flood maps. Similarly,
incorporating renewable energy resources in the grid requires the approximate locations of the
grid lines and buses to be matched with the wind maps. However, in order to avoid exposing
vulnerabilities, topologies of the power transmission networks and particularly the locations of
the substations and the lines are usually not publicly available or are hard to obtain.
There are only very limited test cases and real-world power grid data sets that are publicly
and freely available. These include the IEEE test cases [1], the National Grid UK [2], the Polish
grid [4], and an approximate model of the European interconnected system [162]. To the best
of our knowledge, among these, National Grid UK is the only publicly available dataset with
geographical locations. Even if the data was available, it would be unwise to publish vulnerability
results which are based on real topologies, due to the enormous cost of grid enhancements. On
the other hand, it was recently shown that simple random graph models cannot be used to
generate grids with appropriate structural and spatial characteristics [52]. Therefore, there is a
growing interest in generating synthetic power grids [11,33,34,75].
Motivated by this need, we thoroughly study the structural properties of real power grids
and introduce the Network Imitating Method Based on LEarning (NIMBLE) for generating
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Figure 8.1: The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) regional entities and
the National Electricity Transmission Grid of Mexico (NETGM). Different reliability corporati-
ons/councils are marked with different colors.
synthetic networks with similar structural and spatial properties. We focus on the transmission
networks of the North American and Mexican power grids (see Fig. 8.1) using data that we
obtained from the Platts Geographic Information System (GIS) [3] (Similar techniques could
be applied to industry-grade data sets, if they become publicly available). In particular, we
consider the Western Interconnection (WI), one of the two major interconnections in North
America, which includes the Western Electricity Coordinating Council in the United States
(WECC) and Canada (WECCC).
We evaluate the networks’ structural properties under five metrics: average path length (L),
clustering coefficient (C), degree distribution of the nodes, number of line intersections (X ),
and the length distribution of the lines. For each node i with degree di, at most dipdi ´ 1q{2
lines can exist between its neighbors. The clustering coefficient is the fraction of these allowable
lines that actually exist, averaging over all the nodes. The average path length is defined as the
number of lines in the shortest path between two nodes, averaged over all pairs of vertices. The
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first three metrics are very common [15, 17, 23, 42, 52, 53, 153]. The importance of the number
of line intersections in generating synthetic power grids was first discussed by Birchfield, et
al. [34]. However, to the best of our knowledge, the length distribution of the lines has not been
thoroughly studied before in power grids. The line lengths are particularly important in power
grids, since the physical properties of a line (e.g., admittance and type) are directly correlated
with its length [76], and hence, directly impact the grid’s structural properties.
To compare the robustness of the WI and the generated network to failures, we simulate
cascading failures initiated by double line failures as well as circular area failures (as failures
caused by natural disasters), and compute the yield (the ratio between the demand supplied at
the end of a cascade and the original demand), number of failed lines, and number of connected
components at the end of the cascade in these networks. Cascading failures in networks and
power grids and their robustness have been widely studied [21, 29, 38, 42, 53, 57, 60, 61, 82, 105,
156,159]. In this chapter, we use the cascade model due to line overloads in power grids with a
deterministic outage rule as provided in Chapter 3. We show that the generated networks have
similar structural and spatial properties as well the same level of robustness to failures to the
WI.
8.1 Related work
The structural properties of various power grids (e.g., in North America, some European coun-
tries, and Iran) were studied before [53, 56, 104, 118, 124, 153]. Most of these studies considered
one or two properties (e.g., average degree, degree distribution, average path length, and cluste-
ring coefficient) and computed it in a given power grid. In some cases a certain class of graphs
was suggested as a good representative of a power grid network, based on one or two structural
properties [15,17,23,42,52,53,153]. For example, Watts and Strogatz [153] suggested the small-
world graph as a good representative, based on the shortest path lengths between nodes and
the clustering coefficient of the nodes. Baraba´si and Albert [23] showed that scale-free graphs
are better representatives based on the degree distribution. However, by comparing the WI
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with these models, Cotilla-Sanchez, et al. [52] showed that none of them can represent the WI
properly.
More detailed models that are specifically tailored to the power grid characteristics were
proposed by Wang, et al. [152] and also by Schultz, et al. [122] but they did not consider the
spatial distribution of the nodes and the length distribution of the lines. The spatial distribution
of the nodes is correlated with the length of the lines, and as mentioned above, it is important
to consider line lengths when designing a method for synthetic power grid generation.
While there are several models for generating spatial networks [24, 101, 157], most of them
were not designed to generate networks with properties similar to power grid networks’. In very
recent novel papers [34,75], a synthetic network based on the locations of the cities and the power
plants in Texas was generated. Despite using the geographical locations, no comparisons to the
real grid in Texas (neither topological nor performance wise) were provided by the authors. The
generated networks, however, was shown to have similar topological (e.g., degree distribution)
properties to the WI. In a follow up work [33], more engineering properties (e.g., transformer
and generator parameters) of power grids were studied in detail.
The novel methods in [34, 75] consider more engineering details than our work but do not
provide a general framework to generate multiple synthetic power grids. Our work is the first
to consider the spatial distribution of the nodes (buses) in power grids and to provide a ge-
neral framework for generating multiple synthetic networks with realistic structural properties.
Moreover, this is the first time that the power flows and vulnerability against cascading failures
are considered in evaluating a synthetic power grid. In our future work, we plan to incorporate




We obtained the topological network of the WI from the Platts GIS [3] and conducted longitude-
latitude to planar px, yq coordinate transformation, using the great-circle distance method. We
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Figure 8.2: The average residential power usage versus the number of customers in the US. We
observed that average residential power usage (obtained from EIA website [6]) is directly related
to the population (the slope of the regression line is 9.51). We used this relationship to estimate
the demand at each city based on its population.
extracted the coordinates of the buses/substations from the endpoint coordinates of the lines.
We then used the geographical coordinates of the substations and the lines to construct the
graph with nodes and edges that represent substations and lines, respectively. We used the map
of reliability coorporations/councils boundaries to divide the graph into regional entities (See
Fig. 8.1).
The GIS does not provide the reactance values of the lines. The reactance of a line depends
on its geometrical properties and there is a linear relation between the line’s length and reac-
tance: the longer the line is, the larger its reactance. Thus, we assumed that all lines have the
same physical properties (other than length) and used the length to determine the reactance.
Moreover, since the power flow solution is scale invariant of the reactance values, we simply use
the length of each line as its reactance. We consider the same for the lines in the generated
networks.
To estimate the demands and supplies, we used the cities’ populations and the power plants’
capacities, as well as their locations. The locations and populations of the cities in the U.S. and
Canada are publicly available. We obtained the information about the locations of the power
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Figure 8.3: The degree distributions of the nodes and length distributions of the lines in the WI
and three generated networks. (a) The degree distributions of the nodes in log-log scale. In this
figure, the slope of the fitted linear regression line to the distributions’ tail is ζ “ ´3.49 for the
WI and ζ « ´4.7 for all the generated networks. The Kolmogrov-Smirnov statistic between the
degree distributions in the WI and the generated networks is DKS « 0.05. (b) The log length
distributions of the lines (in km). In this figure, DKL « 0.1 between the length distributions of
the lines in the WI and the generated networks.
plants and their capacities from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) website [6]. We
observed that the average residential power usage (obtained from EIA website [6]) is directly
related to the population (see Fig. 8.2). By modeling this relationship using linear regression, we
estimated the power demand at each city based on its population. Once we computed the total
demand, we assigned the power generation level to each power plant according to its capacity
to supply the demand.
In the WI, we assigned each city (along with its demand) or power plant (along with its
supply) to its closest node.






Figure 8.4: NIMBLE’s steps for generating a synthetic grid similar to the WI. (a) In the first
step, it picks the locations of the cities and power plants as a subset of the nodes (buses) in the
generated network. (b) In the second step, by estimating the spatial density of the nodes in
the WI using GMM, it adds more nodes to the generated network to make the total number of
nodes equal to the one in the WI. (c) In the third step, it finds an spanning tree of the nodes by
connecting each node to its closest node with a higher index to ensure the connectivity of the
network. (d) In the last step, it adds more lines to the network to increase the robustness of the
generated network and adjust its properties (e.g., total number of lines and degree distribution)
to resemble those of the WI. It does it by repeatedly selecting a low degree node in a dense area
and connecting it to a high degree node which is also nearby.
8.2.2 Degree and line length distributions comparison
To compare the degree distributions of the nodes in the WI and the generated networks, we use
the Kolmogrov-Smirnov (DKS) statistic [115]. If P pxq and Qpxq are two Cumulative Distribution
Functions (CDFs), the KS statistic between these two is DKS “ maxx |P pxq ´Qpxq|.
To measure the similarity between the length distributions of the lines in a given network
and a generated network, we use the Kullback-Leibler (DKL) divergence. Specifically, the KL-
divergence of distribution q from p, denoted by DKLpp}qq, is a measure of the information lost
when q is used to approximate p: DKLpp}qq “
ş8
´8 ppxq ln ppxqqpxqdx.
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8.2.3 Cascading failures model
We follow the cascade model due to line overloads in power grids with a deterministic outage
rule as described in Chapter 3: namely, a line e “ tu, vu fails when the magnitude |fe| of
the flow on that line exceeds its capacity ce. The line flow capacities are estimated as ce “
p1 ` αqmaxt|fe|, fu, where f is the median of the initial magnitude of line flows and α is the
lines’ factor of safety. For comparison purposes, we select the median of the initial magnitude
of line flows in the WI as the minimum capacity for the lines in the generated networks as well.
We use yield (the ratio between the demand supplied at the end of a cascade and the original
demand), number of failed lines, and number of connected components at the end of the cascade
to evaluate its severity.
8.2.4 Computation
For analyzing the power grid topological properties, we used the igraph library in R [10]. This
library provides a collection of network analysis tools.
To estimate the KL-divergence between distributions, we used the FNN library in R which
utilizes the method introduced by Boltz, et al. [35] for estimating the KL-divergence between
two distributions using their samples.
For fitting a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) (see Section 8.3), we used the mclust library
in R [72]. This library uses the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm to fit a GMM and
provides the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for the selected number of clusters.
8.3 NIMBLE
The structural properties of the WI are shown in Fig. 8.3 and Table 8.1. The main observations
are: (i) the degree distributions of power grids are very similar to those of scale-free networks,
but grids have less degree 1 and 2 nodes and do not have very high degree nodes (e.g., Fig. 8.3a),
(ii) it is inefficient and unsafe for the power grids to include very long lines (e.g., Fig. 8.3b), and
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Table 8.1: Comparison between the structural properties of the WI and the generated networks.
Three instances of GenNet are shown to illustrate that the metric values are similar in various
generated networks. All networks have 14,430 nodes and 18,884 lines.
Networks L C ζ DKS X DKL
WI 17.44 0.048 -3.49 0 7,358 0
GenNet (1) 16.28 0.048 -4.72 0.051 12,108 0.10
GenNet (2) 16.02 0.045 -4.65 0.043 12,132 0.10
GenNet (3) 16.28 0.050 -4.66 0.052 11,145 0.10

















Figure 8.5: The relationship between the degree of a node and its average ρ with k “ 10, for
the nodes in the WI (the red line is the linear regression fit to the data points).
(iii) the average path length and the clustering coefficient demonstrate the small-world property
of power grids [153].
Based on these characteristics, we introduce the Network Imitating Method Based on LEar-
ning (NIMBLE) for generating synthetic networks similar to the real power grids. The NIMBLE
steps are summarized in Fig. 8.4.
In the first step, the NIMBLE picks the locations of the cities and power plants as a subset of
the nodes (buses) in the generated network. However, since the cities and the power plants are
usually the endpoints of the network, more nodes need to be added to the generated network
to make the total number of nodes equal to the number of nodes in a given grid (here the
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(a) WI (b) GenNet (1) (c) Gen Net (2) (d) GenNet (3)
Figure 8.6: The Western Interconnection (WI) power grid and the three generated networks
with 14,430 buses (nodes) and 18,884 lines.
WI). Notice that if the locations of the cities and power plants are not available and only the
topological properties of the given network need to be imitated, step 1 of the method can be
skipped (see the arXiv report [134], for a more general algorithm for this case).
The node (buses/substations) positions are correlated with the population and geographical
properties. Thus, the nodes can be clustered into groups based on their geographical proximity
using mixture models and in particular the Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM). Hence, in the
second step, NIMBLE uses a GMM for clustering the positions and uses the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) to find the best number of clusters (c). It obtains the mean and covariance
matrix (µj ,Σj) of the points in clusters j “ 1, . . . , c along with the categorical probability of the
clusters pi “ ppi1, . . . , picq. Then, it uses these parameters to generate more nodes with similar
spatial distribution as the nodes in a given network to make the total number of nodes equal in
the given and generated networks. For the WI, we select c “ 55 based on the BIC.
To connect the nodes, the NIMBLE takes two steps inspired by the historical evolution
of power grids. The two main design consideration of the grid are (i) connectivity and (ii)
robustness.
In order for the power grid to operate, the substations (nodes) should be connected. To
satisfy the connectivity of the generated network, in the third step, the NIMBLE connects each
node i to its closest (Euclidean distance) node j such that i ă j in order to form a spanning
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tree of the nodes. This is inspired by the way the power grids are evolved. Each new bus or
substation is connected to the closest bus and substation that already exist in the grid. Since
the cities and the power plants are usually the end points in the power grid, in the NIMBLE,
these nodes have the lowest index. At the end of this step, the network gets connected. Notice
that the resulting tree differs from the minimum spanning of the nodes since the obtained tree
depends on the order of the nodes (for more details see the arXiv report [134]).
In the last step, the NIMBLE repeatedly adds lines to the generated network to increase its
robustness and adjust its properties (e.g., total number of lines, L, and C) to resemble those of
a given network. This step is based on three observations: (i) the degree distributions of power
grids are very similar to those of scale-free networks, but grids have less degree 1 and 2 nodes
and do not have very high degree nodes (e.g., Fig. 8.3a), (ii) it is inefficient and unsafe for the
power grids to include very long lines (e.g., Fig. 8.3b), and (iii) nodes in denser areas are more
likely to have higher degrees (see Fig. 8.5). To compute the density around node i, we define ρi
as the average Euclidean distance of node i from its k nearest nodes. We select k “ 10 in this
work.
Hence, the NIMBLE repeats the following steps until the number of lines is equal to the
number of lines in the given network: (1) select a low degree node in a dense area (observations
(i) and (iii)), and (2) connect it to a high degree node which is also nearby (observations (i) and
(ii)). To select a low degree node in a dense area, the NIMBLE samples a node i from all the
degree 1 and 2 nodes with probability 9ρ´ηi , where η is a tunable parameter. To connect the
sampled node to a high degree but nearby node, the NIMBLE connects node i to node j sampled
from all other nodes with probability 9}~zi ´ ~zj}´β2 dγj , where vector ~zi is the px, yq coordinate
of the node i, and β, γ are tunable parameters. This implies that node i preferentially connects
to a high-degree node, unless the high-degree node is too far in which case it is desirable to
connect to a low-degree but nearby node (as in the preferential attachment model [23], however
distance was not considered there). For the generated networks in this chapter, we empirically
select η “ 0.5, β “ ´2.5, and γ “ 1.5.
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Figure 8.7: Power flows in the WI and the generated networks. (a) The CDF of the flows on
the lines. (b) The CDF of the top 1,000 flows on the lines. (c) The geographical locations of
the lines carrying the top 100 flows.
8.4 Topological evaluation of the generated networks
We demonstrate the performance of the NIMBLE in generating synthetic grids similar to the
WI power grid. Since our method is probabilistic, we generate three networks for evaluation
purposes to show the consistency of the generated networks’ properties. We refer to the gene-
rated networks as: GenNet (1), GenNet (2), and GenNet (3). The generated networks visually
resemble the WI very well (see Fig. 8.6).
Fig. 8.3 compares the degree distributions of the nodes and length distributions of the lines
in the WI and the generated networks. As can be seen in Fig. 8.3a, the tail of the degree
distribution in the WI follows a power-law distribution. However, following the work by Clauset,
et al. [50] and since these networks are finite, there is not enough statistical evidence to support
the power-law hypothesis. Therefore, we only use the slope (ζ) of the fitted linear regression
line to the tail distribution for comparison purposes. Table 8.1 provides a summary of the
topological properties of the WI and the generated networks. The provided results demonstrate
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Table 8.2: Statistics of the flows (MW). The backup lines are the lines that do not initially carry
any significant flow.
Networks Mean Median SD Max Backup lines
WI 282.37 98.54 488.79 13,111.68 3,558
GenNet (1) 168.93 33.32 320.93 4,777.07 3,419
GenNet (2) 153.78 29.53 295.83 6,171.67 3,464
GenNet (3) 172.27 34.71 321.12 8,867.31 3,289
that the generated networks resemble the topological properties of the WI very well. However,
the number of line intersections pX q is about 50% more in the generated networks.
8.5 Robustness evaluation of the generated networks
We use the DC power flow equations and compare the flow distribution as well as the robustness
against cascading failures in the WI and the generated networks. The power demands and
supplies are estimated based on the population of the cities and power plants’ capacities as
described in Subsection 8.2.1. The flow statistics are very similar in the generated networks and
the WI (see Table 8.2). Despite the close similarity in the flow CDFs between the WI and the
generated networks, the locations of the lines that carry the top 100 flows are uncorrelated in
all the four networks (see Fig. 8.7). This demonstrates that NIMBLE generates networks that
not only have very similar flow characteristics to the real network, but also do not reveal the
locations of the potentially vulnerable lines in the real network.
To evaluate the robustness of the generated networks compared to the WI, we study cascading
failures in these networks. As an example, the evolution of the cascade in the WI and the
generated networks is depicted in Fig. 8.8. We consider cascades initiated by double line failures
(see Fig. 8.9) and removal of all the nodes and lines in a circular area (see Figs. 8.10 and 8.11
and also Figs. 8.12 and 8.13).













Figure 8.8: The first 15 steps of the cascades in the WI and the three generated networks. In
all the networks α “ 0.2 and the cascade is initiated by a failure in the line with the highest
flow, indicated with a magenta colored point. (a) Evolution of the cascade in the WI, which
continues over 25 steps, ending with the yield = .338, number of failed lines = 3,041, and
number of connected components = 1,558. (b) Evolution of the cascade in the GenNet (1),
which continues over 15 steps, ending with the yield = .357, number of failed lines = 2,621,
and number of connected components = 1,366. (c) Evolution of the cascade in the GenNet (2),
which continues over 15 steps, ending with the yield = .257, number of failed lines = 3,573, and
number of connected components = 1,946. (d) Evolution of the cascade in the GenNet (3),
which continues over 15 steps, ending with the yield = .277, number of failed lines = 3,434, and
number of connected components = 1,889.
In Fig. 8.9, we observe that the generated networks and the WI have similar level of robus-
tness against failures in the lines that carry the highest flows (notice that as we mentioned in
Fig. 8.7 these lines are in very different locations in the four networks). Figs. 8.10 and 8.11
also suggest that if a big area in the networks fails, the WI and the generated networks on
average behave very similarly. Figs. 8.12 and 8.13 show the heatmaps of the yield for cascades
initiated by area failures in the WI and the generated networks. As can be seen, despite having
a very similar level of robustness, the generated networks do not reveal the vulnerabilities of
the WI since the vulnerable areas in the generated networks and the WI are not in one to one
correspondence.
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Figure 8.9: The severity of the cascades initiated by all possible double line failures selected
from the lines that carry the top 25 largest flows in the networks as a function of the lines’
factor of safety (α). (b) The total number of failed lines at the end of the cascade. (c) Number
of connected components at the end of the cascade. As the cascade proceeds, the networks may
get partitioned into several parts.













































































Figure 8.10: The average severity of the cascades initiated by failures in 10,000 uniformly dis-
tributed regions of radius 20 km as a function of lines’ factor of safety (α). All the nodes and
lines are removed from the initial failed area. (a) Yield. (b) The total number of failed lines at
the end of the cascade. (c) Number of connected components at the end of the cascade.
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Figure 8.11: The average severity of the cascades initiated by failures in 1,000 uniformly distri-
buted regions of radius 100 km as a function of lines’ factor of safety (α). All the nodes and lines
are removed from the initial failed area. The locations of failed areas are exactly the same in
all the four networks. (a) Yield. (b) The total number of failed lines at the end of the cascade.
(c) Number of connected components at the end of the cascade.













Figure 8.12: Yield of the cascades initiated by failures in 10000 regions of radius 20 km uniformly
distributed when α “ 0.6. The color of each point represents the yield of the cascade initiated
by the failure in the area centered at that point. The size of the failed area in the map scale is
shown by a magenta circle.













Figure 8.13: Yield of the cascades initiated by failures in 1000 regions of radius 100 km uniformly
distributed when α “ 0.6. The color of each point represents the yield of the cascade initiated
by the failure in the area centered at that point. The size of the failed area in the map scale is
shown by a magenta circle.
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8.6 Conclusion
We studied the structural and spatial properties of the WI and developed the NIMBLE for
generating synthetic power grid networks. We showed that the generated networks have similar
structural properties as well as the same level of robustness against failures to the WI. Since the
generated grids are embedded on approximately the same coordinates as the real grid, they can
provide realistic test networks to the researchers.
There are several engineering aspects of power grid networks such as line nominal voltages,
voltage and frequency stabilities, and transformer characteristics that were not considered in this
work. In a recent paper [33], statistical properties of some of the related engineering parameters
were studied in details. Incorporate these findings in our model can improve the quality of
the generated networks to the level of industrial grade data sets. Moreover, we believe that
if industrial grade data sets become available to the broad research community, the methods
developed in this chapter can be used in order to develop synthetic grids based on them.
We also believe that our approach can be extended for generating various other types of
spatially distributed networks (e.g., water and gas pipe networks).
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Chapter 9
Future Directions
In this thesis, we have explored some of the critical challenges facing power grids and introduced
new and unconventional approaches to address these challenges. Most of our results have a the-
oretical core with applications to power grids. Some algorithms we developed have applications
beyond these networks. Exploring these applications and extending some of the results in this
thesis can be of interest to researchers in power engineering as well as various other technical
fields. We summarize some of the future research ideas and directions below.
Power Grid Monitoring and Cyber Security: Optimal and robust grid monitoring and
state estimation is essential for its reliable operation and control. Almost all the aftermath
reports of recent major blackouts indicated the “lack of exact grid state awareness” as a key
factor in the inability of the control center to maintain the stability of the grid. Moreover, recent
cyber attacks on the Ukrainian grid have revealed the importance of robust grid monitoring in
the event of a cyber attack. Despite a significant amount of work that has been done to address
these issues, they require more research for development of effective state estimation methods
under critical scenarios. Some of the high level research plans in this direction are: (i) extend
the results in Chapters 5 and 6 to address challenges in optimal measurement units placement,
measurement consistency verification and false data detection, and state estimation under the
AC power flow model, (ii) develop probabilistic state estimation methods using Bayesian data
analysis techniques where the exact state of the grid is hard to estimate, and (iii) develop
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situational awareness tools based on machine learning and data analysis algorithms capable of
spatio-temporal monitoring of frequency dynamics within control areas of transmission grids for
both normal and emergency operations.
Power Grid Contingency Analysis and Control: Recent blackouts have exposed the in-
sufficiency of current protection measures and control mechanisms against failures and attacks.
Studying power grid vulnerabilities and development of sophisticated control mechanisms to
maintain its stability should be an essential part of the future research in this direction. In
particular, one can: (i) build on the work in Chapter 4 and employ both graph theory and ma-
chine learning techniques to provide efficient and tractable methods for high order contingency
analysis in power grids, (ii) extend the work in Chapter 7 for partitioning the grid into several
islands as well as adapt our work to applications beyond power grid networks such as protein-
protein interaction networks, social networks, and sensor networks, (iii) study new challenges
introduced by the energy market to power grids operation both from economical and security
points of view, (iv) study the vulnerabilities and control challenges introduced by the growth of
renewable energy resources and facilitate their deployment in power grids to reduce fossil fuels
consumption, and (v) study interdependencies between failures and cascades in power grids and
other networks (e.g., telecommunications, gas, water, and transportation network), as well as
cascades in other networked cyber-physical systems whose complexities requires interdisciplinary
collaborations.
Smart Grid: The Department of Energy (DOE) envisions that by 2030, the grid will have
evolved into an intelligent energy system, a smart grid [106]. This development will provide a set
of challenges that are completely new to the way power grids have been traditionally operating.
One of the most important promises of the smart grid–which can significantly change the picture
of the grid as we know it–is the ability of consumers to sell excess electric power (produced by
local wind turbines or solar cells) back to the grid. This ability introduces several security,
control, and pricing challenges. Moreover, sales growth of Electric Vehicles can soon change the
dynamics of the demand and supply in power grid operation. While increasing the total number
of Electric Vehicles will result in a huge load on the grid, if the charging and discharging of these
vehicles is done smartly by efficient algorithms, batteries within these vehicles can help to reduce
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the operation cost of the grid in load peak times and also facilitate incorporating of renewable
energy resources. Developing such algorithms requires more interdisciplinary research.
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